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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines consumer behavior using hypothetical and non-hypothetical 
approaches. Across the study, emphasis is made on brand awareness and Willingness-to-
Pay (WTP) measures of consumer preferences and the measurement of unobserved 
individual heterogeneity in the econometric analysis of consumer valuations. The 
methodologies used to elicit valuations and gather consumer preferences are 
hypothetical and non-hypothetical. The statistical tools used to analyze these data 
include econometric models for categorical and limited dependent variables, linear and 
non-linear random parameters models, and Latent Class Analysis (LCA). 
The first essay evaluates the effectiveness of a point-of-purchase advertising 
program conducted for two local horticultural brands. Results based on electronic 
surveys gathered before and after the program was launched suggest that the campaign 
size was not sufficient to significantly increase brand awareness and overall demand, yet 
it increased WTP by 5.5% for those consumers aware of one of the brands. A major 
factor found to influence preferences was purchase frequency, which suggests that other 
advertising methods aimed to increase buying frequency might affect demand more 
effectively. 
The second essay involved the econometric analysis of data collected using 
experimental auctions, which are often multidimensional. Panel data models commonly 
used consider bid-censoring and random effects that capture heterogeneity in the 
intercepts, but overlook heterogeneity in the coefficients. This essay compares different 
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models, and provides evidence that a Random Parameters Tobit model extends the 
measurement of heterogeneity, accounts for bid-censoring, and provides the most 
efficient and consistent estimates. When the model is applied to data collected in a non-
hypothetical Vickrey auction to elicit WTP for government (Food Safety Modernization 
Act, FSMA) and industry-issued (Global GAP) food safety standards in specialty 
melons, findings indicate that valuations are censored and heterogeneous. 
Finally, heterogeneity in valuations is assumed to occur discretely. Using a LCA 
approach, an examination was done to segment consumers based on their unobserved 
motivation to participate in experimental auctions. Moreover, Random Effects Tobit 
models are estimated to investigate differences in WTP among latent classes. The three 
latent classes found were characterized as: “Fee-Chasers”, “Certification Conscious”, 
and “Taste Conscious”. Results reveal that the classes differed significantly in terms of 
their WTP estimates.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The study of consumer behavior has always been a major research topic in economic 
theory that is constantly evolving. It helps marketers, producers, and policy makers 
understand how consumers think, feel, reason, select, and value products with different 
alternatives, and it forms the basis for the analysis of demand for agricultural products. 
Because the horticultural industry is of great importance to the U.S. agricultural 
economy in terms of sales or output, value added, job opportunities, labor income, and 
aesthetic pleasure that supports psychological well-being, several approaches have been 
used in previous studies of consumer tastes and preferences to identify key factors 
affecting consumer purchase decisions regarding horticultural demand.  
This dissertation will examine, in three essays, the use of selected hypothetical 
and non-hypothetical preference methods in eliciting consumer valuations and obtaining 
preference information related to horticultural products. Emphasis is made on improving 
the data collection methods, the econometric analysis of consumer preferences, and the 
importance of fully accounting for sources of observed and unobserved consumer 
heterogeneity. The objectives of this work are summarized as follows:  
 Evaluating the effectiveness of promotion for local horticultural brands in terms of 
changes in demand and consumer awareness, and identifying a consumer profile 
related to preferences towards branded horticultural efforts.  
 Examining the use of a Random Parameters Tobit model in the analysis of 
experimental auction data to account for bid-censoring and unobservable factors that 
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may affect consumers’ valuation of treatments, and providing valuation estimates of 
consumer preferences towards government and industry-sponsored food safety 
standards in specialty products.  
 Identifying potential latent classes of participants in experimental auctions based on 
unobserved motivations for participation and observed indicators of consumers’ 
heterogeneity, and investigating differences, if any, in consumers’ valuation of 
specialty products, government and industry-issued food safety standards, and 
tasting, among members of these classes. 
In Sections 2, 3, and 4 this will be done by using online surveys and non-hypothetical 
experimental auctions to examine consumer preferences towards selected agricultural 
products in a U.S. context. Section 5 concludes, outlines certain limitations of this 
dissertation, and provides directions for future research.  
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2. CONSUMER RESPONSE TO POINT OF PURCHASE ADVERTISING FOR 
LOCAL BRANDS

  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Agricultural brands target consumer’s desire for variety and stimulate financial growth 
of agribusiness companies through higher margins. Even though the development of a 
brand name can be an expensive endeavor, it has gained increasing recognition as a 
marketing instrument to differentiate generic products in the horticultural industry 
(Nijssen and Van Trijp 1998). Moreover, given the importance of promotion in 
differentiating a brand from its competitors, various studies in marketing research have 
focused on investigating how promotion affects consumer preferences toward branding. 
In the United States, state-sponsored checkoff programs for single agricultural 
commodities (e.g. Florida citrus, Washington apples) have been around since at least the 
1930s. More recently, broad-based advertising programs that collectively promote a 
group of agricultural products under a state brand (e.g. Arizona grown, Jersey Fresh, Go 
Texan) have become widespread (Patterson 2006). It is therefore not surprising that a 
plethora of studies have focused on evaluating the impact of generic advertising for food 
commodities (Alston, Freebairn, and James 2001; Williams, Capps, and Palma 2008; 
Moore et al. 2009; Williams, Capps, and Trang 2010), as well as the effectiveness of 
                                                 
 Reprinted with permission from “Consumer Response to Point of Purchase Advertising for Local 
Brands” by Collart, A,J., M.A. Palma, and C.E. Carpio. Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 
45(2):229-242, Copyright 2013 by the Southern Agricultural Economics Association. 
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broad-based advertising of food products marketed under state brands (Govindasamy, 
Italia, and Thatch 1998; Patterson et al. 1999; Carpio and Isengildina-Massa 2010).  
Recent consumer interest for local products opened the door for the development 
of state-sponsored branding efforts for non-food products. Brands of ornamental plants 
that have adapted to the movement of regional branding include Florida Garden Select, 
Louisiana Select, Oklahoma Proven, Colorado Plant Select, Texas Superstar
®
, Earth-
Kind
®
, among others. These state-wide ornamental branding efforts seek to promote 
plants that best adapt to local weather and soil conditions, while enhancing the 
profitability of green industry growers. Previous estimates suggest that the impact of 
these programs cannot be overlooked. Retailers of the Oklahoma Proven brand reported 
increases in sales of 228% as a consequence of this program (Anella et al. 2001). 
Mackay et al. (2001) also noticed that consumers returned to the stores based on 
previous purchases of Texas Superstar
®
 and estimated that about $10 million in new 
plant sales were generated as a result of this program. In addition, these brands 
encourage a positive environmental impact from the use of suitable plants that require 
lower levels of water and pesticides.  
Although numerous studies have been conducted to evaluate promotion 
effectiveness for food commodities, many questions remain regarding promotion 
effectiveness for brands in the ornamental sector. Given that states and industry 
organizations continuously invest in promotion of branded ornamentals, understanding 
the impact of advertising is beneficial to producers linked to the industry and to the state 
promoting the brand. Furthermore, firms often operate on limited marketing budgets and 
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must choose between advertising channels to promote their brands. An examination of 
consumer response to Point of Purchase in-store advertising (POPA) can help brand 
managers adjust marketing channels and rationalize further investments.  
This study considers an in-store Point of Purchase Advertising (POPA) campaign 
of two state-wide ornamental brands: Texas Superstar
®
 (TS) and Earth-Kind
®
 (EK). 
These brands were developed by scientists and extension specialists from the Texas 
A&M University System in conjunction with other state and private industry 
stakeholders of the Texas ornamental industry. Both brands consist of plant material that 
has been selected according to their adaptability to heat, drought, disease, insect 
tolerance, and other weather and soil local conditions. However, each brand offers 
different products to some extent. The TS brand includes plant material that ranges from 
roses to trees, whereas the EK brand includes roses and an environmental stewardship 
program (i.e. the EK challenge, plant selector, EK principles) that encourages the use of 
efficient, traditional and organic gardening techniques.  
In 2010, the Texas Department of Agriculture (TDA) launched an advertising 
campaign, which consisted of developing on-site promotional materials to include with 
TS and EK products at point of purchase locations in an effort to expand consumer 
demand for the local brands. The promotional materials consisted of plant tags with 
information about the brands. The tags were distributed to growers, retailers and 
wholesalers in Texas that carry the brands. Since the POPA did not include other forms 
of mass media advertising, it is of special interest to measure the effectiveness, if any, of 
this type of in-store advertising on consumer demand. The objectives of this study are to 
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evaluate the effects of POPA on consumer preferences in terms of brand awareness and 
willingness-to-pay (WTP), and to identify behavioral and demographic determinants of 
consumer preferences for branded ornamental plants. By evaluating the effects of POPA 
on consumer preferences for ornamental brands we contribute to the existing promotion 
literature in two ways. First, our focus on ornamentals helps to better understand 
consumer response to promotion efforts, as we may expect demand for ornamental 
products to behave differently than demand for agricultural food products. Moreover, the 
limited amount of research to date on promotion effectiveness of ornamentals has 
focused on aggressive media campaigns with no attention to smaller advertising 
programs that still require a sizable monetary investment. 
 
2.2 Literature Review  
A promotion program can shift demand, change price elasticity or both. The type of 
demand response to promotion depends on the components of the program including the 
message being spread (e.g. basic publicity versus real information), the type of products 
being advertised (e.g. necessities versus luxuries), the size of the campaign and choice of 
advertising channels, among other factors. Johnson and Myatt (2006) showed that a 
message that merely publicizes a product’s existence, price, and other features that are 
clearly valued by all consumers might increase demand, whereas a message that informs 
consumers of their personal match with the characteristics of a product might change 
price elasticity of demand. Also, a message containing both basic publicity and real 
information may involve a shift in demand and changes in price elasticity. With regards 
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to the type of product, Rickard et al. (2011) evaluated commodity-specific advertising, 
which intends to promote a category of products (i.e. all types of apples), and broad-
based advertising, which refers to the promotion of a group of products that may be 
substitutes or complements of each other (i.e. all fruits and vegetables). By applying the 
theoretical framework developed by Johnson and Myatt (2006) they showed that 
commodity-specific advertising will lead to an upward shift and more inelastic demand, 
while broad-based advertising will lead to an upward shift and more elastic demand.  
According to Moore et al. (2009), quantifying the magnitude of such demand 
responses is more complex than to measure a potential increase in sales. Because factors 
other than promotion affect sales of a product, statistical methods need to account for all 
these factors in order to isolate the effects of promotion on demand. For instance, 
Rickard et al. (2011) estimated constant and random parameter Tobit models to evaluate 
WTP increases as a result of promotion activities.  
Contrary to food, ornamental plants are selected upon different quality 
differentiating attributes such as drought tolerance, light demand, pest vulnerability, 
color, etc. They are consumed because of the satisfaction consumers derive from their 
aesthetic characteristics and not to satisfy nutritional needs (Palma and Ward 2010). 
Therefore, consumer responses to ornamental promotions may differ compared to 
traditional food products. While many studies have analyzed the effectiveness of 
promotion on demand for food products, fewer studies have focused on floriculture and 
nursery crops. Most of the ornamental promotion literature has focused on the 
importance of a firm’s choice of advertising channels and campaign size. Rimal (1998) 
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analyzed the effects of generic and brand promotions on sales of fresh cut-flowers in the 
U.S. and found that generic promotion efforts generated equal gains among all 
participating retail outlets, whereas brand promotion contributed to an increasing market 
share in particular outlets. Ort, Wilder, and Graham (1998) reported on the effectiveness 
of an extensive promotional campaign consisting of print and media advertising 
conducted by independent garden centers in North Carolina. They found that newspaper 
advertising for a specific plant produced the highest recall rates among consumers. More 
recently, Palma et al. (2012) quantified the effectiveness of firm promotion expenditures 
on sales of green industry firms accounting for firm size and types of advertising. Using 
cost-benefit analysis they concluded that for small and medium firms, internet-based 
advertising generates the highest returns of $5.90 and $7.50 in sales per $1 spent in 
advertising, respectively, whereas for large firms mass-media represents the most 
important advertising channel.  
Thus far no research has examined the impact of low budget in-store advertising 
on consumer preferences for branded ornamentals. Understanding the reach of in-store 
promotions and the main behavioral and demographic factors determining consumer 
preferences for branded products can help ornamental firms evaluate their marketing 
mix, optimize their choice of advertising channels given their budget constraints, and 
target a more specific population of interest.   
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2.3 Data and Sample Weighting  
Data regarding consumer perceptions of branding efforts and WTP were obtained 
through two electronic mail surveys administered to Texas consumers. The first survey 
was conducted in July of 2008, before the POPA program. From this sample of 800 
individuals approximately 34% were actual consumers of ornamental products, hence 
the final number of usable responses was 273 observations. The second survey was 
conducted in August of 2010 after the program was finished and it consisted of a total of 
259 observations. A random sample of 259 observations was taken from the first survey 
in order to balance the pre-program and post-program observations. Moreover, to ensure 
that the two samples were equivalent in terms of demographic characteristics, each 
demographic stratum in the second survey (i.e. gender, age, income, etc.) was weighted 
with respect to the corresponding stratum in the first survey as follows: 
(1)    
wk =
%(Sub)Populationk
%Samplek  
where the numerator indicates the percentage of stratum k in the population or sub-
population of interest and the denominator indicates the percentage of stratum k in the 
sample. Post-stratification weighting improves comparability of the samples by ensuring 
that any changes measured in the statistical models are the results of the variables 
measured and not differences in the demographics of the two samples. The pre-POPA 
program sample and the weighted post-POPA program sample were pooled and used to 
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estimate the models of brand awareness and WTP
1
.  In all models, a dummy variable 
(POPA) is used to differentiate the pre-advertising and post-advertising data (=1 if post-
advertising, 0 otherwise). This variable serves to assess the change in the population 
mean WTP and brand awareness as a result of the advertising campaign. Table 1 
provides a comparison of the survey demographics and the general Texas population.  
 
 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Demographic Variables from Samples Used and Texas 
Population  
    
Brand Awareness 
n=518 
EK Willingness-to-Pay 
n=290 
TS Willingness-to-Pay 
n=268 
Censusa 
Demographic Variables Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Marital status Married 62.0 62.8 61.2 51.5 
 Not married 38.0 37.2 38.8 48.5 
Gender Male 48.1 45.1 46.6 49.6 
 Female 51.9 54.9 53.4 50.4 
Education  High School 11.7 13.2  9.8 46.0 
 College 65.4 65.3 66.9 45.5 
 Graduate School  23.0 21.5 23.3  8.5 
Age Less than 39 35.2 31.3 31.3 59.0 
 40-55 31.6 34.0 32.8 20.4 
 More than 55 33.2 34.7 35.8 20.6 
Income Under $25,000 15.8 18.6 16.4 24.8 
 $25,000-$50,000 30.1 29.0 28.4 25.4 
 $50,001-$75,000 20.8 14.5 17.9 18.2 
 $75,001-$99,999 13.5 14.5 14.9 11.8 
  $100,000-& above 19.7 20.0 22.4 19.8 
aSource: U.S. Census Bureau 2010, American Community Survey 2006-2010. 
Note: n indicates sample size.   
                                                 
1 Similar random sampling and weighting procedures were used to obtain the samples used to estimate the 
models intended to explain the effect of the promotion program on WTP for TS and EK. Because the first 
survey contained a lower number of observations on WTP for both brands, the final samples had a total of 
290 observations used to model WTP for EK and 268 observations used to model WTP for TS. Across all 
samples, the data were comparable to the overall Texas population. See Levy and Lemeshow (2008) and 
Groves et al. (2009) for a theoretical treatment of survey weights.  
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2.4 Methodology 
The conceptual framework for this study is the Random Utility Theory (RUT). In this 
context, the consumer is rational and has a perfect discrimination capability. However, 
the analyst has incomplete information and uncertainty is taken into account. More 
specifically, the utility that individual i associates with choice j is described as: 
(2)      ijijij
VU 
 
where 
ijV is the deterministic component of utility and ij  is an independent and 
identically distributed (iid) random error unobserved to the researcher that reflects 
characteristics of the consumer or the products. For the individual   is known, but for 
the analyst   is an unobserved random variable with some density f , which induces a 
density on U (Hanemann 1984).  
Using this framework, the utility obtained from consuming ornamental plants can 
be written as: 
(3)    ikiikikik POPAysxVU  ),,,(  
where kx  is a vector of ornamental products, is refers to consumer socio-demographic 
characteristics, iy  is income, and ik is a random vector of consumer characteristics or 
ornamental plant features that are unobservable to the econometrician. Moreover, POPA 
is a level of advertising that is given by the firm to the consumer and affects consumer 
preferences (Becker and Murphy 1993).  
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2.4.1 Brand Awareness Models  
Thilmany et al. (2011) point out that assessing the effectiveness of promotional activities 
should note the effects of any shift on demand, but also offer insights into the promotion 
methods that raise awareness and create demand. In modeling brand awareness, the 
individual is modeled as being aware or not of a certain brand, instead of choosing one. 
Specifically, we model awareness of each brand as a function of the number of monthly 
transactions (TRAN), purpose of the purchase (PUR), post promotion on place dummy 
(POPA), and several socio-demographic characteristics, including age, gender, marital 
status, income, educational level, and region (Table 2). Because the dependent variable 
is a binary variable indicating awareness of the brand, a Logit model was considered
2
, 
and the implications for the likelihood of awareness are interpreted in terms of odds 
ratios. The model specification for estimating the probability of brand awareness of the j 
brand (TS or EK) is given by: 
(4) jjj
jj
POPA
INCPURTRANREGREGEDUEDU
MARRIEDFEMALEAGEAGEAWARE






1
1098765
4321
23232
32
  
where 
j  is assumed to follow a standard logistic distribution. The first hypothesis 
investigated by the brand awareness models is whether POPA advertising will increase 
the likelihood of brand awareness (i.e. 01 j ). 
                                                 
2 A two-stage model was also estimated for brand awareness and willingness-to-pay to account for the 
potential endogeneity of brand awareness. The results suggested that brand awareness was not an 
endogenous factor and hence the models were estimated independently.  
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2.4.2 Willingness-to-Pay Models 
A rational individual is assumed to consume product j if the utility from this product is at 
least as great as the utility without the product. Following Rickard et al. (2011) the 
marginal value consumer i places on product j=1, denoted as 
ijc , is defined as the 
amount of income that leaves the consumer’s utility at least as great with or without the 
consumption of j, that is: 
(5)   0001111 ),,,(),,,,( iiiijiiiiij yszxVPOPAcyszxV     
By the random utility assumption the consumer’s WTP for j can be solved from the 
probability of individual i choosing j: 
(6)   )Pr(](.)(.)Pr[)Pr( 1100111 iiiiiii cWTPVVx    
which implies that the consumer WTP has to be at least as great as the marginal value 
for the product, otherwise the product is not consumed.  
Different assumptions about the distribution of the stochastic portion of utility 
produce different choice models (McFadden 1974). If   is assumed to follow a double 
exponential distribution ( 3/,0 22  ), where  is the logit scale parameter, and 
utility of the nonpurchased option is normalized to 1, the probability of consuming j 
becomes:  
(7)   
)/exp(1
)/exp(
)Pr()Pr(
1
1
111


i
i
iii
V
V
xcWTP


 
and after applying a logarithmic transformation on both sides of the odds ratio we 
obtain: 
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(8)    
/
)Pr(1
)Pr(
ln 11
1
1
ii
i
i VWTP
x
x






  
Finally, assuming utility is additive over its components, and normalizing 1  without 
loss of generality, the estimable equation can be written as: 
(9)   
iji
l
illijiiij POPAysPOPAsyV  ),,,(
 
where l are the coefficients associated with l socio-demographic characteristics,   is 
the coefficient associated with income,   is the advertising coefficient and ij  is the 
i.i.d. error term. Based on Carpio and Isengildina-Massa (2010) if WTP elicitation is 
conducted before and after an advertisement campaign, the change in WTP )( WTP
measured by the advertising shock  can be interpreted as the direct effect or shift in the 
demand curve due to the advertising campaign. 
In all WTP models, the dependent variable is the average percentage price 
premium the consumer is willing to pay for the branded product over a regular 
unbranded plant and it ranges from 0 to 41 percent. Percentage premiums are used when 
trying to measure the premium across aggregate categories of products (Carpio and 
Isengildina-Massa 2010). Since the mean WTP variable theoretically has a lower 
threshold of zero, a Tobit specification was used in all WTP models to account for left-
censoring. In the first two models, explanatory variables include the number of 
transactions (TRAN), the purpose of the purchase (PUR), post promotion on place 
dummy (POPA), awareness of the brand (TS-AWARE or EK-AWARE), and several 
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demographic characteristics, including age, gender, marital status, income, educational 
level, and region (Table 2). 
 
 
 
Table 2. Description of Variables Used in the Econometric Analyses 
Variable Description 
TSAWARE Awareness of Texas Superstar® (= 1 if true and 0 otherwise) 
EKAWARE Awareness of Earth-Kind® (= 1 if true and 0 otherwise) 
TSWTP Mean WTP for Texas Superstar® 
EKWTP Mean WTP for Earth-Kind® 
Socio-demographic characteristics 
AGE2 Age between 40-55 years old (= 1 if true and 0 otherwise) 
AGE3 More than 55 years old (= 1 if true and 0 otherwise) 
FEMALE Gender is female (= 1 if true and 0 otherwise) 
MARRIED Marital status is married (= 1 if true and 0 otherwise) 
INC2 Income level (=1 if income equal or above $50,000 and 0 otherwise) 
EDU2 Educational level (=1 if college degree, and 0 otherwise) 
EDU3 Educational level (=1 if graduate school, and 0 otherwise) 
Consumer habits 
TRAN Number of monthly transactions 
PUR Purpose of the purchase (= 1 if self-consumption and 0 otherwise) 
POPA Point of Purchase Advertising (=1 if Post-advertising and 0 otherwise) 
Region   
REG2 Region: Central Texas (= 1 if true and 0 otherwise) 
REG3 Region: South Texas (= 1 if true and 0 otherwise) 
Dummy variables base levels 
AGE1 Age group of 39 years old or less  
INC1 Income group under $50,000 
EDU1 Educational level is high school or less 
REG1 Region is North  
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The mean WTP for brand j (TS or EK) can be written as: 
(10)   
jjj
jj
POPA
INCPURTRANAWAREREGREGEDU
EDUMARRIEDFEMALEAGEAGEWTP






2
11109876
54321
*
2323
232
  
       *,0max jj WTPWTP   
where ),0(~ 2 Nj  and 
*WTP is a latent variable that is observed for values greater 
than zero and censored otherwise. The second hypothesis investigated by the 
willingness-to-pay models is whether POPA advertising will lead to a shift in overall 
demand for these products (i.e. 02 j ). 
The last two models were estimated for a subset of the sample that consisted of 
consumers aware of each brand. These models were estimated to isolate the effect of the 
POPA campaign for a specific group of consumers that has been found to be relevant in 
other evaluations of promotion effectiveness. For instance, Carpio and Isengildina-
Massa (2010) found that only individuals previously aware of the South Carolina-grown 
promotion campaign expressed a change in preferences as a response to the campaign.  
The conditional mean WTP for brand j (TS or EK) can be written as: 
(11)  
jjj
jj
POPA
INCPURTRANREGREGEDUEDU
MARRIEDFEMALEAGEAGEAWAREWTP






3
1098765
4321
*
23232
32)1(
 
 1,0max)1( *  AWAREWTPAWAREWTP jj  
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where ),0(~ 2 Nj . The third hypothesis investigated by the conditional willingness-
to-pay models is whether POPA advertising will lead to a shift in demand by individuals 
aware of the brands (i.e. 03 j ). 
 
2.5 Results and Discussion 
2.5.1 Texas Superstar
®
 Brand Awareness Results 
The Logit results for the TS brand awareness model are presented in Table 3. A 
likelihood ratio test of 32.05 (P<0.0014) is an indication of the goodness of fit of this 
model. Moreover, about 438 of 498 (88%) of survey participants were correctly 
classified as either aware or unaware of the brand. The Hosmer and Lemeshow's test of 
goodness of fit for logistic regression yields a very large p-value (0.87), indicating that 
the predicted frequency and observed frequency matched closely.  
Results show no statistically significant influence of the POPA program on 
raising awareness of TS (i.e. 0,1 TS ), indicating that in-store POPA was not sufficient 
to impact consumer awareness. The results imply that consumers with high income, 
those with a graduate school degree, and those older than 55 years are around 1.5 times 
more likely to be aware of the TS brand, whereas an additional transaction makes a 
consumer about 1.2 times more likely to be aware of the TS brand.  
These findings are consistent with the socio-demographic profile of ornamental 
consumers that Yue and Behe (2008) identified. They found that wealthier consumers 
were more likely to choose traditional freestanding floral outlets (i.e. nurseries and 
garden centers), where mean prices and expenditures per transaction are higher 
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compared to other floral outlets such as box stores or general retailers. The main retail 
outlets for TS products are traditional freestanding floral outlets and to a lesser extent 
box stores or mass merchandisers (i.e. Home Depot, Lowe’s). Hence, it is possible that 
wealthier consumers might be more likely to be aware of TS because they are more 
likely to visit the floral outlets where the majority of TS products are sold. Furthermore, 
high-income consumers may also be less sensitive to price premiums of branded 
ornamentals. With regards to educational level, consumers with graduate degrees might 
be more likely to be exposed to sources of information other than seeing the products at 
the marketplace. For example, agricultural extension services of universities in Texas 
promote both brands through marketing displays at extension offices on campus. The 
expected positive relationship between brand awareness and frequency of purchase 
indicates that as consumers increase the number of monthly transactions and physically 
visit the stores they are considerably more likely to become aware of the brands.  
Results indicate that a female consumer is 43% less likely to be aware of the TS 
brand. The increasing use of landscaping contractor services by females may explain this 
relationship (Collart et al. 2010). Another possibility is related to the floral outlets that 
females prefer and the outlets where TS are offered. Yue and Behe (2008) found that 
females preferred to buy ornamental products at general retailers (i.e. supermarkets) 
followed by box stores, yet most TS products are sold through traditional freestanding 
outlets and have been introduced only more recently into box stores. The propensity 
score indicates that there is a 9.8% probability that the average consumer in Texas is 
aware of TS. 
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2.5.2 Earth-Kind
®
 Brand Awareness Results 
The Logit results for the EK brand awareness model are presented in Table 3. A 
likelihood ratio test of 25.92 (P<0.011) serves as an indicator of goodness of fit. This 
model compared with a naïve model with a 0.5 cutoff predicted 443 of 498 (89%) of the 
observations correctly as either aware or unaware of the brand. The Hosmer and 
Lemeshow's test for logistic regression yields a large p-value (0.45), indicating that the 
model fits the data well.  
Results indicate no statistically significant influence of the POPA program on 
consumer awareness of the EK brand, suggesting again that in-store promotion was not 
enough to affect brand awareness (i.e. 0,1 EK ). Contrary to the TS case, the relationship 
of the variable measuring income above $50,000 (INC2) was negative. It indicated that 
consumers with high income are 73% less likely to be aware of EK. The negative 
relationship between awareness of EK and income appears consistent with consumers’ 
choices of floral outlets. The main outlets for EK roses are box stores such as Walmart 
and general retailers including supermarkets such as HEB. As income level decreases 
consumers are more likely to choose box stores and general retailers as floral outlets 
because of lower prices. Thus, lower income consumers might be more likely to be 
aware of EK because they are more likely to use the floral outlets where EK products are 
available. Also, high-income level citizens are increasingly contracting professional 
lawn care services (Hall et al. 2006), possibly because they can afford to make more use 
of landscaping contractor services. In turn, these consumers may be less involved in the 
design of their landscape and therefore less likely to be familiar with the EK challenge, 
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plant selector, the EK principles to design a sustainable landscape, or to actively 
participate in the educational component of EK. 
The purpose of the purchase for self-consumption (PUR) also had a negative 
effect on awareness. Consumers whose purpose of purchase is self-consumption are 
about 39% less likely to be aware of EK products. This result suggests that ornamental 
consumers may be inclined to search for generic products that associate with lower 
prices when purchasing roses for self-consumption purposes and care more about 
differentiated products when purchasing roses for gifts. The number of transactions per 
month (TRAN) and the South Texas region (REG3) appeared to positively affect 
awareness of EK, implying that influencing the frequency of purchase significantly 
impacts brand awareness. Estimates suggest that a consumer located in South Texas is 
1.7 times more likely to be aware of EK, and that an additional transaction makes the 
consumer about 1.2 times more likely to be aware of EK. The propensity score indicates 
that there is an 8.8 % probability that the average consumer in Texas is aware of the EK 
program, a value slightly lower than that for TS.  
Overall results of the brand awareness models for both TS and EK show that in-
store point of purchase advertising (POPA) did not have statistically significant effects 
on consumer awareness. Instead, the key outcomes that seem to influence awareness of 
local branded ornamentals are income level and frequency of buying. As the number of 
visits to a store increases the chances of a consumer being aware of local brands 
promoted through POPA also increase. 
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Table 3. Brand Awareness Parameter Estimates from Logit Model for the Local 
Brands 
  
Texas Superstar® Earth-Kind® 
 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Odds ratio Coefficient 
(SE) 
Odds ratio 
Intercept -1.7319*** 
(0.5208)  
-1.3567*** 
(0.4943)  
AGE2 (40 to 55) -0.3557 
(0.2216) 
0.7007 -0.1691 
(0.2189) 
0.8444 
AGE3 (older than 55) 0.4385** 
(0.2222) 
1.5504 0.2714 
(0.2225) 
1.3118 
FEMALE -0.8432** 
(0.3618) 
0.4303 -0.5684 
(0.3618) 
0.5664 
MARRIED -0.3619 
(0.3511) 
0.6964 0.1001 
(0.3548) 
1.1052 
INC2 (above $50,000) 0.3720** 
(0.1667) 
1.4507 -0.3150** 
(0.1581) 
0.7298 
EDU2 (college degree) -0.1767 
(0.2380) 
0.8381 -0.0808 
(0.2148) 
0.9224 
EDU3 (graduate school) 0.3909* 
(0.2213) 
1.4784 -0.3692 
(0.2748) 
0.6913 
TRAN (number of transactions) 0.1826* 
(0.0939) 
1.2003 0.1923** 
(0.0926) 
1.2120 
PUR (self-consumption) -0.5232 
(0.3920) 
0.5926 -0.9426** 
(0.3774) 
0.3896 
POPA (point of purchase advertising) 0.4746 
(0.2931) 
1.6073 -0.3421 
(0.3070) 
0.7103 
REG2 (Central Texas) 0.1072 
(0.1520) 
1.1131 -0.0280 
(0.1716) 
0.9724 
REG3 (South Texas) 0.1584 
(0.3082) 
1.1716 0.5375* 
(0.3072) 
1.7117 
Number of usable observations 498 498 
Log-likelihood full model (L1) -167.18 -155.85 
Likelihood ratio 32.05 25.92 
LR P value 0.0014 0.011 
McFadden's R2 0.0875 0.0768 
Hosmer and Lemeshow’s P value 0.87 0.45 
Percentage of correct predictions 87.95 89.16 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at P < 0.1, 0.05, or 0.01, respectively. 
 
 
 
2.5.3 Texas Superstar
®
 Willingness-to-Pay Results 
The parameter estimates for the WTP models for all respondents and respondents aware 
of each brand are presented in Table 4. The sigma parameter which refers to the 
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estimated standard deviation of the residual shows a censoring of the data. The mean 
WTP is measured in percentage terms, thus a positive marginal effect denotes a price 
premium for the brand over a regular plant, whereas a negative marginal effect denotes a 
price discount.  
Results of the WTP model for TS for all respondents indicate no statistically 
significant influence of POPA or any demographic factors on WTP, indicating that in-
store promotion did not affect consumer demand for ornamentals (i.e. 0,2 TS ). The 
self-consumption purpose of the purchase (PUR) had a negative relationship with WTP. 
Its marginal effect implies a price discount of 3.7% if the purpose of the purchase is self-
consumption and a price premium of 3.7% if the purpose is a gift, which suggests a 
predisposition of consumers to save when purchasing branded ornamentals for self-use 
purposes. In contrast, the number of transactions per month (TRAN) and brand 
awareness (TS-AWARE) had a positive relationship. Notably, the variable with the 
highest effects on WTP was brand awareness; consumers aware of the TS brand are 
willing to pay a 4.5% price premium for TS certified plants compared to regular 
unbranded plants. Consumers with an additional transaction per month are willing to pay 
a price premium for branded plants of 1% over non-branded plants. Results show that 
the average consumer of ornamentals in Texas is willing to pay a price premium of 
10.4% for TS plants over regular plants.  
Furthermore, WTP for TS was also estimated for a sub-sample of ornamental 
consumers aware of the TS brand (Table 4). Results show no statistically significant 
influence of the POPA program on WTP (i.e. 0,3 TS ). However, female consumers 
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aware of TS have a significant price discount of about 10.3% for this brand. The 
previous discussion of TS awareness indicated that females may have lower probability 
of awareness because of their choice of retail outlets. Yet, even females aware of the 
brand express a price discount, which exposes the importance of gender and retail outlet 
selection for marketing of this brand. Regarding the frequency of monthly transactions, 
an additional transaction by consumers aware of TS is estimated to increase the mean 
WTP by 5.3%, implying that purchase frequency plays a role not only in increasing the 
likelihood of awareness of TS, but also in inducing price premiums. 
2.5.4 Earth-Kind
®
 Willingness-to-Pay Results 
Results of the WTP model for EK for all respondents indicate there were no significant 
effects of in-store promotion (i.e. 0,2 EK ) or demographic factors, but once more there 
were strong effects from the number of monthly transactions (TRAN), the purpose of the 
purchase (PUR), and brand awareness (EK-AWARE). The negative sign and 
significance of the variable that measured purpose of the purchase imply a price discount 
of 3.3% if the purpose of the purchase is self-consumption, which validates the 
propensity of consumers to save when purchasing branded plants for self-use. The 
positive estimate of frequency of purchase (TRAN) indicates that an additional 
transaction per month carries an increase of 1.2% in mean WTP for EK. As in the TS 
case, the variable with the highest effect on WTP was brand awareness (EK-AWARE); 
consumers aware of the EK brand are willing to pay a 4.7% price premium for EK roses 
compared to regular roses. Based on the econometric model estimates, the average 
consumer of ornamentals in Texas is willing to pay a price premium of 9.8% for EK 
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roses, a lower but close estimate to the premium that consumers are willing to pay for TS 
products.   
Results of the model examining WTP for a sub-sample of consumers aware of 
the EK brand (Table 4) show that, for this segment of the buying population, the POPA 
program effectively shifted demand for EK products (i.e. 0,3 EK ). In spite of being a 
low-cost in-store promotion, the program expanded demand for consumers that have 
been previously exposed to EK (Table 4). For those consumers the magnitude of the 
increase in WTP is estimated to be about 5.5%. This model also supports a negative 
relationship between female consumers aware of branded ornamentals and WTP price 
premiums, that is, female consumers aware of EK have price discounts that reach 6.8%. 
Finally, frequency of purchase not only increases the likelihood of awareness of EK, but 
also induces price premiums in consumers aware of the brand; an additional transaction 
by aware consumers is estimated to increase mean WTP by 2.7%.  
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Table 4. Willingness-to-Pay Parameter Estimates from Tobit Model for the Local Brands 
  Texas Superstar
®
 Earth-Kind
® 
 
 All respondents Aware respondents All respondents Aware respondents 
 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Marginal  
effect 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Marginal  
effect 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Marginal  
effect 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Marginal  
effect 
Intercept 0.1044*** 
(0.0277)  
0.1360 
(0.0815)  
0.0853*** 
(0.0298)  
0.1259** 
(0.0510)  
AGE2 (40 to 55) -0.0022 
(0.0095) 
-0.0019 -0.0111 
(0.0447) 
-0.0101 -0.0060 
(0.0097) 
-0.0048 -0.0245 
(0.0247) 
-0.0235 
AGE3 (older than 55) -0.0081 
(0.0098) 
-0.0068 0.0160 
(0.0466) 
0.0146 -0.0123 
(0.0103) 
-0.0099 -0.0701*** 
(0.0238) 
-0.0672 
FEMALE 0.0082 
(0.0173) 
0.0069 -0.1136** 
(0.0550) 
-0.1033 0.0247 
(0.0179) 
0.0199 -0.0711* 
(0.0388) 
-0.0682 
MARRIED -0.0008 
(0.0167) 
-0.0007 0.0054 
(0.0538) 
0.0049 -0.0167 
(0.0173) 
-0.0134 0.0120 
(0.0311) 
0.0115 
INC2 (above $50,000) -0.0002 
(0.0075) 
-0.0002 -0.0385 
(0.0276) 
-0.0350 0.0071 0.0057 -0.0084 -0.0081 
  
EDU2 (college degree) 0.0143 
(0.0110) 
0.0119 -0.0207 
(0.0489) 
-0.0188 0.0140 
(0.0107) 
0.0113 -0.0124 
(0.0209) 
-0.0119 
EDU3 (graduate school) -0.0128 
(0.0098) 
-0.0107 -0.0582** 
(0.0234) 
-0.0529 -0.0083 
(0.0110) 
-0.0067 0.0003 
(0.0239) 
0.0003 
TRAN (number of transactions) 0.0105** 
(0.0045) 
0.0088 0.0578*** 
(0.0151) 
0.0526 0.0148*** 
(0.0048) 
0.0120 0.0282** 
(0.0108) 
0.0271 
PUR (self-consumption) -0.0427** 
(0.0211) 
-0.0371 -0.0564 
(0.0566) 
-0.0523 -0.0391* 
(0.0220) 
-0.0327 -0.0460 
(0.0339) 
-0.0446 
POPA (point of purchase advertising) 0.0021 
(0.0137) 
0.0018 0.0351 
(0.0548) 
0.0321 0.0004 
(0.0144) 
0.0003 0.0575* 
(0.0328) 
0.0555 
AWARE (brand awareness) 0.0520** 
(0.0205) 
0.0453 
 
 0.0562*** 
(0.0201) 
0.0475 
 
 
REG2 (Central Texas) -0.0041 
(0.0071) 
-0.0034 -0.0014 
(0.0275) 
-0.0013 0.0012 
(0.0076) 
0.0009 0.0099 
(0.0173) 
0.0095 
REG3 (South Texas) -0.0003 
(0.0141) 
-0.0003 0.0006 
(0.0421) 
0.0005 0.0024 
(0.0146) 
0.0020 0.0164 
(0.0230) 
0.0157 
SIGMA 0.1062*** 
(0.0051)  
0.1076*** 
(0.0137)  
0.1145*** 
(0.0055)  
0.0872*** 
(0.0093)  
 26 
 
Table 4. Continued 
  Texas Superstar
®
 Earth-Kind
® 
 
 All respondents Aware respondents All respondents Aware respondents 
Number of usable observations 259 39 278 45 
Likelihood ratio 22.59 24.5 34.43 31.49 
LR P value 0.0469 0.0174 0.001 0.0017 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at P < 0.1, 0.05, or 0.01, respectively. 
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2.5.5 Industry Implications 
Branding, only when combined with effective marketing, can help agribusiness firms 
develop awareness and increase price premiums that can lead to enhanced profitability. 
Results from this study suggest that in-store POPA was not sufficient to significantly 
increase brand awareness and total demand for local ornamental brands. However, a 
major factor found to increase both overall demand and likelihood of brand awareness 
was buying frequency, which suggests that other advertising methods aimed to increase 
buying intensity might affect demand more effectively.  
Our findings indicated that female consumers are less likely to be aware of 
branding efforts such as TS, and those aware expect price discounts. Also, consumers 
buying for self-use are willing to pay less for branded ornamentals. Previous studies in 
the literature have found that buyer frequency in ornamentals increased with females, 
self-use purchases, and in certain months of the year (Palma and Ward 2010), which 
suggests that those consumers that do most floral transactions per household might be 
those that expect price discounts for branded ornamentals (i.e. females, self-use 
purchases). This implies that if marketing managers would like to increase demand for 
branded ornamentals among those consumers willing to pay price premiums, they could 
personalize their marketing strategies to increase buying frequency among male 
consumers and those who buy only for special occasions. An increase in buying 
frequency could be accomplished through specific marketing tools such as loyalty 
programs or online retailing. Loyalty programs differ from other strategies by their 
emphasis on increasing repeat-purchase loyalty rather than only on gaining market share 
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(Sharp and Sharp 1997). Their impact on purchase behavior has led to an increasing 
popularity across industries, which has also resulted in the introduction of new 
currencies (e.g. frequent flyer miles, rewards points) that can lower consumers’ 
perceived cost for a product (Dreze and Nunes 2004). However, for a loyalty program to 
be a worthy investment that effectively increases buying intensity, it must be designed in 
a way that adds value to consumers. Online retailing can facilitate the purchase of 
products by consumers who spend large amounts of time on the internet and by time-
constrained consumers (Bellman, Lohse, and Johnson 1999). In online retailing, aspects 
such as an easy returns process have been shown to positively influence repurchase 
behavior (Griffis et al. 2012).  
Another factor that had a strong effect on consumer WTP was brand awareness. 
Marketing efforts aimed to increase buying frequency likely increase the level of 
consumer awareness and WTP; as consumers make more transactions and visit the stores 
they are more likely to be exposed to in-store promotion and to become aware of 
ornamental brands, which influence their WTP. However, increasing brand awareness 
through other types of advertising also has a direct effect on WTP. For instance, because 
consumers with less discretionary time are turning to the internet to search for product 
information and to make purchases, social media is playing an increasingly important 
role as a source of information, with the advantage that it can be easily tailored to the 
population of interest at a low cost. Our estimates suggest that once consumers are aware 
of a brand, in-store promotion might help boost demand. 
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Consumer income also had a significant effect on brand awareness. Consumers 
with relatively high income (above $50,000) are more likely to be aware of branded 
ornamentals sold at traditional freestanding floral outlets, where average prices are 
higher, but less likely to be aware of ornamental brands sold at general retailers that 
include products and educational components. This implies that marketers need to tailor 
their communications intended to spread brand awareness not only to the product being 
offered but also to consumers’ demographics and their preferred floral outlets.  
 
2.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This study analyzed the effects of a low-cost Point of Purchase Advertising (POPA) 
program launched for the local brands Texas Superstar
®
 (TS) and Earth-Kind
®
 (EK) on 
brand awareness and willingness-to-pay (WTP). The study used two electronic surveys 
conducted in Texas, before and after POPA, to study the main factors affecting 
consumer preferences. Exposure to the POPA did not have significant effects on overall 
consumer demand. Instead, consumer habits of purchase including brand awareness, the 
purpose of the purchase and the number of transactions had the largest effects on WTP. 
We identified a price discount for both brands when the purpose of the purpose is self-
use and price premiums when the purpose is a gift and with marginal increases in the 
number of transactions.  
The POPA program shifted demand solely for a subpopulation of consumers that 
have been previously exposed to the EK brand (i.e. 0,3 EK ). Given that the consumer is 
already aware of EK, the presence of the POPA induces a price premium of about 5.5%. 
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These conditional models also evidenced a negative relationship between females and 
WTP. The number of transactions positively affected the likelihood of awareness of 
branded ornamentals, and induced price premiums in respondents aware and non-aware 
of TS and EK. With regards to brand awareness, consumers with relatively high income 
(above $50,000) are expected to be more likely to be aware of TS, but less likely to be 
aware of brands with educational components such as EK. Moreover, older and more 
educated consumers are more likely to be aware of TS, whereas females have a lower 
likelihood of awareness. Self-use purchases had a significant negative effect on 
awareness of EK, whereas the South Texas region had a positive effect on awareness of 
this brand. Also, an increasing buying frequency consistently increased awareness of 
both brands.  
These results must be interpreted with caution as other exogenous factors may 
have played a role in promotion effectiveness. The lack of significance of the POPA 
parameter suggests that in-store promotion did not have an effect on brand awareness or 
WTP for the overall population. However, the value of this parameter measured the 
difference in the population WTP between the 2008-2010 periods, hence it might also 
account for other exogenous factors. Particularly, the economic recession of 2009 may 
have had an effect in consumer spending in ornamental goods despite advertising efforts 
by firms and represent a limitation to our findings. In addition, because a stated 
preference method was used to elicit consumer valuations of branded ornamentals, our 
WTP measures may be an overestimate of consumers’ true WTP. However, the same 
elicitation method was used to assess WTP before and after the advertising campaign, 
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and we focused on the difference in WTP as a result of in-store promotion rather than 
the actual level of WTP. Recent literature that has also made use of stated preference 
methods include Tonsor and Wolf (2012), who administered an online survey to U.S. 
consumers in order to collect stated WTP for milk attributes, and Holmquist, 
McCluskey, and Ross (2012) who used hypothetical contingent valuation to elicit WTP 
for wine attributes. In contrast, the use of revealed preference methods may provide 
gains in accuracy of valuation estimates, yet even in non-hypothetical settings factors 
such as participatory fees, bid affiliation, and zero-bidders can potentially introduce bias 
into the valuations (Lusk and Hudson 2004). 
The results of this study provide insights into the effectiveness of in-store 
advertising for local branded ornamentals in terms of brand awareness and WTP. The 
profile of ornamental consumers identified in this study can be helpful in the design of 
future marketing strategies aimed to increase buying frequency, which was found to 
effectively increase brand awareness and WTP for branded ornamentals.   
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3. MODELING UNOBSERVED CONSUMER HETEROGENEITY IN 
EXPERIMENTAL AUCTIONS: AN APPLICATION TO THE VALUATION OF 
FOOD SAFETY STANDARDS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Non-hypothetical experimental auctions have been widely used to elicit consumers’ 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a great variety of commodities and services. Because they 
involve a trade-off between money and goods in an active market setting, they have the 
advantage over stated preference methods that avoid hypothetical bias, and thus have 
been useful instruments to valuate novel products and quality attributes (Abidoye et al. 
2011; Alfnes 2007). Because conducting experimental auctions can be a more expensive 
endeavor relative to other value elicitation mechanisms, data are often collected for 
several goods (i.e. multiple good valuation) across several bidding rounds. That is, data 
collected are typically multidimensional and need to be analyzed using panel data 
models (Lusk and Shogren 2007).  
Previous experimental auction studies have used different econometric 
approaches to model the bid equation to take into account the panel structure of the data, 
including pooled linear regression (Alfnes and Rickertsen 2003), and linear and 
nonlinear fixed effects (Shogren, List, and Hayes 2000; List and Shogren 1999) and 
random effects models (Corrigan and Rousu 2006a; Corrigan and Rousu 2006b; Lusk, 
Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004). However, a key limitation in these panel data models is 
the assumption that the regression coefficients are constant. As noted by Woolridge 
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(2011), it is possible that treatment effects vary widely across individuals in unobserved 
ways. For instance, if a coefficient is used to estimate participants’ mean WTP for a 
given treatment, a constant coefficients model assumes that all consumers have the same 
valuation for that treatment; yet, it is plausible that valuations differ based on 
unobserved heterogeneity in consumer preferences. Random Parameters models, also 
referred to as Random Coefficients or Mixed models, have been used more recently in 
the literature to fully account for unobserved individual heterogeneity in consumers’ 
valuations. These models allow flexible modeling of within-cluster correlation, suitable 
for auction sessions with multiple products and repeated rounds in which the bids 
submitted by the same participant tend to be strongly correlated across rounds (Lusk, 
Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004). Furthermore, while many of the applications of random 
parameters have used a linear regression framework (McAdams et al. 2013; Yue et al. 
2010), there exists a growing literature on nonlinear models with random parameters 
(Greene 2012; Train 2009). This article examines the usefulness of the Random 
Parameters Tobit model in accommodating unobserved individual heterogeneity in the 
coefficients and the censoring nature of the data collected in experimental auctions with 
multiple bids per respondent. We apply the Random Parameters Tobit, also referred to in 
the literature as Censored Random Parameters or Mixed Tobit model, to data collected 
in a non-hypothetical sealed-bid second-price Vickrey auction (Vickrey 1961) conducted 
to elicit consumers’ valuation of specialty melons, government and industry-issued food 
safety standards, and tasting treatments. 
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The valuation of food safety as a quality attribute has been a longstanding topic 
in the literature (Hayes et al. 1995; van Ravenswaay 1988). After numerous food-borne 
illness outbreaks linked to the consumption of meat and fresh produce there have been 
increasing efforts to enhance the safety of the U.S. food supply. In the melon industry, 
outbreaks of Salmonella and Listeria in Cantaloupes and Honeydews during 2008, 2011, 
and 2012 resulted in consumer deaths, product recalls by the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and disruptions of international trade and consumer confidence. 
Although several food safety and protection standards for fresh produce are currently 
being promoted by the government, private-sector retailers, producers groups, and 
international organizations, this article considers industry-sponsored (GlobalGAP) and 
government-sponsored (FSMA) programs. The recent signing into law of the Food 
Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) by President Obama on January 4, 2011 provides 
evidence of the political importance of industry regulation of food safety and preventive 
control in the U.S. Under the FSMA, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is 
introducing mandatory Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs) for domestic fresh produce 
production and harvesting. In addition, on-farm produce handling, holding, and packing 
operations are treated as food facilities, which are required to develop and implement a 
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) plan. Overall, these provisions 
require that produce farms establish science-based standards for safe production and 
harvesting of fruits and vegetables that are raw commodities to minimize the risk of 
illness. Similarly, GlobalGAP is a non-governmental organization that sets voluntary 
standards for the certification of good agricultural practices that ensure food safety in 
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agricultural products around the world.  Under this program, growers need to comply 
with specific practices and are audited by third-party agents trained according to 
International Standards Organization (ISO) 9000 quality management or ISO 14000 
environmental management standards. An important motivation of this privately-
sponsored food safety program, which is now established in over 80 countries around the 
world, is the development of uniform standards that are recognized across national 
boundaries to facilitate international trade (Palma et al. 2010; Paggi et al. 2013). 
The objectives of this article are as follows. First, to examine the use of the 
Random Parameters Tobit model in the analysis of experimental auction data to account 
for bid-censoring and unobservable factors that may affect consumer’s valuation of 
treatments. Second, to provide valuation estimates of consumer preferences towards 
selected food safety standards in specialty produce. We contribute to the literature by 
comparing different estimation methods including Constant Parameters Tobit, Random 
Effects Tobit, Random Parameters Linear, and Random Parameters Tobit, and by 
investigating which estimation method provides the best fit and generates the most 
efficient WTP estimates when data follows a panel structure (i.e. multiple bids by the 
same individual for multiple treatments). Because repeated rounds with multiple good 
valuation are becoming a standard practice in experimental auctions, the results of this 
article have implications for model selection in the analysis of experimental auction data. 
Secondly, given the plethora of food safety initiatives that producers are expected to 
comply with in order to avoid disruptions in revenues, remain competitive, and avoid 
being excluded from influential markets, the limited literature available has focused on 
 36 
 
examining the evolution of these standards and the costs that producers face as they 
implement the activities required for compliance (Paggi et al. 2013; Palma et al. 2010). 
However, less attention has been given to analyzing consumer preferences. Information 
on consumer valuation of selected food safety programs provides valuable input to 
producers, importers, marketers, and other stakeholders to more accurately weigh the 
costs and the benefits of complying with these standards, to help determine the welfare 
effects of food safety standards and food product labeling, and to gain a deeper 
understanding of consumer behavior. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
Experimental economists have used different econometric models to analyze 
experimental auction bids. Alfnes and Rickertsen (2003) used Pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares regression to estimate WTP differences among different types of beef using 
multiple repeated trials. Yet, the use of pooled linear regression when several responses 
are collected from each individual may result in inefficient parameter estimates 
(Carlsson and Martinsson 2007). Lusk et al. (2001) used a Double Hurdle model, as an 
alternative to a Tobit specification, to account for the two-step process of a field study 
valuating steak tenderness. Their in-store experiment consisted of collecting one bid per 
consumer using a modified Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism. A Double 
Hurdle model separates the decision of whether to pay more for a tender steak (i.e. a 
zero bid) versus the decision of how much more (i.e. a positive bid). Various 
experiments in the literature that have collected multidimensional data make use of panel 
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data models. Corrigan and Rousu (2006a) used Random Effects Linear models to study 
bid affiliation from posted prices across three experimental auctions. Shogren, List, and 
Hayes (2000) and List and Shogren (1999) found very similar results in their estimates 
of Fixed and Random Effects models, and report the fixed effects estimates in their 
studies on preference learning and price information, respectively. Lusk, Feldkamp, and 
Schroeder (2004) estimated a Random Effects Tobit model to evaluate the impact of 
experimental auction procedures on the valuation of different qualities of beef. Corrigan 
and Rousu (2006b) also make use of a Random Effects Tobit to test the endowment 
effect in the absence of loss aversion, even though they do not report whether the 
random effects were statistically significant in the panel data. 
Importantly, unobserved individual heterogeneity may take the form of either 
random intercepts or random coefficients, that is, the multiple bids submitted by the 
same individual can be correlated through a shared random intercept or a shared random 
slope, or both. Despite the increasing popularity of experimental auctions with multiple 
goods and multiple rounds, the valuation of one good influences the valuation of 
subsequent goods (Lusk and Shogren 2007); hence, bids submitted by the same 
participant over repeated products and treatments tend to be strongly correlated (Lusk, 
Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004). As a consequence, Random Parameters models have 
been used more recently to account for unobserved individual heterogeneity in the 
coefficients. In the context of experimental auctions, McAdams et al. (2013) estimated a 
Random Parameters Linear model to explain willingness-to-pay for novel food products 
and found statistically significant effects in all random parameters, suggesting 
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heterogeneity in individual effects on WTP of the auctioned products, the product forms, 
and the treatments. Yue et al. (2010) estimated a Random Parameters Linear model to 
examine consumer WTP for biodegradable containers for flowers and compare these to 
their WTP estimates from conjoint analysis data. Although they found a statistically 
significant random intercept, indicating a correlation between the multiple bids 
submitted by the same participant, they do not report the random coefficients. Moreover, 
both studies failed to account for the censoring structure of the data. Even if 
experimental auctions provide continuous measures of monetary valuations, the bids are 
often censored at zero (Lusk and Shogren 2007). A Random Parameters Tobit model 
accounts for unobserved individual heterogeneity in the coefficients while modeling the 
censoring nature of the data. An empirical application of several econometric models 
using auction data collected in South Central U.S. to elicit consumers’ valuations of food 
safety certification programs sheds light on the importance of fully considering bid-
censoring and unobserved individual heterogeneity in the regression parameters in 
experimental auctions. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Experimental Design and Data 
Eight experimental sessions were conducted during three days. Each session included 
between 18 and 26 participants, with a total of 172 participants. The participants were 
representative consumers (nonstudents) recruited from central Texas through multiple 
newspaper and online advertisements and were matched with a study session based on 
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their schedule availability, age, and gender to reflect the socio-demographics of U.S. 
grocery shoppers (Carpenter and Moore 2006). The distribution of demographic 
characteristics of experimental auction participants is shown in table 5.  
 
 
Table 5. Demographic and Other Characteristics of Experimental Auction 
Participants 
Variable Category Sample Population a,b,c 
    Mean Percent Mean Percent  
Age 18 to 29 years of age   38.6   40.4 
 
30 to 49 years of age 
 
32.2 
 
17.8 
 
50 years of age or more 
 
29.2 
 
12.5 
Education High school degree or less 
 
11.7 
 
33.8 
 
Bachelor's degree or 
 
60.2 
 
45.9 
 
at least some college 
    
 
Graduate school degree or 
 
28.1 
 
20.4 
 
at least some graduate 
school 
    Household size 
 
2.6 
 
2.6 
 (number of individuals) 
     Gender Female 
 
58.8 
 
49.0 
 
Male 
 
41.2 
 
51.0 
Marital status Married 
 
54.4 
 
33.7 
 
Not married 
 
45.6 
 
66.2 
Yearly household income Less than $50,000 
 
60.1 
 
62.3 
 
Greater or equal than 
$50,000 but 
 
27.4 
 
23.7 
 
less than $100,000 
    
 
$100,000 or more 
 
12.5 
 
14.0 
Primary grocery shopper  Yes 
 
87.1 
  of the household No 
 
12.9 
  Weekly household spending  
 
26.3 
   on fruits and vegetables ($) 
     Amount of fresh fruit and 
vegetables on hand as 
 
66.5 
   percentage of full stock           
a Source: American Community Survey 2007-2011. 
b Population statistics for the Bryan/College Station, TX area. 
c The age categories available in the American Community Survey are: 20 to 34 years of age, 35 to 54 
years of age, and 55 years of age or more. 
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To ensure that participants were regular buyers of fruits, the advertisement 
specified that the study would involve consumer decision-making for fruit purchases. 
About 87% of participants were the primary shopper of groceries in their household. 
After arrival to the session, participants completed a consent form and were assigned 
anonymous ID numbers. They were provided with written and oral explanations on the 
incentive-compatible sealed-bid second-price Vickrey auction (Vickrey 1961)3 and were 
explained their weakly dominant strategy, that is, to bid their true WTP for a unit of each 
good. Because subjects were simultaneously bidding on substitute goods, which may 
cause demand reduction or diminishing marginal utility (Lusk and Shogren 2007), 
subjects were informed that while the session included several rounds of bidding and 
several goods per round, only one of the goods and one of the non-hypothetical bidding 
rounds would be randomly selected as binding at the end of the experiment. Then, 
subjects participated in a first practice round. To ensure that they understood the auction 
procedure, they took a short knowledge quiz on the auction procedures and the correct 
answers to the quiz were discussed by a session monitor. Next, subjects participated in a 
second practice round. After participating in the short quiz and practice rounds, subjects 
participated in non-hypothetical auctions for six fruit products that are close substitutes: 
Cantaloupe, Honeydew, Tuscan melon, Canary melon, Galia melon, and personal 
watermelon as a control product.  
                                                 
3 In the Vickrey auction participants submit a sealed-bid, and the highest bidder pays a price equal to the 
second highest bid. 
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In the non-hypothetical rounds there was one between-subjects treatment and two 
within-subjects treatments. The treatments were 1) Tasting: Four sessions participated in 
a tasting of each product prior to submitting their bids, while the other four sessions did 
not taste the products before bidding; 2) Industry-based Food Safety Certification Label: 
All participants were given information on a food safety certification label that would be 
issued by GlobalGAP, an industry-based effort that sets standards for the certification of 
agricultural products around the world; and 3) Government-based Food Safety 
Certification Label: All participants were given information on a food safety certification 
label that would be issued by the government (FSMA) through USDA. GlobalGAP is 
primarily based in Europe, and FSMA had not been fully implemented at the time of the 
auction. Therefore, participants were not familiar with either of the two food safety 
standards prior to the information treatments. The order of the within-subjects treatments 
was randomized for each session to account for ordering effects. At the time of bidding, 
participants were given the chance to examine the fruit products up for auction. Once all 
non-hypothetical rounds were finished, subjects completed a survey to gather data on 
purchasing habits and socio-economic characteristics while the session monitors 
randomly determined the binding round and product for each session. At the end of the 
session, the auction results were announced. Because prices were not posted between 
rounds, bid affiliation (Corrigan and Rousu 2006a; List and Shogren 1999) was not an 
issue. That is, bids were not influenced by the bids submitted previously by other 
participants. Finally, subjects were paid a participation fee of $30 less any fruit 
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purchases they made during the auction. The complete written instructions given to 
participants are available in Appendix B.   
3.3.2 Econometric Models 
The experimental auction consisted of multiple goods j=1,…,J and multiple treatments 
s=1,…S, implying that multiple observations       were collected from each 
participant i=1,…N. Because multiple bids are collected from a given participant, the 
resulting pooled data set is likely to exhibit cross-sectional heterogeneity. A Random 
Parameters Tobit model can be specified to account for unobserved heterogeneity and 
the censoring of zero bids within and across individuals. We first assume that the bids 
are generated by an underlying latent variable and follow a Tobit specification: 
(12)          
                     
                   
   
where       
  is the latent value of individual i’s bid in treatment round s for product j,  
       is the observed value,      represents a set of product characteristics, treatment 
indicators, and socio-demographic and behavioral characteristics,   is a vector of 
random intercepts,   is a vector of random coefficients,   is a vector of constant 
coefficients, and      represents a vector of random error terms. Note that the Random 
Effects Tobit used in panel data models results if   is zero and only   is random, 
whereas in a Constant Parameters Tobit specification   is zero and   is constant. 
In a Random Parameters Tobit, by allowing the individual-specific parameter set 
  to vary randomly around a common mean-coefficient vector, it is assumed that not 
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only the intercept, but also certain product features or treatments exhibit individual 
heterogeneity. The model specification for a given individual i is given by: 
(13)                          
                      
        ̅     and      ̅     
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 )     if     
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]  if       or  (    
 )     if      
       ,          
     
    if       or     
      if      
where     
  is a         column vector of latent values of the dependent variable 
associated with each observation,   is a         column vector of 1s,    denotes the 
mean intercept for the group of observations submitted by individual i,  ̅ is a scalar that 
represents the grand mean or the mean of the intercepts for the observations submitted 
by all individuals, and    denotes the deviation of the mean intercept for i from the grand 
mean, that is, it captures the variation in intercepts between individuals. These random 
intercepts are distributed with a zero mean and variance   
 , and are independent across 
individuals. Similarly,        allows for variation in the values of the specified regressors 
for each individual. The     mean coefficients column vector    consists of a 
common-grand mean coefficient vector  ̅ that takes into account the observations by all 
individuals, plus a vector    that indicates unit-specific deviations of the mean 
coefficients vector from the set of grand mean coefficient values, and      is a       
  matrix of K random covariates.  
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For simplicity, the vector    does not depend on any individual invariant 
variables as in Lusk and Shogren (2007, p. 106) and Greene (2004). Random variation in 
   is induced by the vector of variations   , which captures variation in coefficients 
between individuals. By assumption, these unit-specific deviations are uncorrelated 
across individuals (i.e.  (    
 )     if     ), which in turn implies that the random 
coefficients are uncorrelated between individuals. Within the same individual, the 
deviations are assumed to follow a distribution with a zero mean vector and the common 
variance-covariance matrix  , which is stable over observations. The diagonal and off-
diagonal elements of this     matrix correspond, respectively, to the variance and 
covariance terms of the coefficients associated with the K random covariates, such as 
product features or treatment indicators. In this article, a normal distribution of the 
random coefficients is assumed, so that         ̅    and          
   if    . Also, 
     is a         matrix of L fixed covariates,   is a     vector of coefficients that 
are constant for all bidders, and    is a conformable set of normally distributed overall 
error terms with mean zero and common variance matrix   
 . The assumption  (    
 )  
  if     implies that the errors are uncorrelated across individuals and there is no serial 
correlation, however, the variance of the ith individual’s disturbance term is constant for 
any observation by i. This set accounts for unobserved variation within individuals by 
capturing the deviation of individual i’s unobservable WTP function value from the 
observed WTP by i. 
The pooled model over all individuals i=1,…N takes the form: 
(14)                ̅   ̃         
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where      is a column vector with            observations, A is a      
     matrix, where each sub-matrix    has       rows and the     column is 
composed entirely of 1s and the rest of 0s,   is an     vector of random intercepts 
composed by the grand mean plus the deviation for each individual,    is an      
     matrix of random covariates,  ̅ is a      vector of grand means corresponding 
to the coefficients of the   random covariates,  ̃  is a               matrix of 
random covariates,   is a         vector of deviations,    is a           
matrix of constant covariates,   is a      vector of coefficients of the   constant 
covariates, and   is a conformable set of normally distributed overall error terms with 
mean zero and common constant variance matrix   
         . Finally, a common 
assumption in random coefficients models is that the random effects  ,  ,  , and   are 
uncorrelated (Moeltner and Layton 2002; Swamy 1970).  
For ease of notation hereafter let   denote the total of bids submitted by each 
individual (i.e.      ). The bids can be positive, zero, or even negative in theory4. If 
                                                 
4 Although individuals were theoretically allowed to submit negative bids, no participants bid negative 
values. 
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there are m non-positive or censored bids out of T total bids submitted by i, the joint 
probability of observing this cluster of observations is: 
(15)                                    
                 
   
         
           
                  
  (     (  ̅      ̅      )        (  ̅      ̅      )             ) 
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    ̅     ̅      
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where                 is the composite error term and      indicates the 
multivariate normal distribution that has both censored and uncensored parts. If we let 
  
            and   
               represent the groups of censored and 
uncensored components, respectively, the joint density     
    
    can be rewritten as: 
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where the conditional density     
         
 |  
    and F(.) is the multivariate normal 
cumulative distribution function. The log-likelihood function for i is given by: 
(17)                  
          
    
      
         
   
The second term in this equation is a joint cdf that can include up to T integrals, i.e. if all 
T bids reported by i are censored at zero. This term does not have a closed form solution 
that would allow solving the log-likelihood function numerically, thus the model is 
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estimated using Simulated Maximum Likelihood Estimation (SMLE). This procedure is 
similar to conventional MLE except that simulated probabilities are used instead of the 
exact probabilities (Train 2009). The simulated log-likelihood for all participants is then: 
(18)      ( ̃)  ∑       
        ̃ 
        
where  ̃ 
  is the simulated component. Once this component has been approximated, the 
function can be maximized using conventional MLE.  
In our application, WTP bids are modeled as a function of both random and 
constant covariates. Random covariates include product characteristics and treatment 
indicators, whereas constant covariates include socio-demographic and behavioral 
characteristics. Product characteristics include the melon variety (Cantaloupe, 
Honeydew, Tuscan, Canary, or Galia), and the type of fruit (melon or watermelon), and 
treatment variables include dummy indicators identifying tasting and food safety 
standard treatments. Table 6 shows a description of the demographic and behavioral 
variables included in all econometric analyses. In this article we use the RPM procedure 
in NLOGIT5 using 500 Halton5 draws to estimate the Random Parameters Tobit model. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Demographic and Behavioral Variables Used in the Econometric Analyses 
Variable Definition 
AGE1a Value of 1 if 18 to 29 years of age, 0 otherwise 
AGE2 Value of 1 if 30 to 49 years of age, 0 otherwise 
AGE3 Value of 1 if 50 years of age or more, 0 otherwise 
EDU1a Value of 1 if high school degree or less, 0 otherwise 
                                                 
5 A Halton non-random sequence has been shown to generate gains in speed and efficiency in the 
simulation process when compared to random sequences (Greene 2012; Moeltner and Layton 2002).   
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Table 6. Continued 
Variable Definition 
EDU2 Value of 1 if for education x: high school degree<x<=4-year/bachelor's degree, 0 otherwise 
EDU3 Value of 1 if some graduate school or more, 0 otherwise 
HHSIZE Number of individuals living in the household 
FEMALE Value of 1 if female, 0 otherwise 
MARRIED Value of 1 if married, 0 otherwise 
INC1a Value of 1 if household yearly income <$50,000, 0 otherwise 
INC2 Value of 1 if for household yearly income x: $50,000<=x<$100,000, 0 otherwise 
INC3 Value of 1 if household yearly income of $100,000 or more, 0 otherwise   
ASPENDFV Average value of household weekly expenditures on fruits and vegetables in $ 
FVOH Amount of fresh fruit and vegetables on hand as percentage of full stock 
a Used as dummy variables base levels. 
 
 
 
3.4 Results and Discussion 
3.4.1 Statistical Methods 
The experimental auction bids were pooled, which resulted in 3,096 observations (6 
products   3 rounds   172 participants).  After accounting for missing data on survey 
questions, there were a total of 2,968 usable observations. Table 7 provides descriptive 
statistics for the bids by treatment rounds. Regarding the food safety treatments, 
consumers submitted higher mean bids for melons certified for food safety by either the 
government or the industry compared with non-certified products. Higher mean bids 
were reported for a food safety certification issued by the government compared to an 
industry-based certification. Equality among the two distribution functions of WTP for 
food safety standards was tested by means of a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, 
which tests the null hypothesis that the distributions are equal. The null hypothesis could 
not be rejected (P = 0.624), indicating that the distributions of WTP for both food safety 
programs are statistically equal.  
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for the Bids     
    Treatment 
  Product Tasting 
No 
tasting  
Industry 
label 
Government 
label  
All 
rounds 
Mean Cantaloupe 1.72 1.80 1.99 2.06 1.94 
 
Honeydew 1.67 1.87 1.91 1.99 1.89 
 
Tuscan 2.05 1.83 2.10 2.17 2.07 
 
Canary Yellow 1.72 1.79 1.98 2.03 1.92 
 
Galia 1.75 1.81 2.00 2.05 1.94 
 
Personal 
Watermelon 1.97 2.41 2.32 2.35 2.29 
 
All bids 1.81 1.92 2.05 2.11 2.01 
Standard deviation Cantaloupe 0.92 0.79 0.98 0.99 0.95 
 
Honeydew 0.97 0.98 1.08 1.13 1.07 
 
Tuscan 1.23 1.05 1.22 1.23 1.20 
 
Canary Yellow 1.17 1.16 1.20 1.23 1.20 
 
Galia 1.15 0.97 1.18 1.19 1.15 
 
Personal 
Watermelon 1.12 1.16 1.21 1.23 1.20 
 
All bids 1.10 1.04 1.15 1.17 1.14 
Percentage of zero 
bids Cantaloupe 1.20 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.39 
 
Honeydew 3.61 2.25 2.91 3.49 3.10 
 
Tuscan 2.41 4.49 4.09 4.07 3.88 
 
Canary Yellow 6.10 6.74 5.81 6.40 6.21 
 
Galia 4.82 4.49 5.23 5.81 5.23 
 
Personal 
Watermelon 6.02 0.00 2.33 2.91 2.71 
  All bids 4.02 3.00 3.39 3.88 3.59 
Note: Bids indicate the participants' reservation price, that is, their maximum willingness to pay for one 
unit of each good. 
 
 
 
Table 8 shows the estimation results of the experimental auction data using 
Random Parameters Linear and Random Parameters Tobit models6. As in Rickard et al. 
(2011), the standard deviations of the random parameters, which capture the dispersion  
                                                 
6 Constant Parameters Tobit and Random Effects Tobit models were also estimated for the bid equation. A 
likelihood ratio test (       
      ) rejected the null hypothesis of a nested Constant Parameter Tobit 
regression (     
    
   ) in favor of a Random Effects Tobit specification (     
      
    ), 
indicating that individual-specific random intercepts in the data were present. These results are available 
from the authors upon request. 
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Table 8. Random Parameters Econometric Estimates for WTP for Fruit Products  
 
Random Parameters Linear Random Parameters Tobitc 
 
Parameter Standard Error  Parameter Standard Error  Marginal Effect 
 
Means of Random Parameters 
Intercept 1.9258*** 0.2088 1.3717*** 0.0457 
 Honeydew -0.0526 0.0563 -0.0709** 0.0354 -0.0709 
Tuscan 0.1361** 0.0674 0.0621* 0.0345 0.0621 
Canary -0.0125 0.0697 -0.0721** 0.0318 -0.0720 
Galia 0.0233 0.0637 -0.0146 0.0329 -0.0146 
Personal watermelon 0.3460*** 0.0633 0.5345*** 0.0369 0.5344 
Tasting × Cantaloupe -0.1152* 0.0635 -0.1525* 0.0895 -0.1525 
Tasting × Honeydew -0.0981 0.0668 -0.1680* 0.0970 -0.1680 
Tasting × Tuscan -0.0919 0.0652 0.0132 0.0956 0.0132 
Tasting × Canary -0.0893 0.0713 -0.1129 0.0922 -0.1129 
Tasting × Galia -0.1491** 0.0736 -0.1307 0.0922 -0.1307 
Tasting × Personal watermelon -0.0947 0.0662 -0.1489 0.0982 -0.1489 
GlobalGAP food safety standards 0.1349*** 0.0500 0.1251*** 0.0222 0.1251 
FSMA food safety standards  0.1818*** 0.0419 0.1831*** 0.0244 0.1831 
 
Demographics/Behaviors 
AGE2 (30 to 49) -0.1720 0.1849 0.3456*** 0.0324 0.3455 
AGE3 (50 or more) -0.2198 0.1878 -0.1564*** 0.0324 -0.1564 
EDU2 (College) 0.1393 0.1401 0.1669*** 0.0229 0.1669 
EDU3 (Graduate school) 0.2491 0.2259 -0.0063 0.0382 -0.0063 
HHSIZE (Household size) -0.0069 0.0587 0.1212*** 0.0097 0.1212 
FEMALE -0.1703 0.1352 -0.1364*** 0.0230 -0.1364 
MARRIED -0.1158 0.1876 -0.3696*** 0.0322 -0.3696 
INC2 ($50,000 to less than $100,000) 0.1774 0.1698 -0.0298 0.0273 -0.0298 
INC3 ($100,000 or more) -0.0712 0.2222 -0.1345*** 0.0379 -0.1345 
ASPENDFV (Expenditures on produce) 0.0026 0.0039 0.0090*** 0.0007 0.0090 
FVOH (Percentage of produce on hand) 0.0003 0.0015 0.0021*** 0.0003 0.0021 
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Table 8. Continued 
 
Random Parameters Linear Random Parameters Tobitc 
 
Parameter Standard Error Parameter Standard Error Marginal Effect 
 
Standard Deviations of Random Parameters 
Intercept 0.7948*** 0.0481 0.7985*** 0.0096 
 Honeydew 0.6631*** 0.0436 0.4299*** 0.0222 
 Tuscan 0.8159*** 0.0527 0.5496*** 0.0228 
 Canary 0.8471*** 0.0526 0.6208*** 0.0261 
 Galia 0.7664*** 0.0479 0.3727*** 0.0225 
 Personal watermelon 0.7596*** 0.0466 0.8336*** 0.0279 
 Tasting × Cantaloupe 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.1114 0.0828 
 Tasting × Honeydew 0.1372** 0.1136 0.0004 0.0850 
 Tasting × Tuscan 0.0002 0.0666 0.0928 0.0722 
 Tasting × Canary 0.2539*** 0.0761 0.1559* 0.0846 
 Tasting × Galia 0.3071*** 0.0698 0.1919*** 0.0740 
 Tasting × Personal watermelon 0.1097* 0.1377 0.1045 0.0752 
 Global GAP food safety label 0.5248*** 0.0326 0.3977*** 0.0126 
 USDA food safety label 0.3912*** 0.0266 0.1592*** 0.0153   
σ(e) 0.3184*** 0.0065 0.5559*** 0.0032 
 No. of usable observations 2968 
 
2968 
  Log-Likelihood -2701.86 
 
-3212.84 
  Likelihood ratio test 3,604.94***a   2,601.94***b     
Note: *, **, ***, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
a Likelihood ratio test of Random Parameters Linear vs. Constant Parameters Linear regression. 
b Likelihood ratio test of Random Parameters Tobit vs. Constant Parameters Tobit regression. 
c Based on 500 Halton draws. 
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in intercepts and coefficients between individuals, are interpreted as unobserved 
individual heterogeneity. Results indicate that most of the standard deviations in both 
random parameters models were statistically significant, meaning that unobserved 
heterogeneity in the valuations is an important feature of the experimental auction data. 
The random specifications of the models (     
    and   
   ) provided 
better fit to the data than their constant counterparts (     
    
   ). A likelihood 
ratio test (           
      ) rejected the null hypothesis of a nested Constant 
Parameters Linear regression in favor of a Random Parameters Linear specification. A 
likelihood ratio test (           
      ) rejected the null hypothesis of a nested 
Constant Parameters Tobit regression in favor of a Random Parameters Tobit 
specification. The Random Parameters Tobit specification also provided a better fit than 
a Random Effects Tobit (     
      
    ), based on a likelihood ratio test that 
greatly exceeded the critical value at a 99 percent confidence level (           
  
    ).  
Results from both random parameters models were similar. Although the random 
parameters models properly account for the existing unobserved heterogeneity and 
within-cluster correlation of random covariates, the linear model still ignores potential 
bid-censoring at zero. In our pooled data, about 4% of the usable observations were left-
censored at zero. Results of a Hausman specification test (Hausman 1978) of the Linear 
Random Parameters specification versus the Random Parameters Tobit specification 
indicated that the Random Parameters Tobit model was the most appropriate for the 
auction data.  Under the null hypothesis, parameter estimates from the Random 
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Parameters Linear are consistent, while parameter estimates from the Random 
Parameters Tobit are efficient and consistent. The null hypothesis could not be rejected 
based on a calculated Hausman test statistic distributed       
          . Hence, 
among all models considered, specifying a Random Parameters Tobit model provided 
the best model fit and the most efficient and consistent parameter estimates.  
3.4.2 Valuation of Food Safety Standards 
The marginal effects of the Random Parameters Tobit model evaluated at the mean 
values of the independent variables are presented in the last column of table 4. Both 
government-issued and industry-issued food safety certification treatments had a positive 
and significant effect on WTP compared with non-certified products. A government-
based program (FSMA) had higher WTP compared with an industry-based (GlobalGAP) 
program, suggesting a greater degree of consumer trust in government food safety 
oversight and enforcement. Marginal effects indicate that consumers are willing to pay 
an average price premium of $0.13 for a fruit product that meets industry-issued 
certification standards (GlobalGAP) for food safety and good agricultural practices, 
whereas they are willing to pay an average price premium of $0.18 for a fruit product 
that meets government-issued certification standards (FSMA), compared with a non-
certified product. In reference to the average WTP value, these marginal effects 
represent an increase in WTP of about 6.5% for an industry-based program and 8.9% for 
a government-based program. Although there was no statistical difference in the 
distributions of WTP for food safety standards as tested by a two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic, results of the Random Parameters Tobit indicate that the mean 
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parameter estimate of WTP for government-sponsored food safety standards (FSMA) is 
statistically higher than the mean parameter estimate of WTP for industry-sponsored 
standards (GlobalGAP). Using the estimated variance/covariance matrix to calculate a 
right-tailed z-test, the null hypothesis of equality      ̂      ̂        was rejected in 
favor of the alternative hypothesis      ̂      ̂        at a 1 percent significance 
level. The significance of the food safety parameter estimates was robust across all 
econometric models considered. Furthermore, results from both random parameter 
models indicate that the coefficients associated with the food safety treatments are 
heterogeneous as indicated by the strong significance of their standard deviations, 
implying that the valuation of a food safety certification label varies significantly across 
participants. That is, consumers may value the presence of food safety standards, 
however, their valuations do not depend only on observed variables, but also on 
unobservable differences that give rise to heterogeneous preferences across participants 
(e.g. previous experiences related to food-borne diseases).  
Differences in product varieties and a tasting treatment were also investigated. 
Estimates show that consumers expressed price discounts of $0.07 for Honeydew and 
Canary varieties, and price premiums of $0.06 for Tuscan and $0.53 for a personal 
watermelon, compared with the benchmark Cantaloupe melon variety. The Tuscan 
melon seems to be a promising specialty variety in terms of willingness-to-pay and 
consumer preferences. It was the only specialty melon that had a statistically significant 
price premium compared with Cantaloupe, and it was the only variety for which mean 
bids increased after tasting the product, though the latter effect was not statistically 
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significant. All the coefficients associated with the product varieties were significantly 
random, indicating that preference valuations for these fruit products vary by individual. 
In contrast, tasting had a significant negative effect on WTP for Cantaloupe and 
Honeydew melons, and this effect was homogeneous across participants. After tasting 
the melons, all consumers expressed a homogeneous price discount of $0.15 for 
Cantaloupe and $0.17 for Honeydew.  
The constant covariates of the model included socio-demographic and behavioral 
characteristics of participants. Regarding the socio-demographic profile, results show 
that consumers aged 30 to 49 years old, and those with at least a college education, are 
willing to pay price premiums for these fruit products. Consumers with 50 years of age 
or older, females, married, and with relatively high yearly household income (greater 
than $100,000), expressed price discounts. Related to the effect of gender, Corrigan and 
Rousu (2006a) found that in some treatments male participants’ bids for candy bars and 
mugs increased at a higher rate than those of female participants, suggesting that men 
may submit higher bids as they may be more driven to be declared the winner of an 
auction. Regarding behavioral characteristics, a higher WTP is linked to consumers that 
are consistent purchasers of fruits, specifically, those with higher average expenditures 
on fruits and vegetables, those with a higher amount of fresh fruits and vegetables on 
hand as a percentage of their full stock, and larger households.  
Results from this article show that a Random Parameters Tobit model provided 
the best model fit and the most efficient and consistent parameter estimates. We use this 
model to provide estimates of consumer valuation of selected food safety programs, 
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which can aid producers, importers, marketers, and other stakeholders carry out analysis 
of the costs and benefits of compliance, and further understand consumer preferences.  
 
3.5 Summary and Conclusions 
Econometric models for panel data currently used in the analysis of experimental auction 
data have used different approaches to regression analysis of the bid equation to take 
into account the panel structure of the data. Some of the models used include pooled 
linear regression, and linear and nonlinear fixed effects and random effects models. 
Panel data model structures typically build unobserved individual heterogeneity into the 
intercept term. However, an important limitation in these models is the assumption that 
the regression coefficients are constant, since the valuation of a certain treatment may 
differ by individual due to unobserved factors. In this article, we used a Random 
Parameters Tobit model, also referred to as Censored Random Parameters or Mixed 
Tobit model, in the analysis of experimental auction data to extend the measurement of 
heterogeneity to other parameters, such as the treatment indicators. This model provides 
the flexibility of fitting models with constant and random coefficients with the possible 
assumption of correlation among the random components. An important implication for 
experimental economists is that they could employ a within-subjects design in 
experimental auctions, which results in a larger number of observations under treatment 
and control, while accounting for the correlation among bids submitted by the same 
individual for multiple products and treatments. We apply this model to data collected in 
a non-hypothetical sealed-bid second-price Vickrey auction conducted in central Texas. 
 57 
 
Among all estimation methods considered the Random Parameters Tobit model provided 
the best model fit and most efficient estimates, while accounting for bid-censoring and 
effectively capturing heterogeneity in preferences.  
Results of our empirical application show that participants are willing to pay a 
price premium of $0.13 for a product that meets industry-issued (GlobalGAP) 
certification standards for food safety and good agricultural practices, and a price 
premium of $0.18 for a fruit product that meets government-issued certification 
standards (FSMA), compared with a non-certified product. Perhaps the most notable 
result is the statistical significance of the standard deviations of the random parameters 
associated with both food safety standards, meaning that the valuations are 
heterogeneous across individuals. With regard to product varieties, estimates show price 
premiums for Tuscan melon and personal watermelon, and price discounts for 
Honeydew and Canary, compared with Cantaloupe. These price premiums and discounts 
were significantly heterogeneous. Conversely, the tasting sessions had homogeneous and 
significant negative effects on WTP for Cantaloupe and Honeydew, indicating that 
tasting these products significantly reduced all consumers’ WTP homogeneously. 
Constant covariates related to socio-demographic and behavioral characteristics such as 
age, gender, income, consumer expenditures, household size, and produce on hand, also 
had a statistically significant effect on WTP. Overall, the results indicate that unobserved 
heterogeneity is an important feature of experimental auction data that needs to be 
accounted for in the econometric analysis.  
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Additional research could test the applicability of the Random Parameters Tobit 
model to the analysis of experimental auction data under different procedures (i.e. 
product, auction mechanism), and whether this model is appropriate for other value 
elicitation methods that result in a censored panel structure for the dependent variable. 
Moreover, other econometric specifications can be investigated. As explained by Greene 
(2012), simulation-based random parameters estimators are flexible, allowing these 
models to be extended beyond the assumption of a normal distribution for the random 
parameters. Also, the random parameters corresponding to the treatments could be 
constrained to be positive to be consistent a priori with theoretical restrictions, or could 
be extended to depend on other individual invariant variables that affect the mean of the 
random parameters.   
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4. WHO PARTICIPATES IN EXPERIMENTAL AUCTIONS? A LATENT 
CLASS ANALYSIS WITH INDIVIDUAL HETEROGENEITY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Experimental auctions have become an increasingly common method of value elicitation 
that provides direct estimates of consumers’ valuations. A well-known advantage of 
non-hypothetical experimental auctions over hypothetical stated preference methods is 
that individuals are put in a simulated market environment where there are real monetary 
consequences to stating a valuation different than their true valuation (Lusk and Shogren 
2007). In order to resemble real traders, individuals are usually provided with a 
participation fee that serves as an initial endowment to bid and compensates individuals 
for their participation time. The magnitude of this endowment has been shown to 
influence willingness-to-pay estimates (Loureiro, Umberger, and Hine 2003).  
Although the provision of cash compensation enhances participation rates, it is 
also likely that other driving forces might serve as motivators to participate in an 
experimental auction and play a role in influencing bidding behavior. For instance, 
individuals might have a personal preference for the category of products being 
investigated, desire to support the entity conducting the research, availability of time and 
willingness to help, among other potential motivations that may be interrelated. All of 
these factors could result in unobserved individual heterogeneity that has not yet been 
accounted for in experimental auction design.  
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Previous studies have investigated bidding behavior from a behavioral and 
psychological stand-point (Adam et al. 2011; Ding et al. 2005). However, no 
information is available concerning the underlying motivation for individuals to 
participate in experimental auctions and its influence on actual willingness-to-pay 
(WTP). This article extends the knowledge and understanding of experimental auctions 
by analyzing unobserved and observed heterogeneity among experimental auction 
participants and its effect on willingness-to-pay estimates. The objectives are as follows: 
First, identifying potential latent classes of participants in experimental auctions based 
on unobserved motivations and observed indicators of participants’ heterogeneity. 
Second, investigating differences, if any, in consumers’ valuation of specialty melons, 
government and industry-issued food safety standards, and tasting, amongst members of 
these classes. Using a non-hypothetical second-price Vickrey auction (Vickrey 1961) 
conducted to elicit willingness-to-pay for government and industry-issued food safety 
standards, we segment participants into latent classes based on observed indicators of 
motivations to participate. We contribute to the experimental auction literature by 
identifying and characterizing three distinct classes of experimental auction participants 
based on motivation, a latent construct that has been of little attention in the literature, 
and by quantifying the ways in which this latent construct influences bidding behavior. 
Understanding the motivational, behavioral and demographic composition of different 
unobserved latent classes of participants may help experimenters to understand 
discrepancies in their WTP estimates. 
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4.2 Literature Review 
Consumer preferences for commodities, rights, and services are characterized by 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity. The increasing use in the literature of Random 
Parameters models to analyze experimental auction data (Yue et al. 2010, McAdams et 
al. 2013) suggests that individual unobserved heterogeneity is a significant feature of 
data collected in experimental auctions that deserves attention prior to making inferences 
about consumers’ valuations of products. Yet, while procedures that allow the 
parameters to vary randomly over individuals effectively account for unobserved 
heterogeneity, they are not well-suited to explaining the sources of heterogeneity. 
Alternatively, heterogeneity in preferences can be assumed to occur discretely using a 
latent class approach, which consists of sorting individuals into a number of latent 
classes, each composed of homogeneous individuals (Boxall and Adamowicz 2002).  
Latent Class Analysis (LCA), also known as finite mixture modeling, serves to 
identify a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive classes or subgroups that are 
unobserved. LCA assumes that there is an unobserved categorical variable, such as the 
number of distinct subgroups, types, or categories of individuals, which are measured by 
observed categorical indicators that are interrelated. This statistical tool has been used in 
the social (Coffman et al. 2007), psychological (Lubke and Muthen 2005), political 
(Breen 2000; Feick 1989; McCutcheon 1985), and health sciences (Laumann, Paik, and 
Rosen 1999) to investigate theoretical concepts that cannot be directly observed, such as 
ability, racial prejudice, religious commitment, or motivation. For instance, Coffman et 
al. (2007) made use of observed indicators of drinking motivations among high school 
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seniors to identify four latent classes of drinking behavior and to suggest prevention 
programs targeted to each class. LCA has also been used in choice-based conjoint 
analysis to cluster respondents into distinct classes based on observable attributes of 
choice (Ortega et al. 2011; Boxall and Adamowicz 2002; Ouma, Abdulai, and Drucker 
2007; Swait 1994). Boxall and Adamowicz (2002) used a branded choice experiment to 
identify four classes of recreationists based on attitudinal measures of motivation for 
taking a trip to a wilderness park, and to examine welfare measures. 
The use of LCA in the context of auctions has not been widespread, but previous 
studies have looked into participants’ behavior and motivations to win the auction. 
Adam et al. (2011) suggest that past auction outcomes which trigger emotions such as 
the joy of winning or loser regret, and the economic environment of perceived 
competition, may impact future bidding behavior. Ding et al. (2005) studied a formal 
representation of the impact of emotional bidders on bids across consumers and the way 
in which past bidding behavior influenced future bids. They found that there is a strong 
motivation effect associated with bidding, and such emotions change dynamically based 
on the outcome of the previous bids. They present a detailed theoretical framework of 
emotional bidding behavior and refer to auction fever as the interplay of past auction 
outcomes, the economic competition environment, and auction events. However, even if 
LCA has been applied to a wide range of issues in various fields, it has not yet been used 
to identify classes of participants in experimental auctions based on their motivation to 
attend the auction in the first place. This distinction allows the estimation of more 
accurate cost-benefit analyses and provides insights into the differential welfare impacts 
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of a policy change, such as policies related to the implementation of industry and 
government-based food safety standards. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Experimental Design and Data 
Eight experimental auction sessions were conducted during three days. Each session 
included between 18 and 26 participants, with a total of 172 participants. The 
participants were representative consumers (nonstudents) recruited from central Texas 
through multiple newspaper and online advertisements and were matched with a study 
session based on their schedule availability, age, and gender to reflect the socio-
demographics of U.S. grocery shoppers (Carpenter and Moore 2006). To ensure that 
participants were regular buyers of fruits, the advertisement specified that the study 
would involve consumer decision-making for fruit purchases. About 87% of participants 
were the primary shopper of groceries in their household.  
After arrival to the session, participants completed a consent form and were 
assigned anonymous ID numbers. They were provided with written and oral 
explanations on the incentive-compatible sealed-bid second-price Vickrey auction 
(Vickrey, 1961)7 and were explained their weakly dominant strategy, that is, to bid their 
true WTP for a unit of each good. Because subjects were simultaneously bidding on 
substitute goods, which may cause demand reduction or diminishing marginal utility 
                                                 
7 In the Vickrey auction participants submit a sealed-bid, and the highest bidder pays a price equal to the 
second highest bid. 
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(Lusk and Shogren 2007), subjects were informed that while the session included several 
rounds of bidding and several goods per round, only one of the goods and one of the 
non-hypothetical bidding rounds would be randomly selected as binding at the end of the 
experiment. Then, subjects participated in a first practice round. To ensure that they 
understood the auction procedure, they took a short knowledge quiz on the auction 
procedures and the correct answers to the quiz were discussed by a session monitor. 
Next, subjects participated in a second practice round. After participating in the short 
quiz and practice rounds, subjects participated in non-hypothetical auctions for six fruit 
products that are close substitutes: Cantaloupe, Honeydew, Tuscan melon, Canary 
melon, Galia melon, and personal watermelon as a control product.  
In the non-hypothetical rounds there was one between-subjects treatment and two 
within-subjects treatments. The treatments were 1) Tasting: Four sessions participated in 
a tasting of each product prior to submitting their bids, while the other four sessions did 
not taste the products before bidding; 2) Industry-based Food Safety Certification Label: 
All participants were given information on a food safety certification label that would be 
issued by GlobalGAP, an industry-based effort that sets standards for the certification of 
agricultural products around the world; and 3) Government-based Food Safety 
Certification Label: All participants were given information on a food safety certification 
label that would be issued by the government (FSMA) through USDA. GlobalGAP is 
primarily based in Europe, and FSMA had not been fully implemented at the time of the 
auction. Therefore, participants were not familiar with any of the two food safety 
standards prior to the information treatments. The order of the within-subjects treatments 
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was randomized for each session to account for ordering effects. At the time of bidding, 
participants were given the chance to examine the fruit products up for auction. Once all 
non-hypothetical rounds were finished, subjects completed a survey to gather data on 
purchasing habits, socio-economic characteristics, and binary indicators (“Yes” or “No”) 
of unobserved motivation to participate, while the session monitors randomly 
determined the binding round and product for each session. At the end of the session, the 
auction results were announced. Because prices were not posted between rounds, bid 
affiliation (Corrigan and Rousu 2006a; List and Shogren 1999) was not an issue. That is, 
bids were not influenced by the bids submitted previously by other participants. Finally, 
subjects were paid a participation fee of $30 less any fruit purchases they made during 
the auction. The complete written instructions given to participants are available from 
the authors upon request.   
4.3.2 Statistical Models  
4.3.2.1 Latent Class Analysis  
Heterogeneity in preferences is assumed to occur discretely using a latent class approach 
where the n consumers are sorted into a number of S latent classes. Suppose we estimate 
a latent class model with s=1,…,k,…,S classes from a set of   observed categorical 
indicators, each of which contains   possible outcomes, for individuals        . Let 
the vector    (         ) represent individual i’s observed responses to the j=1,…J  
indicators, where the m possible outcomes of     are         . Let the indicator 
function          equal 1 if individual i gives the m
th response to the jth variable, and 
0 otherwise. Dependence between indicators in the overall sample is expected, but 
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within a class the indicators are assumed to be independent (Linzer and Lewis 2011; 
Lanza et al. 2007). Therefore, the unconditional probability density function of the 
vector of responses    across all classes is approximated by a mixture of S component 
distributions, as in: 
(19)                  ∑   
 
     |         
(1.1)      ∑   
 
   ∏ ∏     |  
        
  
   
 
    
where the class membership probabilities             are the mixture weights or 
prior probabilities and the conditional probability density functions   |     are the 
mixture components. By local or conditional independence, the component distributions 
are assumed to be multi-way cross-classification tables with all categorical indicators 
mutually independent. The parameters of the component densities,            , 
correspond to vectors of indicator-response probabilities for each class. The purpose of 
LCA is to estimate the parameters          given realized values of   and a value of 
S provided by the analyst. The likelihood function for   is given by: 
(20)       |   ∏         
 
    
Maximizing the corresponding log-likelihood function with respect to each of the 
parameters is equivalent to doing a weighted likelihood maximization, in which the 
weights are given by the posterior probabilities of observing    into each of the latent 
classes. For instance, the posterior probability that each individual belongs to each class, 
conditional on the observed indicators, can be calculated using Bayes’ Theorem: 
(21)        |           
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However, these weights depend on the parameters   being estimated. This is 
solved by using the iterative Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster, 
Laird, and Rubin, 1977). The EM algorithm is applicable because each individual’s class 
membership is unknown and may be treated as missing data (Linzer and Lewis 2011; 
McLachlan and Peel 2000; McLachlan and Krishnan 1997). The log-likelihood is given 
by: 
(22)          ∑    [∑     |        
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In the E-Step, the expectation of        is obtained by using random initial 
estimates of the mixture components and mixture weights to calculate the missing class 
membership probabilities using equation 21, as in: 
(23)      (   |     
   )   ̂  
    
Once the non-observed class membership probabilities are replaced by their 
initial random estimates, the M-Step consists of maximizing the      (    )  with 
respect to   subject to: 
(24)    ∑     
 
                         
which yields maximum likelihood estimates of    and    for s=1,…,S. These estimates 
are used to recalculate the posterior probabilities and return to the E-step. The iterative 
EM algorithm repeats the Expectation-Maximization process until a certain convergence 
criteria is met (Wedel and DeSarbo 1994).  
Since the actual number of classes is unknown, information criteria are used as a 
guide to assist in determining S. Atkinson (1980) generalized the information criterion 
as: 
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(25)                 
where p indicates the number of parameters to be estimated. Akaike’s information 
Criterion (AIC; Akaike 1973) sets     and tends to favor larger models. The Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC; Schwartz 1978) sets        , where n denotes sample 
size; it imposes an additional sample size penalty on the log-likelihood, tending to favor 
more parsimonious models. The Adjusted BIC (Sclove 1987) imposes a lighter penalty 
than that of BIC by setting     (
   
  
). All of these criteria are compared for different 
specified values of S, and the model with the minimum values is chosen. Because the 
different criteria often do not result in the same model being selected, theory, judgment, 
and interpretability also play a role in model selection (Dziak et al. 2012). Once an 
optimal model has been identified and the corresponding   parameters that maximize 
the expected log-likelihood function have been estimated, the final posterior 
probabilities  ̂   provide a mean to classify the n individuals into the S classes by 
assigning each individual to the class with the highest posterior probability. That is, 
individual i belongs to class k if  ̂    ̂   for all    . 
4.3.2.2 Willingness-to-Pay 
To investigate differences in willingness-to-pay among latent classes, a Random Effects 
Tobit model is estimated for each class. The experimental auction consisted of multiple 
goods g=1,…,G and multiple treatments t=1,…T, implying that multiple observations 
      were collected from each participant i=1,…n. Because multiple bids are 
collected from a given participant, the resulting pooled data set is likely to exhibit cross-
sectional heterogeneity. The Random Effects Tobit is commonly used in auction data to 
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account for bid-censoring and the panel structure of data typically collected in 
experimental auctions. We first assume that the bids are generated by an underlying 
latent variable and follow a Tobit specification: 
(26)           
                     
      
     {        
  } for s = 1,…S 
where      
  is the latent value of individual i’s bid in treatment round t for product g, 
       is the observed value,       represent a set of product characteristics, treatment 
indicators, and socio-demographic and behavioral characteristics,   is a vector of 
coefficients,    is a vector of random effects, and      represents a vector of random error 
terms. The random effects    are i.i.d. N(0,   
 ), and      are i.i.d. N(0,   
 ) independently 
of   . The Random Effects Tobit model specification for a given individual i is given by: 
(27)         
                
where     
  is a         column vector of latent values of the dependent variable 
associated with each individual. Table 9 shows a description of the demographic and 
behavioral variables included in all econometric analyses. In this article, the Latent Class 
Model and Random Effects Tobit parameters were estimated using Stata 12 (StataCorp 
2011). 
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Table 9. Demographic and Behavioral Variables Used in the Econometric Analyses 
Variable Definition 
AGE1a Value of 1 if 18 to 29 years of age, 0 otherwise 
AGE2 Value of 1 if 30 to 49 years of age, 0 otherwise 
AGE3 Value of 1 if 50 years of age or more, 0 otherwise 
HHSIZE Number of individuals living in the household 
FEMALE Value of 1 if female, 0 otherwise 
MARRIED Value of 1 if married, 0 otherwise 
AVINCOME Average household yearly income in thousand dollars 
ASPENDFV Average value of household weekly expenditures on fruits and vegetables in US$ 
FVOH Amount of fresh fruit and vegetables on hand as percentage of full stock  
a Used as dummy variables base levels. 
 
 
 
4.4 Results and Discussion 
4.4.1 Latent Class Analysis 
4.4.1.1 Choosing the Number of Latent Classes 
When applying LCA the actual number of classes is unknown. Thus, a sequence of 
latent class models with 2 to 9 classes were estimated. The log-likelihood values, AIC, 
BIC and adjusted BIC for each model are summarized in table 10. Because the 
assumption of a    distribution in a likelihood ratio G2 or deviance test is not met in LCA 
(Lanza et al. 2007; Lin and Dayton 1997; Wedel and Desarbo 1994), this statistic is used 
only in a rough way to compare models. The minimum AIC and adjusted BIC statistics 
favored a three-class model, whereas the minimum BIC statistic favored a two-class 
model8. When the criteria differ, AIC often tends to choose a large model (i.e. 
overfitting), while BIC often tends to choose a small model (i.e. underfitting). However, 
                                                 
8 In practice,      in the generalized information criterion is often replaced by the practically equivalent 
likelihood ratio G2 (i.e. the deviance statistic) following the procedure in Dziak et al. (2012). Although the 
two definitions return different numerical values, they lead to equal model selection decisions. 
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Dziak et al. (2012) note that when the sample size n is small, the most likely error is 
underfitting, so the criterion with lower underfitting rates, such as AIC is preferred. 
Moreover, the estimated class-membership probabilities for the two-class model9 were 
6.19% and 93.81% for each class, whereas the estimated probabilities for the three-class 
model were 6.06%, 38.64%, and 55.30%. As discussed by Lanza et al. (2007) the size of 
each class should be nontrivial, meaning that each class should be distinguishable from 
the others on the basis of its probabilities. Therefore, given the estimated values of the 
information criteria and the sample size relative to the population complemented with 
judgment and interpretability, a three-class model was chosen. In terms of model 
performance, this is equivalent to balancing sensitivity, which refers to having enough 
parameters to adequately model the relationships among variables in the population, 
with specificity, which refers to not overfitting the model or suggesting nonexistent 
relationships (Dziak et al. 2012). 
4.4.1.2 Characterizing the Latent Classes  
Table 11 shows the estimated class membership probabilities and indicator-response 
probabilities. The class membership probabilities determined that 6.06% of individuals 
were members of Class 1, 38.64% were members of Class 2, and the remaining 55.30% 
were assigned to Class 3. The indicator-response probabilities represent the probability 
of endorsing the observed indicator for each latent class. That is, there is a 99% 
probability that consumers in Class 1 were participating for the first time in an 
experimental auction. Individuals in this class were also very likely to consider that all 
                                                 
9 Estimates of   for the two-class model are provided in Appendix C. 
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studies must include a compensation fee, and were not likely to participate with the 
intention of helping advance research efforts, supporting the educational institution, or 
due to interest in the auctioned products. Moreover, only 22% of individuals in this class 
would have participated if there was no payment.  
 
 
Table 10. Comparison of Latent Class Models    
Number  
of  
latent classes 
(S) 
Number 
of 
parameters 
(p) 
Log 
likelihood  
at 
convergence 
Likelihood ratio 
G
2
 
AIC
a
 BIC
b
 Adjusted 
BIC 
2 23 -1053.1 482.4 528.4 600.6 527.8 
3 35 -1036.6 449.3 519.3 629.2 518.4 
4 47 -1025.6 427.3 521.3 669.0 520.2 
5 59 -1016.9 410.1 528.1 713.4 526.6 
6 71 -1011.6 399.3 541.3 764.4 539.6 
7 83 -1002.8 381.8 547.8 808.6 545.8 
8 95 -996.8 369.8 559.8 858.2 557.4 
9 107 -985.0 346.1 560.1 896.2 557.4 
Note: Boldface type indicates the selected model. 
 a AIC (Akaike Information Criterion). 
 b BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) uses n=171. 
  
 
 
Individuals in Class 1 and Class 2 were very likely to participate with the 
intention of supporting the educational institution and expressed more interest in the 
auctioned products. They had a 58% probability of attending the experiment even if 
there was no payment, and were not so concerned about the requisite of a participation 
fee in experimental studies. All consumers in both classes were motivated by their desire 
to help advance research efforts. However, individuals in Class 2 were very likely to be 
participating for the first time in an experimental auction, were not necessarily residents 
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of the area where the study was conducted, and did not have any affiliation to the 
educational institution conducting the research. Individuals in Class 3 were more 
experienced in experimental auctions relative to the rest of the participants, had a 90% 
probability of being permanent residents of the area where the study was conducted, and 
certain individuals were associated with the educational institution conducting the 
research. 
 
 
Table 11. Latent Class Parameter Estimates for Three-Class Model 
    Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
  
Latent class membership 
 probabilities (π) 
    6.06% 38.64% 55.30% 
Variable Definition 
Indicator-response  
probabilities (θ) 
FIRST Participating for the first time in an experimental auction 0.99 0.88 0.56 
RELATIVES Relatives work at the university 0.29 0.01 0.45 
HELPU Signed up to support the educational institution 0.13 0.93 0.85 
PAYMENT Would have participated even without payment 0.22 0.58 0.58 
FRUITS Signed up because of interest in the auctioned products 0.22 0.58 0.52 
RESIDENT Permanent resident in the area 0.40 0.40 0.90 
HELPRES Signed up to help advance research efforts 0.06 1.00 1.00 
FEE Considers that all studies must include a participation fee 0.88 0.32 0.40 
FULLTIME Employed full time 0.11 0.16 0.38 
POSTPONED Postponed other activities to be able to participate 0.41 0.61 0.47 
DEGREE Earned a degree at the educational institution 0.21 0.17 0.37 
 
 
 
Table 12 shows a description of demographic and behavioral characteristics of 
experimental auction participants by latent class, for the entire sample, and for the 
Bryan/College Station, TX population. Class 1 was composed of young individuals 
(60% aged 18 to 29 years old) and certain individuals aged 50 years old or more (30%). 
 74 
 
Class 2 was composed mainly of young individuals (about 85% between 18 to 49 years 
old), while about 80% of individuals in Class 3 were older than 30 years old.  Regarding 
gender and marital status, Class 1 had mostly males that were not married; Class 2 had 
both males and females that were not married, while Class 3 included mostly married 
females. 
 Household size and income were two variables that followed a trend from one 
class to the other, that is, households in Class 3 were larger in average than those in 
Class 2, and households in Class 2 were larger than those in Class 1. Average yearly 
household income for Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 was $25,000, $34,485, and $68,279, 
respectively. Although 60% of all participants had on average a bachelor’s degree or at 
least some college, and this percentage held across classes, participants in Class 3 were 
the most educated as this class included the highest percentage of participants with 
graduate education and the lowest percentage of high school education only. Class 2 was 
also more educated relative to Class 1. Perhaps related to household size, those 
participants in Class 3 expressed the highest weekly household spending on fruits and 
vegetables, and the highest amount of fresh produce on hand as a percentage of their full 
stock. 
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Table 12. Demographic and Other Characteristics of Experimental Auction Participants by Latent Class 
  
Variable Category All Participants Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Population
a
 
    Mean Percent Mean Percent Mean Percent Mean Percent Mean Percent  
Age 
18 to 29 years 
of age 
 
38.6   60.0   60.3 
 
20.4   40.4 
 
30 to 49 years 
of age 
 
32.2 
 
10.0 
 
25.0 
 
39.8 
 
17.8 
 
50 or more 
years of age 
 
29.2 
 
30.0 
 
14.7 
 
39.8 
 
12.5 
Education 
High school 
degree or less 
 
11.7 
 
20.0 
 
14.7 
 
8.6 
 
33.7 
 
Bachelor's 
degree or 
 
60.2 
 
60.0 
 
58.8 
 
61.3 
 
45.9 
 
at least some 
college 
          
 
Graduate school 
degree or 
 
28.1 
 
20.0 
 
26.5 
 
30.1 
 
20.4 
 
at least some 
graduate school 
          Household size 
 
2.6 
 
2.0 
 
2.4 
 
2.8 
 
2.6 
 (number of individuals) 
           Gender Female 
 
58.8 
 
40.0 
 
47.8 
 
68.8 
 
49.0 
 
Male 
 
41.2 
 
60.0 
 
52.2 
 
31.2 
 
51.0 
Marital status Married 
 
54.4 
 
20.0 
 
38.2 
 
70.3 
 
33.8 
 
Not married 
 
45.6 
 
80.0 
 
61.8 
 
29.7 
 
66.2 
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Table 12. Continued 
  
Variable Category All Participants Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Population
a
 
    Mean Percent Mean Percent Mean Percent Mean Percent Mean Percent  
Yearly household income ($) 
 
52,309 
 
25,000 
 
34,485 
 
68,279 
   Primary grocery shopper  Yes 
 
87.1 
 
80.0 
 
89.7 
 
86.0 
  Weekly household spending  
 
26.3 
 
22.0 
 
21.9 
 
30.0 
   on fruits and vegetables ($) 
           Amount of fresh produce on hand 
 
66.5 
 
67.1 
 
55.9 
 
74.3 
   as percentage of full stock                       
a Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2007-2011 American Community Survey (ACS). Statistics correspond to the Bryan/College Station, TX population. 
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Table 13. Random Effects Estimates for WTP for Fruit Products by Latent Classes 
  Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All Participants 
  Fee Chasers Certification Conscious  Taste Conscious    
E[y] 1.52 2.05 2.03 2.01 
 
Parameter S.E. 
∂E[y]⁄ 
∂x Parameter S.E. 
∂E[y]⁄ 
∂x Parameter S.E. 
∂E[y]⁄ 
∂x Parameter S.E. 
∂E[y]⁄ 
∂x 
Intercept -2.0332 1.2898 
 
2.1277*** 0.3081 
 
2.4403*** 0.2861 
 
2.1024*** 0.1881 
 Honeydew 0.0605 0.1666 0.0600 -0.0037 0.0825 -0.0036 -0.0994 0.0646 -0.0965 -0.0557 0.0494 -0.0534 
Tuscan 0.1425 0.1664 0.1415 0.1046 0.0826 0.1007 0.0635 0.0647 0.0618 0.0819* 0.0495 0.0789 
Canary -0.4382*** 0.1679 -0.4304 0.0654 0.0825 0.0629 -0.0615 0.0648 -0.0597 -0.0339 0.0495 -0.0325 
Galia -0.1068 0.1671 -0.1056 0.0514 0.0825 0.0494 -0.0425 0.0648 -0.0413 -0.0113 0.0495 -0.0108 
Watermelon -0.1160 0.1671 -0.1147 0.3329*** 0.0825 0.3220 0.4374*** 0.0645 0.4285 0.3676*** 0.0493 0.3561 
Tasting × 
Cantaloupe 0.0379 0.2991 0.0376 -0.0520 0.1501 -0.0498 -0.1341 0.1384 -0.1299 -0.1191 0.0963 -0.1139 
Tasting × 
Honeydew -0.0382 0.3003 -0.0378 0.0097 0.1512 0.0093 -0.2776** 0.1385 -0.2674 -0.1407 0.0968 -0.1345 
Tasting × 
Tuscan -0.0190 0.2995 -0.0189 0.2506* 0.1509 0.2426 0.0584 0.1385 0.0569 0.1165 0.0966 0.1124 
Tasting × 
Canary -0.0820 0.3043 -0.0812 -0.0259 0.1526 -0.0248 -0.1230 0.1391 -0.1192 -0.1053 0.0974 -0.1008 
Tasting × 
Galia 0.2302 0.2999 0.2289 0.0125 0.1512 0.0120 -0.2217 0.1391 -0.2141 -0.0994 0.0969 -0.0952 
Tasting × 
Watermelon -0.0983 0.3021 -0.0973 -0.2018 0.1510 -0.1922 -0.2492* 0.1386 -0.2403 
-
0.2763*** 0.0967 -0.2624 
Global GAP  0.0225 0.1691 0.0223 0.2668*** 0.0754 0.2570 0.0819 0.0517 0.0798 0.1355*** 0.0417 0.1304 
FSMA  0.1130 0.1691 0.1120 0.2875*** 0.0754 0.2769 0.1369*** 0.0517 0.1333 0.1787*** 0.0417 0.1721 
AGE2  -1.7101 1.1110 -1.4457 0.0381 0.3230 0.0366 -0.3570 0.2703 -0.3463 -0.1419 0.1949 -0.1361 
AGE3  1.7968** 0.8118 1.7791 -0.2863 0.3877 -0.2724 -0.6118** 0.2754 -0.5916 -0.4177** 0.2044 -0.3980 
HHSIZE  0.5443* 0.3150 0.5394 0.0658 0.1094 0.0632 -0.0653 0.0716 -0.0636 -0.0283 0.0620 -0.0272 
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Table 13. Continued 
  Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 All Participants 
  Fee Chasers Certification Conscious  Taste Conscious    
E[y] 1.52 2.05 2.03 2.01 
 
Parameter S.E. 
∂E[y]⁄ 
∂x Parameter S.E. 
∂E[y]⁄ 
∂x Parameter S.E. 
∂E[y]⁄ 
∂x Parameter S.E. 
∂E[y]⁄ 
∂x 
FEMALE -4.1989*** 1.0403 -3.1845 -0.3745 0.2388 -0.3591 -0.2597 0.1897 -0.2533 -0.2973** 0.1459 -0.2861 
MARRIED -0.3567 0.6420 -0.3514 -0.0825 0.3525 -0.0791 -0.0929 0.2473 -0.0905 0.0503 0.1998 0.0483 
AVINCOME 
(Average 
yearly 
income) 0.1111*** 0.0275 0.1101 -0.0084* 0.0043 -0.0081 0.0021 0.0022 0.0020 0.0001 0.0019 0.0001 
ASPENDFV 
(Expenditures 
on produce) -0.0370*** 0.0127 -0.0366 0.0051 0.0091 0.0049 0.0051 0.0045 0.0050 0.0056 0.0042 0.0054 
FVOH 
(Produce on 
hand) 0.0286*** 0.0065 0.0283 -0.0021 0.0027 -0.0021 -0.0001 0.0020 -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0016 -0.0003 
σ(u) a 0.3208*** 0.0885   0.8889*** 0.0800   0.7784*** 0.0604   0.8756*** 0.0498   
σ(e) b 0.5570*** 0.0314 
 
0.7387*** 0.0158 
 
0.7034*** 0.0130 
 
0.7155*** 0.0097 
 ρ c 0.2491 0.1048   0.5915 0.0447   0.5505 0.0395   0.5996 0.0280 
 Log-Likelihood -151.41 -1448.39 -1891.46 -3537.99 
Likelihood ratio test d 26.87*** 844.47*** 1012.17*** 2167.53*** 
Number of usable 
observations 180 1204 1638 3022 
Note: Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks are used to denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
a Standard deviation of individual-specific error. 
b Standard deviation of overall error. 
c Percent contribution of the panel-level variance to the total variance. 
d Likelihood ratio test that σ(u) = 0. 
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4.4.2 Willingness-to-Pay 
Differences in willingness-to-pay estimates were estimated to complement the 
characterization of the latent classes. Table 13 contains parameter estimates from the 
Random Effects Tobit (RET) models per class and for all participants. A likelihood ratio 
test (       ) rejected the null of a nested Constant Parameter Tobit regression 
(     
   ) in favor of a Random Effects Tobit specification (     
    ), indicating 
that individual-specific random intercepts in the data were present. These random effects 
capture the combined effect of all other individual-specific variables besides motivation 
that are constant over bidding rounds and are omitted because they are unobserved. The 
significance of   
  is interpreted as the presence of correlation between the multiple bids 
(i.e.   goods    treatments) submitted by the same participant. 
Coefficients from the RET for all participants indicate that all consumers place 
value on food safety standards. The magnitude of the marginal effects indicate that 
consumers are willing to pay price premiums of $0.17 and $0.13 for food safety 
standards issued by the government (Food Safety Modernization Act, FSMA) and the 
industry (Global GAP), respectively, for a certified fruit product compared with a non-
certified product. Coefficients also indicate that all consumers are willing to pay a price 
premium for a Tuscan melon compared with the baseline Cantaloupe, and that although 
they are willing to pay about $0.36 for a watermelon compared with a Cantaloupe, their 
WTP for a watermelon actually decreases by $0.26 after tasting it. 
Estimating WTP equations separately for each cluster provides more detailed 
information than a model which pools the clusters. Consumers in Class 1 (6.1% of 
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participants) had no statistically significant price premiums for food safety standards, 
and except for a significant price discount for Canary melons compared to Cantaloupes, 
nothing can be said about their preferences for the rest of the fruit products or the tasting 
treatment. The average consumer in Class 1 is willing to pay $1.52 per fruit. Recall 
Class 1 is composed of individuals who were very likely to consider that all studies must 
include a compensation fee, and most likely would have not participated if there was no 
payment. Moreover, most of them were not interested in helping advance research 
efforts, supporting the educational institution, or in the auctioned products. This leads us 
to refer to the first latent class of consumers as “Fee Chasers”. As discussed previously, 
this class was composed mainly of young males that were not married and were aged 18 
to 29 years old (60%) or older than 50 years old (30%), were not married, had a 
relatively lower average yearly household income, smaller household size, and 
comparatively the lowest educational level.  
In contrast, consumers in Class 2 (38.6% of participants) significantly care about 
the certification of credence attributes, such as food safety and good agricultural 
practices. They had price premiums of about $0.28 for fruit products certified for food 
safety and good agricultural practices by the government and $0.26 for fruit products 
certified by the government, compared with non-certified products. These participants 
are not willing to pay a price premium for a Tuscan melon compared with Cantaloupe, 
however, their average bids increased significantly after tasting the Tuscan melon. They 
also had a price premium of about $0.32 for a watermelon compared with a Cantaloupe. 
Since these consumers value food safety certification standards the most out of all 
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classes, we refer to them as “Certification Conscious”. Perhaps derived from their food 
safety concerns, the average consumer in Class 2 is willing to pay $2.05 per fruit, which 
represents an increase of $0.53 from that of Class 1. Consumers in this class were 
supportive of the research and fruit products, but did not have previous experience in 
experimental auctions, were not residents of the area where the study was conducted, 
and did not have any affiliation to the institution conducting the experiment. They were 
characterized by being relatively young males and females that were not married and had 
an average household size, yearly income, and educational level greater than those in 
Class 1.  
Consumers in Class 3 (55.3% of participants) expressed a partial interest in food 
safety certification standards. They are willing to pay a price premium of about $0.13 for 
a fruit product certified for food safety by the government; a lower estimate than that of 
Class 2. Moreover, they are not willing to pay any premium for industry-issued 
standards, suggesting that these consumers may have the perception that firms are more 
driven by profits than by concerns of food safety compliance. Yet, they expressed 
greater concern about the taste of the products. Coefficients indicate that consumers in 
Class 3 are willing to pay a price premium of $0.43 for a personal watermelon, and that 
their WTP for watermelon and Honeydew significantly decreases after the tasting 
treatment by $0.24 and $0.27, respectively. Since this class of consumers does not gain 
as much value from food safety certification standards, but place more emphasis on 
tasting attributes, we refer to them as “Taste Conscious”. The average consumer in Class 
3 is willing to pay $2.03 per fruit, a close but lower estimate than that of Class 2. “Taste 
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Conscious” consumers were supportive of the research and the fruit products, most 
likely residents of the area where the study was conducted, partially affiliated to the 
institution conducting the experiment, and had more experience in experimental auctions 
than consumers in Class 2. This class of consumers is characterized by older and married 
females, with the largest average household size, yearly income, and educational level.  
 
4.5 Summary and Conclusion 
Experimental auctions are now widely used as a method of value elicitation that provides 
direct estimates of consumers’ valuations of goods, right, and services. Although the 
usual provision of cash compensation to participants enhances participation rates, and 
gives them an initial endowment to bid, there may be other reasons that motivate people 
to participate in consumer experiments. In this article, a latent class approach was used 
to study the underlying motivations of individuals to participate in experimental 
auctions, and to investigate significant differences, if any, in willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
values among latent classes.  
Using data collected in a non-hypothetical second-price Vickrey auction 
conducted to elicit willingness-to-pay for government and industry-issued food safety 
standards in specialty melons, three latent classes of participants were identified. Based 
on observed indicators of motivations to participate, demographic and behavioral 
characteristics, and WTP estimates, three latent classes were found and characterized as: 
“Fee Chasers” (6.06% of participants), “Certification Conscious” (38.64% of 
participants), and “Taste Conscious” (55.3% of participants). Results from the Random 
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Effects Tobit models reveal that estimating WTP equations separately for each cluster 
provides more detailed information than a model which pools the clusters. The classes 
differed significantly in terms of their unobserved motivation to participate in the 
experimental study, socio-demographic profile, willingness-to-pay, and preferences 
towards the products. Not accounting for these differences might lead researchers to 
make erroneous inferences regarding product valuation that could be used subsequently 
in cost-benefit analyses and the calculation of welfare impacts of policy changes. Our 
results shed light on the importance of modeling important sources of unobserved 
individual heterogeneity in order to obtain more precise estimates of consumer’s 
valuation of treatments and make more accurate inferences from data collected in 
experimental auction studies.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FURTHER RESEARCH NEEDS 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
This dissertation examined consumer behavior and willingness-to-pay using hypothetical 
and non-hypothetical preference methods to elicit consumer valuations. Several 
econometric models of panel data, and Latent Class Analysis (LCA), were used to 
examine: 
 The effectiveness of in-store promotion expenditures for local horticultural 
brands in terms of consumer demand and brand awareness. 
 The use of a Random Parameters Tobit model in the analysis of experimental 
auction data to account for bid-censoring and unobserved consumer 
heterogeneity in the valuation of products and treatments. 
 The segmentation of experimental auction participants based on their unobserved 
motivation to participate, and differences in the valuation of products and 
treatments among latent classes. 
Specifically, Section 2 evaluated the effectiveness of a Point of Purchase Advertising 
(POPA) program conducted by the Texas Department of Agriculture (TDA) in support 
of the Texas Superstar® (TS) and Earth-Kind® (EK) local horticultural brands. Using 
data from two electronic surveys completed before and after the POPA took place, it was 
found that exposure to the POPA did not have significant effects on overall consumer 
demand. A shift in demand occurred solely for a subpopulation of consumers that have 
been previously exposed to the EK brand: given that the consumer is already aware of 
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EK, the presence of the POPA induces a price premium of about 5.5%. Instead, 
consumer habits of purchase including brand awareness, the purpose of the purchase and 
the number of transactions had the largest statistically significant effects on WTP, 
suggesting that other advertising methods might affect demand more effectively.  
 Section 3 reported the results of several panel data econometric models applied 
to data collected in a non-hypothetical sealed-bid second-price Vickrey auction 
conducted in central Texas. Among all estimation methods considered, the Random 
Parameters Tobit model provided the best model fit and most efficient estimates while 
accounting for bid-censoring and effectively capturing unobserved individual 
heterogeneity in preferences. Results showed that participants are willing to pay a price 
premium of $0.13 for a product that meets industry-issued (GlobalGAP) certification 
standards for food safety and good agricultural practices, and a price premium of $0.18 
for a fruit product that meets government-issued certification standards (FSMA), 
compared with a non-certified product. Importantly, these valuations were 
heterogeneous across individuals. 
Finally, Section 4 identified three latent classes of participants in experimental 
auctions. Based on observed indicators of motivations to participate, demographic and 
behavioral characteristics, and WTP estimates, three latent classes were found and 
characterized as: “Fee Chasers” (6.06% of participants), “Certification Conscious” 
(38.64% of participants), and “Taste Conscious” (55.3% of participants). Results from 
the Random Effects Tobit models reveal that estimating WTP equations separately for 
each cluster provides more detailed information than a model that pools the clusters. 
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Overall, results of Section 3 and 4 suggest that incorporating and understanding 
unobserved heterogeneity provides information that can be used to make more reliable 
inferences about policy impacts and subsequent decision-making. 
 
5.2 Limitations 
This dissertation contains a number of limitations, which include: 
 The lack of significance of the POPA parameter in Section 2 suggests that in-
store promotion did not have an effect on brand awareness or WTP for the 
overall population. However, other exogenous factors may have played a role in 
promotion effectiveness. Particularly, the economic recession of 2009 may have 
had an effect in consumer spending in ornamental goods despite advertising 
efforts by firms and represent a limitation to our findings. 
 In Section 2, the use of stated preference methods, in which consumers are asked 
to state their hypothetical willingness-to-pay for branded ornamentals, may result 
in an overestimation of consumers’ true WTP.  This limitation was alleviated by 
the fact that we focused on the difference in WTP estimates between the 2008-
2010 periods and not in the total WTP estimate. However, the use of a 
hypothetical preference method must be recognized as a potential source of bias 
in valuations.  
 Models in Section 3 and 4 used data collected using a non-hypothetical 
experimental auction. Compared to stated preference methods, this method does 
not suffer from hypothetical bias, and compared to revealed preference methods, 
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valuations are directly inferred. Yet, in non-hypothetical experimental auctions 
factors such as participatory fees, bid affiliation, and zero-bidders can still 
potentially introduce bias into the valuations. 
 
5.3 Suggestions for Further Research  
Several opportunities to develop further research can be derived from this study.  In 
particular, an extension to Section 2 would be the use of non-hypothetical preference 
methods to evaluate the effectiveness of promotion. Although this might be a more 
expensive endeavor to pursue, this could account for hypothetical bias and, given any 
budget constraints, the sample size could be maximized following the econometric 
approach provided in Section 3.  
Concerning Section 3, additional research could test the applicability of the 
Random Parameters Tobit model to the analysis of experimental auction data under 
different procedures (i.e. product, auction mechanism), and whether this model is 
appropriate for other value elicitation methods that result in a censored panel structure 
for the dependent variable. Moreover, other econometric specifications can be 
investigated by allowing these models to be extended beyond the assumption of a normal 
distribution for the random parameters or by constraining the random parameters 
corresponding to the treatments to be positive, consistent a priori with theoretical 
restrictions, or could be extended to depend on other individual invariant variables that 
affect the mean of the random parameters.   
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 Finally, the Latent Class Analysis (LCA) could be extended in several ways. In 
Section 4 all indicators were categorical. However, the basic idea of LCA, that 
parameters of a statistical model differ across unobserved subgroups, can also be applied 
with variables of other scales types. For instance, clustering with continuous observed 
indicators and a categorical latent variable, also known as Latent Profile Analysis, 
replaces the probabilities by densities. Moreover, LCA can be extended by relating 
covariates to the class membership probabilities and by examining the latent classes by 
grouping variables. In general, all models could be refined with the availability of more 
observations, which may result in more accurate state-of-the-art panel data econometric 
models.  
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A.2 Stata Code 1
st
 Essay  
 
*----------------------------------------------------------------------------  
*DO FILE TO ANALYZE ONLINE SURVEYS 
*TOBIT, PROBIT, LOGIT 
*ALBA J. COLLART 
*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 
*START DO FILE 
log using output, text replace 
set more off, permanently 
clear 
 
*** Import data from Purchasers.txt 
insheet using Purchasers.txt, clear 
 
*** Start  
drop if id == . 
 
***  Generate income dummies for >50K and <50K 
generate inc1 = 1 if (ic1+ic2)==1 
replace inc1=0 if inc1==. 
replace inc1 =. if id==214 
 
generate inc2 = 1 if (ic3+ic4+ic5)==1  
replace inc2=0 if inc2==. 
replace inc2 =. if id==214 
 
***  Aggregate age and calculate means  
gen age12= age1 + age2 
 
sort pop, stable 
by pop: count 
 
***  Generate variables for categorical product attributes 
tab lcd, gen(demand) 
tab og, gen(organic) 
tab ld, gen(light) 
tab gg, gen(growth) 
tab dt, gen(drought) 
tab vc, gen(color) 
tab s, gen(season) 
tab p, gen(price) 
 
*** Summary statistics of the original sample (273/259) 
* Survey of 2008, n=273 
* Survey of 2010, n=259 
 
by pop: sum ekaw tsaw ekwtp tswtp mar gen edu1 edu2 edu3 age12 age3 age4 inc1 inc2 reg1 reg2 reg3  
 
*** Take random sample from Survey of 2008 to downsize to n=259 
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preserve 
 
set seed 123456789 
sort age1, stable 
by age1: count 
sample 60 if pop==0 & age1==1  
sort age1, stable 
by age1: count 
 
sort pop, stable 
by pop: count 
 
keep if pop==0 
save zero.dta, replace   
 
restore 
 
* Now we have a new data file for Survey of 2008 with n=259 
* Next, lets create a data file with only observations from Survey of 2010  
preserve 
 
keep if pop==1 
count 
save one.dta, replace 
 
restore 
 
clear 
 
*Put both together and start using that data file 
use zero.dta 
append using one.dta 
save pooled.dta, replace 
 
sort pop, stable 
by pop: count 
 
clear 
use pooled.dta 
 
*** Summary statistics of the sample (259/259) 
sort pop, stable 
by pop: summarize ekaw tsaw ekwtp tswtp mar gen edu1 edu2 edu3 age12 age3 age4 inc1 inc2 ic1 ic2 ic3 
ic4 ic5 reg1 reg2 reg3  
 
*** Generate weighted variables 
*Note: Logit - It doesn't make a difference to weight awareness variable (0/1) 
gen mweight= 0.620155 /0.7258687  
gen wmar = mar*mweight if pop==1 
 
gen gweight= 0.5193798/0.7075099  
gen wgen = gen*gweight if pop==1 
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gen ed1weight = 0.1167315/0.1312741 
gen wedu1 = edu1*ed1weight if pop==1 
 
gen ed2weight = 0.6536965/0.7142857 
gen wedu2 = edu2*ed2weight if pop==1 
 
gen ed3weight = 0.229572/0.1544402 
gen wedu3 = edu3*ed3weight if pop==1 
 
gen a12weight = 0.3515625/0.0894942 
gen wage12 = age12*a12weight if pop==1 
 
gen a3weight = 0.3164063/0.2996109 
gen wage3 = age3*a3weight if pop==1 
 
gen a4weight = 0.3320313/0.6108949 
gen wage4 = age4*a4weight if pop==1 
 
gen inc1weight = 0.4594595/0.3449612  
gen winc1 = inc1*inc1weight if pop ==1 
 
gen inc2weight = 0.5405405/0.6550388  
gen winc2 = inc2*inc2weight if pop ==1 
 
gen reg1weight = 0.1891892/0.2046332 
gen wreg1 = reg1*reg1weight if pop ==1 
 
gen reg2weight = 0.6640927/0.3243243 
gen wreg2 = reg2*reg2weight if pop ==1 
 
gen reg3weight = 0.1467181/0.4710425 
gen wreg3 = reg3*reg3weight if pop ==1 
 
*Verify that the means for demographics are equal 
sum ekaw tsaw ekwtp tswtp mar gen edu1 edu2 edu3 age12 age3 age4 inc1 inc2 reg1 reg2 reg3 if 
(pop==0) 
sum ekaw tsaw ekwtp tswtp wmar wgen wedu1 wedu2 wedu3 wage12 wage3 wage4 winc1 winc2 wreg1 
wreg2 wreg3 if (pop==1) 
 
*Replace variables with new weighted variables in Survey of 2010 
replace mar=wmar if pop==1 
replace gen=wgen if pop==1 
replace edu1=wedu1 if pop==1 
replace edu2=wedu2 if pop==1 
replace edu3=wedu3 if pop==1 
replace age12=wage12 if pop==1 
replace age3=wage3 if pop==1 
replace age4=wage4 if pop==1 
replace inc1=winc1 if pop==1 
replace inc2=winc2 if pop==1 
replace reg1=wreg1 if pop==1 
replace reg2=wreg2 if pop==1 
replace reg3=wreg3 if pop==1 
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*** Generating dummies 
gen dedu2 = edu2 - edu1 
gen dedu3 = edu3 - edu1 
gen dage3 = age3 - age12 
gen dage4 = age4 - age12 
gen dinc2 = inc2 - inc1 
gen dreg2 = reg2 - reg1 
gen dreg3 = reg3 - reg1 
 
gen ddemand2 = demand2 - demand1 
gen ddemand3 = demand3 - demand1 
gen ddemand4 = demand4 - demand1 
gen ddemand5 = demand5 - demand1 
gen dorganic2 = organic2 - organic1 
gen dorganic3 = organic3 - organic1 
gen dorganic4 = organic4 - organic1 
gen dorganic5 = organic5 - organic1 
gen dlight2 = light2 - light1 
gen dlight3 = light3 - light1 
gen dlight4 = light4 - light1 
gen dlight5 = light5 - light1 
gen dgrowth2 = growth2 - growth1 
gen dgrowth3 = growth3 - growth1 
gen dgrowth4 = growth4 - growth1 
gen dgrowth5 = growth5 - growth1 
gen ddrought2 = drought2 - drought1 
gen ddrought3 = drought3 - drought1 
gen ddrought4 = drought4 - drought1 
gen ddrought5 = drought5 - drought1 
gen dcolor2 = color2 - color1 
gen dcolor3 = color3 - color1 
gen dcolor4 = color4 - color1 
gen dcolor5 = color5 - color1 
gen dseason2 = season2 - season1 
gen dseason3 = season3 - season1 
gen dseason4 = season4 - season1 
gen dseason5 = season5 - season1 
gen dprice2 = price2 - price1 
gen dprice3 = price3 - price1 
gen dprice4 = price4 - price1 
gen dprice5 = price5 - price1 
 
 
*** After replacing, obtain statistics for all variables and corresponding dummies 
summarize ekaw tsaw ekwtp tswtp mar gen dedu2 dedu3 dage3 dage4 dinc2 dreg2 dreg3 tran pur pop 
 
sort pop, stable 
by pop: summarize mar gen edu1 edu2 edu3 age12 age3 age4 inc1 inc2 reg1 reg2 reg3  
by pop: summarize ekaw tsaw ekwtp tswtp mar gen dedu2 dedu3 dage3 dage4 dinc2 dreg2 dreg3 tran pur 
pop 
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********************************************************************************* 
*** Estimate Logit for EKAW using logit command, use mfx for marginal effects,  
*** fitstat for goodness of fit and lstat for fraction of correct predictions 
 
logit ekaw dage3 dage4 gen mar dinc2 dedu2 dedu3 tran pur pop dreg2 dreg3  
estimates store Model1 
mfx 
fitstat 
lstat 
lfit, group(10) table 
 
*** Estimate odds ratio using logistic command 
logistic ekaw dage3 dage4 gen mar dinc2 dedu2 dedu3 tran pur pop dreg2 dreg3 
 
********************************************************************************* 
 
*** Estimate Logit for TSAW using logit command, use mfx for marginal effects,  
*** fitstat for goodness of fit and lstat for fraction of correct predictions 
 
logit tsaw dage3 dage4 gen mar dinc2 dedu2 dedu3 tran pur pop dreg2 dreg3 
estimates store Model2 
mfx 
fitstat 
lstat 
lfit, group(10) table 
 
*** Estimate odds ratio using logistic command 
logistic tsaw dage3 dage4 gen mar dinc2 dedu2 dedu3 tran pur pop dreg2 dreg3 
 
********************************************************************************* 
 
* Test for endogeneity EK 
preserve 
 
*** Heckman correction: 1st stage probit 
probit  ekaw dage3 dage4 gen mar dinc2 dedu2 dedu3 tran pur pop dreg2 dreg3 
estimates store Model3 
mfx 
fitstat 
lstat 
 
*** Compare Model1 is ekaw logit, Model3 is ekaw probit 
estimates stats Model1 Model3 
 
*** Calculate probability of awareness 
predict EVENTPROB 
predict PROBITXB, xb 
 
*** Calculate pdf, cdf and mills ratio 
gen PDFPROBIT = normalden(PROBITXB) 
gen CDFPROBIT = normprob(PROBITXB) 
gen IMR = PDFPROBIT/CDFPROBIT 
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*** Heckman correction: 2nd stage tobit 
version 8.2: tobit ekwtp dage3 dage4 gen mar dinc2 dedu2 dedu3 tran pur pop ekaw dreg2 dreg3 IMR, 
ll(0) 
test _b[_se]=0 
dtobit, brief 
 
restore 
 
 
* Test for endogeneity TS 
preserve 
 
*** Heckman correction: 1st stage probit 
probit  tsaw dage3 dage4 gen mar dinc2 dedu2 dedu3 tran pur pop dreg2 dreg3 
estimates store Model4 
mfx 
fitstat 
lstat 
 
*** Compare Model2 is tsaw logit, Model4 is tsaw probit 
estimates stats Model2 Model4 
 
*** Calculate probability of awareness 
predict EVENTPROB 
predict PROBITXB, xb 
 
*** Calculate pdf, cdf and mills ratio 
gen PDFPROBIT = normalden(PROBITXB) 
gen CDFPROBIT = normprob(PROBITXB) 
gen IMR = PDFPROBIT/CDFPROBIT 
 
*** Heckman correction: 2nd stage tobit 
version 8.2: tobit tswtp dage3 dage4 gen mar dinc2 dedu2 dedu3 tran pur pop tsaw dreg2 dreg3 IMR, ll(0) 
test _b[_se]=0 
dtobit, brief 
 
restore 
 
 
 
*********************************************************************************** 
* Clear to start with the WTP models. We start by using the (259/259) sample 
 
clear 
use pooled.dta 
 
*** To estimate EKWTP, notice that the Survey of 2010 has 259 observations on WTP, 
*** but the Survey of 2008 has only 145. Thus, take a random sample from Survey  
*** of 2010 when ekwtp is not a missing value to have n=145. 
 
preserve 
 
set seed 123456789 
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sort pop, stable 
by pop: count if ekwtp!=. 
sample 56 if ekwtp!=. & pop==1  
sort pop, stable 
by pop: count if ekwtp!=. 
 
drop if ekwtp==. 
by pop: count 
 
* Now both surveys have the same number of non-missing observations on EKWTP 
 
*** Summary statistics of the sample (145/145) 
sort pop, stable 
by pop: summarize ekaw tsaw ekwtp tswtp mar gen edu1 edu2 edu3 age12 age3 age4 inc1 inc2 ic1 ic2 ic3 
ic4 ic5 reg1 reg2 reg3  
 
*** Generate weighted variables (Tobit-Weight ekwtp variable) 
gen ekwtpweight =  0.1093103/0.0713793  
gen wekwtp = ekwtp*ekwtpweight if pop==1 
 
gen mweight= 0.6275862 /0.7310345 
gen wmar = mar*mweight if pop==1 
 
gen gweight= 0.5486111 /0.7357143   
gen wgen = gen*gweight if pop==1 
 
gen ed1weight = 0.1319444/0.1655172 
gen wedu1 = edu1*ed1weight if pop==1 
 
gen ed2weight = 0.6527778/0.7517241 
gen wedu2 = edu2*ed2weight if pop==1 
 
gen ed3weight = 0.2152778/0.0827586 
gen wedu3 = edu3*ed3weight if pop==1 
 
gen a12weight = 0.3125/0.1041667  
gen wage12 = age12*a12weight if pop==1 
 
gen a3weight =  0.3402778/0.3125  
gen wage3 = age3*a3weight if pop==1 
 
gen a4weight =  0.3472222/0.5833333 
gen wage4 = age4*a4weight if pop==1 
 
gen inc1weight = 0.4758621/0.3680556 
gen winc1 = inc1*inc1weight if pop ==1 
 
gen inc2weight = 0.5241379/0.6319444 
gen winc2 = inc2*inc2weight if pop ==1 
 
gen reg1weight = 0.1862069/0.2206897  
gen wreg1 = reg1*reg1weight if pop ==1 
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gen reg2weight = 0.6482759/0.2896552 
gen wreg2 = reg2*reg2weight if pop ==1 
 
gen reg3weight = 0.1655172/0.4896552 
gen wreg3 = reg3*reg3weight if pop ==1 
 
*Verify that the means for demographics and ekwtp are equal 
sum ekaw tsaw ekwtp tswtp mar gen edu1 edu2 edu3 age12 age3 age4 inc1 inc2 reg1 reg2 reg3 if 
(pop==0) 
sum ekaw tsaw wekwtp tswtp wmar wgen wedu1 wedu2 wedu3 wage12 wage3 wage4 winc1 winc2 
wreg1 wreg2 wreg3 if (pop==1) 
 
 
*Replace variables with new weighted variables in Survey of 2010 
replace ekwtp=wekwtp if pop==1 
replace mar=wmar if pop==1 
replace gen=wgen if pop==1 
replace edu1=wedu1 if pop==1 
replace edu2=wedu2 if pop==1 
replace edu3=wedu3 if pop==1 
replace age12=wage12 if pop==1 
replace age3=wage3 if pop==1 
replace age4=wage4 if pop==1 
replace inc1=winc1 if pop==1 
replace inc2=winc2 if pop==1 
replace reg1=wreg1 if pop==1 
replace reg2=wreg2 if pop==1 
replace reg3=wreg3 if pop==1 
 
*** Generating dummies 
gen dedu2 = edu2 - edu1 
gen dedu3 = edu3 - edu1 
gen dage3 = age3 - age12 
gen dage4 = age4 - age12 
gen dinc2 = inc2 - inc1 
gen dreg2 = reg2 - reg1 
gen dreg3 = reg3 - reg1 
 
*** After replacing, obtain statistics for all variables and corresponding dummies 
summarize ekaw tsaw ekwtp tswtp mar gen dedu2 dedu3 dage3 dage4 dinc2 dreg2 dreg3 tran pur pop 
 
sort pop, stable 
by pop: summarize mar gen edu1 edu2 edu3 age12 age3 age4 inc1 inc2 reg1 reg2 reg3  
by pop: summarize ekaw tsaw ekwtp tswtp mar gen dedu2 dedu3 dage3 dage4 dinc2 dreg2 dreg3 tran pur 
pop 
 
*** Estimate Tobit for EKWTP for all respondents  
version 8.2: tobit ekwtp dage3 dage4 gen mar dinc2 dedu2 dedu3 tran pur pop ekaw dreg2 dreg3, ll(0) 
test _b[_se]=0 
 
*** Estimate the four types of Marginal effects for Tobit 
dtobit, brief 
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********************************************************************************** 
 
* Test for endogeneity EK 
 
*** Heckman correction: 1st stage probit 
*probit  ekaw dage3 dage4 gen mar dinc2 dedu2 dedu3 tran pur pop dreg2 dreg3 
*mfx 
 
*** Calculate probability of awareness 
*predict EVENTPROB 
*predict PROBITXB, xb 
 
*** Calculate pdf, cdf and mills ratio 
*gen PDFPROBIT = normalden(PROBITXB) 
*gen CDFPROBIT = normprob(PROBITXB) 
*gen IMR = PDFPROBIT/CDFPROBIT 
 
*** Heckman correction: 2nd stage tobit 
*version 8.2: tobit ekwtp dage3 dage4 gen mar dinc2 dedu2 dedu3 tran pur pop ekaw dreg2 dreg3 IMR, 
ll(0) 
*test _b[_se]=0 
*dtobit, brief 
 
********************************************************************************* 
 
*** Estimate Tobit for EKWTP for aware respondents 
keep if ekaw==1 
*histogram ekwtp, normal discrete freq 
version 8.2: tobit ekwtp dage3 dage4 gen mar dinc2 dedu2 dedu3 tran pur pop dreg2 dreg3, ll(0) 
test _b[_se]=0 
 
*** Estimate the four types of Marginal effects for Tobit 
dtobit, brief 
 
********************************************************************************* 
*** Restore to pooled.dta (259/259) sample 
restore 
 
********************************************************************************* 
 
*** To estimate TSWTP, notice that the Survey of 2010 has 259 observations on  
*** TSWTP, but the Survey of 2008 has only 134. Thus, take a random sample from 
*** Survey of 2010 when TSWTP is not a missing value to have n=134. 
 
preserve 
 
set seed 123456789 
sort pop, stable 
by pop: count if tswtp!=. 
sample 52 if tswtp!=. & pop==1  
sort pop, stable 
by pop: count if tswtp!=. 
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drop if tswtp==. 
by pop: count 
 
* Now both surveys have the same number of non-missing observations on TSWTP 
 
*** Summary statistics of the sample (134/134) 
sort pop, stable 
by pop: summarize ekaw tsaw ekwtp tswtp mar gen edu1 edu2 edu3 age12 age3 age4 inc1 inc2 ic1 ic2 ic3 
ic4 ic5 reg1 reg2 reg3  
 
*** Generate weighted variables (Tobit-Weight tswtp variable) 
gen tswtpweight =  0.1085075/0.0839552 
gen wtswtp = tswtp*tswtpweight if pop==1 
 
gen mweight=  0.6119403/0.7313433 
gen wmar = mar*mweight if pop==1 
 
gen gweight=   0.5338346/0.7461538 
gen wgen = gen*gweight if pop==1 
 
gen ed1weight = 0.0977444/0.1641791  
gen wedu1 = edu1*ed1weight if pop==1 
 
gen ed2weight =  0.6691729/0.761194 
gen wedu2 = edu2*ed2weight if pop==1 
 
gen ed3weight = 0.2330827/0.0746269 
gen wedu3 = edu3*ed3weight if pop==1 
 
gen a12weight =  0.3134328/0.1052632 
gen wage12 = age12*a12weight if pop==1 
 
gen a3weight =   0.3283582/0.3157895 
gen wage3 = age3*a3weight if pop==1 
 
gen a4weight = 0.358209/0.5789474 
gen wage4 = age4*a4weight if pop==1 
 
gen inc1weight = 0.4477612/0.3834586 
gen winc1 = inc1*inc1weight if pop ==1 
 
gen inc2weight = 0.5522388/0.6165414 
gen winc2 = inc2*inc2weight if pop ==1 
 
gen reg1weight = 0.1940299/0.2164179 
gen wreg1 = reg1*reg1weight if pop ==1 
 
gen reg2weight = 0.6567164/0.2835821 
gen wreg2 = reg2*reg2weight if pop ==1 
 
gen reg3weight = 0.1492537/0.5 
gen wreg3 = reg3*reg3weight if pop ==1 
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*Verify that the means for demographics and tswtp are equal 
sum ekaw tsaw ekwtp tswtp mar gen edu1 edu2 edu3 age12 age3 age4 inc1 inc2 reg1 reg2 reg3 if 
(pop==0) 
sum ekaw tsaw ekwtp wtswtp wmar wgen wedu1 wedu2 wedu3 wage12 wage3 wage4 winc1 winc2 
wreg1 wreg2 wreg3 if (pop==1) 
 
 
*Replace variables with new weighted variables in Survey of 2010 
replace tswtp=wtswtp if pop==1 
replace mar=wmar if pop==1 
replace gen=wgen if pop==1 
replace edu1=wedu1 if pop==1 
replace edu2=wedu2 if pop==1 
replace edu3=wedu3 if pop==1 
replace age12=wage12 if pop==1 
replace age3=wage3 if pop==1 
replace age4=wage4 if pop==1 
replace inc1=winc1 if pop==1 
replace inc2=winc2 if pop==1 
replace reg1=wreg1 if pop==1 
replace reg2=wreg2 if pop==1 
replace reg3=wreg3 if pop==1 
 
*** Generating dummies 
gen dedu2 = edu2 - edu1 
gen dedu3 = edu3 - edu1 
gen dage3 = age3 - age12 
gen dage4 = age4 - age12 
gen dinc2 = inc2 - inc1 
gen dreg2 = reg2 - reg1 
gen dreg3 = reg3 - reg1 
 
*** After replacing, obtain statistics for all variables and corresponding dummies 
summarize ekaw tsaw ekwtp tswtp mar gen dedu2 dedu3 dage3 dage4 dinc2 dreg2 dreg3 tran pur pop 
 
sort pop, stable 
by pop: summarize mar gen edu1 edu2 edu3 age12 age3 age4 inc1 inc2 reg1 reg2 reg3  
by pop: summarize ekaw tsaw ekwtp tswtp mar gen dedu2 dedu3 dage3 dage4 dinc2 dreg2 dreg3 tran pur 
pop 
 
********************************************************************************** 
 
*** Estimate Tobit for TSWTP for all respondents 
version 8.2: tobit tswtp dage3 dage4 gen mar dinc2 dedu2 dedu3 tran pur pop tsaw dreg2 dreg3, ll(0) 
test _b[_se]=0 
 
*** Estimate the four types of Marginal effects for Tobit 
dtobit, brief 
 
 
*********************************************************************************** 
 
* Test for endogeneity TS 
 125 
 
 
*** Heckman correction: 1st stage probit 
*probit  tsaw dage3 dage4 gen mar dinc2 dedu2 dedu3 tran pur pop dreg2 dreg3 
*mfx 
 
*** Calculate probability of awareness 
*predict EVENTPROB 
*predict PROBITXB, xb 
 
*** Calculate pdf, cdf and mills ratio 
*gen PDFPROBIT = normalden(PROBITXB) 
*gen CDFPROBIT = normprob(PROBITXB) 
*gen IMR = PDFPROBIT/CDFPROBIT 
 
*** Heckman correction: 2nd stage tobit 
*version 8.2: tobit tswtp dage3 dage4 gen mar dinc2 dedu2 dedu3 tran pur pop tsaw dreg2 dreg3 IMR, 
ll(0) 
*test _b[_se]=0 
*dtobit, brief 
 
 
********************************************************************************** 
 
*** Estimate Tobit for TSWTP for aware respondents 
keep if tsaw==1 
version 8.2: tobit tswtp dage3 dage4 gen mar dinc2 dedu2 dedu3 tran pur pop dreg2 dreg3, ll(0) 
test _b[_se]=0 
 
*** Estimate the four types of Marginal effects for Tobit 
dtobit, brief 
 
************************************************************************************* 
 
restore 
 
************************************************************************************* 
 
*END DO FILE 
log close   
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APPENDIX B 
 
B.1 Experiment Advertisement in The Eagle Newspaper 
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B.2 Experiment Advertisement in The Battalion Newspaper 
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B.3 Institutional Review Board-Approved Consent Form 
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B.4 Experimental Auction Questionnaire 
Introductory Instructions 
 
Welcome!  Thank you for agreeing to participate in today’s session. 
 
When you entered the room you received this packet of information.  You should have 
also been assigned a participant ID number, located on the front page of this packet of 
information.  You should use this ID number to identify yourself throughout the session 
today. The use of identification numbers ensures individual confidentiality. 
 
As a reminder before we start today’s session, your participation is completely 
voluntary.  At any time you may elect to end your participation in the session. However, 
in order to receive the participation fee you must complete the session. All information 
collected today will be kept confidential and will not be used for any purpose other than 
this research.   
 
The purpose of today’s session is to gather some general information on the 
decision making process for purchasing fruit.  We will now go through a series of 
instructions. These instructions will be read from a script to make sure the procedures 
are accurately described.   There will be an opportunity for questions once we go 
through the instructions.  
 
For the rest of today’s session, it is very important that there be no further talking 
or other communication between participants.  If you have questions or comments, 
please inform a session monitor.   If you are not able to comply with these requests you 
may be disqualified from the experiment.   
 
If you have any questions, please direct them to a session monitor who will gladly 
answer them. 
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Overview 
 
***Please follow all instructions presented in this booklet carefully.  If you have any 
questions, please ask a session monitor. 
 
The purpose of today’s experiment is to help us understand purchasing decisions for fruit 
and fruit products.  To accomplish this purpose, you will be asked to submit bids for 
several items in an auction setting and complete a survey. If you are one of the buyers of 
the auctions, you will pay the auction price and in exchange you will receive the item.  
You will be given more information on the auction procedures shortly. 
 
The experiment will proceed in several stages as described below. 
 
STAGE 1: Learn How Bids Are Submitted  
STAGE 2: Learn How Prices and Buyers of the Auction Are Determined 
STAGE 3: First Practice Round 
STAGE 4: Complete Short Knowledge Quiz  
STAGE 5: Second Practice Round  
STAGE 6: Submit Bids for Fruit Products 
STAGE 7: Complete Survey 
STAGE 8: Determine Auction Buyers 
STAGE 9: Receive Payment 
 
However, first please review the Consent Form if you have not already done so.  Once 
you have read the form, you should print your name and sign and date on the second 
page.  You can be provided with a copy of this form if you desire. 
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STAGE 1: Learn How Bids Are Submitted 
 
The Auction: The auction that you will participate in today is called a “sealed bid 2nd-
price auction”.   
  
1. You will examine the products that will be auctioned. 
You will be given the opportunity to re-evaluate each item if you would like to 
do so. 
 
2. Write down your bid. 
After you examine the items, please write down the maximum amount that you 
would be willing to pay for each item on the corresponding “Bid Sheet.” 
 
3. Return to your seat and wait for the Bid Sheet to be collected. 
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STAGE 2: Learn How the Auction Price and Buyers Are Determined 
 
How The Auction Price is Determined: Today you will be participating in a sealed bid 
2nd-price auction.  Choosing the market price: 
After all the bids for the items have been collected from all participants, we will 
sort the bids from highest to lowest.  The 2nd highest bid will be the market price. 
The highest bidder will pay the market price for the product.  
 
How Buyers are Determined: 
1. Auction Buyers: 
You will participate in more than one round of auctions today.  However, only 
one round will be binding, we will select at random which one of these rounds 
will be binding. All rounds have an equal chance of being drawn.  Once the 
binding round is drawn, a single product from that round will be selected. 
Therefore, you will only have a chance to purchase one fruit item from 
today’s session. 
 
For the round that is binding, the person who bid the highest price will purchase 
the item at the market price.  This buyer will pay the market price for that round, 
which will be deducted from the participation fee, and will take home the 
product. 
 
IMPORTANT REMINDERS: For the auction it is in your best interest to truthful 
bid your value. 
*Remember, in the auction it is in your best interest to submit a bid of EXACTLY your 
true value for the good.  If you submit a bid for less than your value, then other bidders 
may win the item at a price equal to your value and you may miss out on having the item 
at a price you would be actually willing to pay. If you submit a bid for more than you 
value the item, then you may win the auction for that price and pay more than you 
wanted to pay for the item. 
* The practice rounds are hypothetical, but the auction rounds for fruit products are 
not.  The buyer of the auction will actually pay money to obtain the fruit item. 
* When deciding on your bid, consider the alternatives for what you could spend that 
much money on.  For example, if you did not buy the product up for auction, how many 
gallons of gas could you purchase with the amount you bid?  Consider other options 
when deciding what your true value is for that good.   
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*You will not buy more than one fruit item from this market.  We will randomly select 
one product to be binding. 
*At least one session participant will take home ONE fruit product today.  There will 
be a session participant who will buy a product based on the auction bids. Therefore, you 
should think carefully about your valuations. 
 
 
 135 
 
 
 
 
 
Please do not read any further until instructed to do so by 
the session monitor.  Your cooperation is greatly 
appreciated! 
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STAGE 3: First Practice Round of Auction 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
In this stage you will participate in the first hypothetical practice round.  First you will 
be asked to bid on four types of snack products. The stage will proceed as follows: 
 
1. When instructed by a session monitor, you may go to the tables to examine 
each product.  Please do not talk with each other during bidding.  We will be 
happy to answer any of your questions. 
2. On the practice-bidding sheet, you will write down your bid for each item. 
Then, return to your seat. 
3. Wait until a session monitor collects the practice-bidding sheets. 
 
 
While you wait for the price and buyers of this practice round to be determined, you will 
complete a short knowledge quiz on your understanding of the auction procedures. The 
knowledge quiz starts on the next page (8).  
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STAGE 4: Short Knowledge Quiz  
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is a brief quiz designed for you to check your understanding of how the auctions 
you will participate in today will operate.  Please choose the answer you feel is correct.  
Once all participants have completed the quiz, we will go over the answers together. 
 
About the Auction: 
1. In a sealed bid 2nd-price auction, the highest bidder wins the auctioned item. 
a. True 
b. False 
 
2. The person who wins the auction for the binding round and product will pay the 
amount he/she bid for the item.  
a. True 
b. False 
 
3. More than one round of bidding on several products will be done today, but only 
one round and one product will be randomly selected to be binding. 
a. True 
b. False 
 
4. There will be the opportunity to actually purchase and take home more than one 
fruit product today. 
a. True 
b. False 
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Please do not read any further until instructed to do so by 
the session monitor.  Your cooperation is greatly 
appreciated! 
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STAGE 5: Second Practice Round of Auction 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
You have completed half of the practice.  Now you will be asked to bid on three types of 
coffee mugs. The practice round will proceed as follows: 
 
1. When instructed by a session monitor, you may go to the tables to examine 
each product.  Please do not talk with each other during bidding.  We will be 
happy to answer any of your questions. 
2. On the practice-bidding sheet, you will write down your bid for each item. 
Then, return to your seat. 
3. Wait until a session monitor collects the practice-bidding sheets. 
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Please do not read any further until instructed to do so by 
the session monitor.  Your cooperation is greatly 
appreciated! 
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TASTING REPORT 
 
As you enjoy the fruit products, please rate from 0 (worst) to 10 (best) each of the 
following characteristics for each product: 
  
 Color Smell  Taste Freshness Sweetness Overall 
Appearance 
Cantaloupe       
Honeydew       
Tuscan Melon       
Canary Melon       
Galia Melon       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you have any questions, please direct them to a session monitor who will gladly 
answer them. 
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Please do not read any further until instructed to do so by 
the session monitor.  Your cooperation is greatly 
appreciated! 
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STAGE 6: FRUIT AUCTIONS  
Thank you for participation so far.  The next auction rounds will be for several fruit 
products, but only one of the rounds will be binding. The binding round will be selected 
at random after all rounds have been completed.  
 
INSTRUCTIONS: The stage will proceed as follows: 
 
1. When instructed to do so, you may go to the tables to examine each product. 
Please do not talk with each other during bidding.  The monitor will be happy 
to answer any of your questions. 
2. On the bidding sheet, write down your bid for each item. Then, return to your 
seat. 
3. Wait until a session monitor collects your sheets. 
 
Please do not turn the page until directed to do so.  We will repeat the auction procedure 
whenever indicated. 
 
The market price for the binding fruit auction will not be posted until the end of today’s 
session.   
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Please do not read any further until instructed to do so by 
the session monitor.  Your cooperation is greatly 
appreciated! 
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STAGE 7: SURVEY  
INSTRUCTIONS: Please select only one answer by marking an “X” in the blank unless 
otherwise indicated. There is no right or wrong answer. Your survey responses are very 
important to the results of today’s sessions.  Please remember that all responses will 
be kept confidential.  
 
1. PRIMARY SHOPPER: Are you the PRIMARY grocery shopper for your 
household? 
a. ___ Yes    b.   ___ No 
 
2. WEEKLY FOOD EXPENDITURES: How much, on average, does your 
household spend on food PER WEEK?  (Include grocery, snacks, restaurants, 
and any other food purchases).  
a.    ___ $0-$49   f.    ___ $250 - $299 
b. ___ $50 - $99   g.   ___ $300 - $399 
c. ___ $100 - $149   h.   ___ $400 - $499 
d. ___ $150 - $199   i.    ___ $500 - $749 
e. ___ $200 - $249   j.    ___ $750 or more 
 
3. WEEKLY FRUIT AND VEGETABLE EXPENDITURES: How much, on 
average, does your household spend on fruits and vegetables PER WEEK? 
a. ___ $0-$24   d.   ___ $75 - $99 
b. ___ $25 - $49   e.   ___ $100 or more 
c. ___ $50 - $74 
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4. FRESH FRUIT AND VEGETABLE EXPENDITURES: Approximately 
what portion of your fruit and vegetable purchases are for FRESH fruits 
and vegetables (Please exclude any canned, frozen, and/or processed fruits 
and vegetables). 
a. ___ None of the fruits and vegetables purchased are fresh. 
b. ___ 1-24% of the fruits and vegetables purchased are fresh. 
c. ___ 25-49% of the fruits and vegetables purchased are fresh. 
d. ___ 50-75% of the fruits and vegetables purchased are fresh. 
e. ___ 76-100% of the fruits and vegetables purchased are fresh. 
 
5. LOCATION OF FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PURCHASES: Of the 
following options, where does your household make the LARGEST 
PORTION of its fruit and vegetable purchases? 
a. ___ Mass-merchandiser (e.g., Walmart, Target) 
b. ___ Supermarket/ Grocery Store (e.g. HEB, Kroger, Albertsons) 
c. ___ Roadside Fruit and Vegetable Stand 
d. ___ Farmers’ Market 
e. ___ Other (Please 
Indicate:_____________________________________) 
 
6. LAST PURCHASE OF FRUIT AND VEGETABLES: When was the last 
time someone in your household purchased fruits and vegetables? 
a. ___ Less than 2 days ago  d.   ___ 8- 10 days ago 
b. ___ 2-4 days ago   e.   ___ 11-14 days ago 
c. ___ 5-7 days ago   f.    ___ More than 2 weeks ago 
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7. FREQUENCY OF FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PURCHASES: How often 
do your household purchase fresh fruits and vegetables? 
a. ___ Less than once a month  d.   ___ Once a week 
b. ___ Once a month   e.   ___ More than once a week 
c. ___ Two to three times / month 
 
8. FRESH FRUIT ON HAND: Please estimate the amount of FRESH FRUIT 
that you currently have on hand in your home as a percentage of your full 
stock. 
a. ___ 0%     e.   ___ 50-74% 
b. ___ 1-24%    f.    ___ 75-100% 
c. ___ 25-49% 
 
9. FRESH VEGETABLES ON HAND: Please estimate the amount of FRESH 
VEGETABLES that you currently have on hand in your home as a 
percentage of your full stock. 
a. ___ 0%     e.   ___ 50-74% 
b. ___ 1-24%    f.    ___ 75-100% 
c. ___ 25-49% 
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How important are the following factors to you when making melon purchasing 
decision? (Please select only one level of importance per row). 
  
Not 
Important 
At All 
Not Very 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Very 
Important 
10. PRICE         
11. TASTE         
12. NUTRITION         
13. CONVENIENCE         
14. VISUAL 
APPEARANCE         
15. SIZE         
16. FRESHNESS         
17. GROWING 
LOCATION      
18. CERTIFIED 
PRODUCTION 
PRACTICES     
 
 
19. Prior to today’s session, had you heard the term “food safety” before? 
a. ___ Yes  c.  ___ Don’t Know/ Don’t Remember 
b. ___ No 
 
20. Do you look for certification labels (e.g. origin certified, organic certified, 
etc.) on fruit products before you purchase them? 
a. ___ Never 
b. ___ Rarely 
c. ___ Sometimes 
d. ___ Most of the time 
e. ___ Always 
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21. Do you think most persons look for certification labels on food products 
before they purchase them? 
a. ___ Never 
b. ___ Rarely 
c. ___ Sometimes 
d. ___ Most of the time 
e. ___ Always 
 
22. Have you ever experienced food poisoning from consuming fruits and 
vegetables? 
a. ___ Yes 
b. ___ No 
c. ___ Don’t Know/ Don’t Remember  
 
23. Do you believe there to be benefits of consuming fruits and vegetables that 
have been certified for appropriate food safety? 
a. ___ Yes 
b. ___ No 
c. ___ Don’t Know/ Not Sure  
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24. PARTICIPANT: Please mark an “X” below the corresponding column for each 
row 
 
 Yes No 
I am participating for the 1st time in a study like this   
I have relatives that currently work at Texas A&M   
I am curious and want to learn about studies like this   
I signed up because I wanted to help Texas A&M   
Even if there was no payment, I would have signed up to participate 
in this study 
  
I signed up because the study involved fruits   
I postponed other activity(ies) to be here today   
I am a Bryan/College Station permanent resident   
I have a degree from Texas A&M University   
I signed up because I wanted to help research efforts   
All studies must include a participation fee   
 
 
 
25. AGE: Please indicate your age in years: 
a. ___ 18- 19    e.   ___ 50-59 
b. ___ 20-29    f.    ___ 60-69 
c. ___ 30-39    g.   ___ 70 or over 
d. ___ 40-49     
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26. EDUCATION: Please indicate the highest level of education you have 
completed: 
a. ___ Some High School or less  e.   ___ 4 year/ Bachelor’s 
Degree 
b. ___ High School Diploma  f.    ___ Some Graduate School 
c. ___ Some College   g.   ___ Graduate Degree 
d. ___ 2 year/ Associates Degree 
 
27. HOUSEHOLD SIZE: Including yourself, how many people live in your 
household?  Include yourself, your spouse, and any dependents.  Please do 
NOT include your roommates if you share an apartment/house. 
a. ___ People   
 
28. CHILDREN: How many children live in your household, if any? 
a. ___ Children 
 
29. GENDER: Please indicate your gender: 
a. ___ Female  b. ___ Male 
 
30. RACE: Please indicate your race: 
a. ___ Asian/Pacific Islander 
b. ___ African American 
c. ___ Caucasian/White  
d. ___ Native American/ Indigenous 
e. ___ Hispanic 
f. ___ Other (Please List: _______________________________________) 
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31. MARITAL STATUS: What is your current marital status? 
a. ___ Single    b.   ___ Married 
 
32. INCOME: Please indicate your household yearly income for 2011 for all the 
people in your household.  (Include all forms of income, including salary, 
interest and dividend payments, tips, scholarship support, student loans, parental 
support, social security, child support, and allowance). 
a. ___ Less than $30,000   f.    ___ $70,000-$79,999 
b. ___ $30,000-$39,999   g.    ___ $80,000-$89,999 
c. ___ $40,000-$49,999   h.   ___ $90,000-$99,999 
d. ___ $50,000-$59,999   i.    ___ $100,000-$149,999 
e. ___ $60,000-$69,999   j.    ___ More than $150,000 
 
33. EMPLOYMENT: Which of these best describes your employment status?  
a. ___ Unemployed   e.   ___ Retired 
b. ___ Stay-at-Home Parent  f.   ___ Disabled 
c. ___ Part-time Employed  g.  ___ Student 
d. ___ Full-time Employed 
 
34. Please, provide any additional comments about today’s experience: 
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Thank you for your participation! Your responses 
are very important for us.  A session monitor will collect your 
questionnaire. 
 
Please do not discuss the procedures of today’s study with anyone who will 
be participating in later rounds of the study until after they have completed 
their session.  This will help ensure the validity of our results. 
 
Shortly, you will receive your participation fee minus any purchases. Please 
wait for further instructions. 
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B.5 Bidding Sheets 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
STAGE 3: PRACTICE ROUND 1: Snack Bidding 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate the maximum amount that you would be willing to 
pay for each of these items.  Write the amount of your bid (in dollars and cents) in the 
“Bid” column in the chart below. 
 
A.  
CHIPS 
 
B.  
CHEESE 
PUFFS 
C.  
COOKIE 
 
D.  
CRACKERS 
 
BID:$_______ BID:$_______ BID:$_______ BID:$_______ 
 
 
STAGE 5: PRACTICE ROUND 2: Coffee Mug Bidding 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate the maximum amount that you would be willing to 
pay for each of these items.  Write the amount of your bid (in dollars and cents) in the 
“Bid” column in the chart below. 
 
A. 
TEXAS A&M LOGO  
MUG 
B. 
WHITE CERAMIC  
MUG 
 
C. 
THERMAL  
MUG 
 
BID:$_______ BID:$_______ BID:$_______ 
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_______________________________________________________________________ 
STAGE 6: ROUND 3-A Fruit Product Bidding 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate the maximum amount that you would be willing to 
pay for each of these items.  Write the amount of your bid (in dollars and cents) in the 
“Bid” column in the chart below. Please be sure to write a bid for ALL products 
listed. 
 
 
A. 
Cantaloupe 
 
B. 
Honeydew 
C. 
Tuscan 
Melon 
D. 
Canary 
Melon 
E. 
Galia 
Melon 
F. 
Personal 
Watermelon 
BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
STAGE 6: ROUND 3-B Fruit Product Bidding 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate the maximum amount that you would be willing to 
pay for each of these items.  Write the amount of your bid (in dollars and cents) in the 
“Bid” column in the chart below. Please be sure to write a bid for ALL products 
listed. 
 
 
A. 
Industry Certified 
Cantaloupe 
 
B. 
Industry 
Certified 
Honeydew 
C. 
Industry 
Certified 
Tuscan 
Melon 
D. 
Industry 
Certified 
Canary 
Melon 
E. 
Industry 
Certified 
Galia 
Melon 
F. 
Personal  
Watermelon 
BID:$____ BID:$___ BID:$___ BID:$____ BID:$____ BID:$_____ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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_______________________________________________________________________ 
STAGE 6: ROUND 3-C Fruit Product Bidding 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate the maximum amount that you would be willing to 
pay for each of these items.  Write the amount of your bid (in dollars and cents) in the 
“Bid” column in the chart below. Please be sure to write a bid for ALL products 
listed. 
 
 
A. 
USDA Certified 
Cantaloupe 
 
B. 
USDA 
Certified 
Honeydew 
C. 
USDA 
Certified 
Tuscan 
Melon 
D. 
USDA 
Certified 
Canary 
Melon 
E. 
USDA 
Certified 
Galia 
Melon 
F. 
Personal  
Watermelon 
BID:$______ BID:$___ BID:$____ BID:$____ BID:$_____ BID:$_____ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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B.6 NLOGIT 5 Code 2
nd
 Essay 
 
 
IMPORT; 
FILE="C:\Users\acollart\Desktop\DISSERTATION\AUCTION\MIXED\NLOGIT\RPM\nlogit.csv"$ 
NAMELIST; ALLX = ONE, HONEY, TUS, CANA, GAL, WAT, TCANTA, THONEY, TTUS, TCANA, 
TGAL, TWAT, INDUSTRY, GOVERN, DAGE2, DAGE3, DEDU2, DEDU3, HHSIZE, FEMALE, 
MARRIED, DINC2, DINC3, ASPENDFV, FVOH $ 
NAMELIST; RPX = ONE, HONEY, TUS, CANA, GAL, WAT, TCANTA, THONEY, TTUS, TCANA, 
TGAL, TWAT, INDUSTRY, GOVERN $ 
SETPANEL; Group = id ; Pds = groupti $ 
 
 
? Random Parameters Linear 
REGRESS; Lhs = wtp 
; Rhs = ALLX 
; RPM 
; Fcn = ONE(n), HONEY(n), TUS(n), CANA(n), GAL(n), WAT(n), TCANTA(n), THONEY(n), 
TTUS(n), TCANA(n), TGAL(n), TWAT(n), INDUSTRY(n), GOVERN(n) 
; Panel 
; Pts = 500 
; Halton  
; Covariance Matrix $  
 
MATRIX; b0 = b 
; v0 = varb $  
 
 
? Random Parameters Tobit 
TOBIT; Lhs = wtp 
; Rhs = ALLX 
; RPM 
; Fcn = ONE(n), HONEY(n), TUS(n), CANA(n), GAL(n), WAT(n), TCANTA(n), THONEY(n), 
TTUS(n), TCANA(n), TGAL(n), TWAT(n), INDUSTRY(n), GOVERN(n) 
; Panel 
; Pts = 500 
; Halton 
; Partial Effects  
; Covariance Matrix $  
 
MATRIX; b1 = b 
; v1 = varb $ 
 
 
?Hausman Test 
MATRIX; d=b1-b0 
; List 
; V = Nvsm(v1,-v0) 
; H = d'*V*d  
; c = Rank(V) $ 
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B.7 Stata Code 2
nd
 Essay  
 
*----------------------------------------------------------------------------  
*DO FILE TO ANALYZE EXPERIMENTAL AUCTION DATA 
*TOBIT, RANDOM EFFECTS TOBIT, RANDOM EFFECTS LINEAR, RANDOM PARAMETERS 
LINEAR 
*ALBA J. COLLART 
*----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
*START DO FILE 
log using output, text replace 
set more off, permanently 
clear 
 
cd "C:\Users\acollart\Desktop\DISSERTATION\AUCTION\MIXED\STATA\Reshape" 
 
 
*LEGEND 
* rp=round.product 
 
*round:  =1 tasting (between) 
*   =2 industry (within) 
*    =3 government (within) 
 
*product:  =1 cantaloupe 
*   =2 honeydew 
*   =3 tuscan 
*   =4 canary 
*   =5 galia 
*   =6 watermelon 
 
*** Import data  
insheet using Reshape.txt, clear 
 
reshape long wtp, i(id) j(rp) 
 
*----------------------------------- 
*Variable manipulation 
*----------------------------------- 
 
*Generate indicators for product varieties 
 
gen canta:1= rp==11|rp==21|rp==31 
gen honey:1= rp==12|rp==22|rp==32 
gen tus:1= rp==13|rp==23|rp==33 
gen cana:1= rp==14|rp==24|rp==34 
gen gal:1= rp==15|rp==25|rp==35 
gen wat:1= rp==16|rp==26|rp==36 
 
 
*Generate indicator for treatments, and interactions of tasting*product 
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gen tasting:1= (id<419) 
gen industry:1= (20<rp) & (rp<27) 
gen government:1= (30<rp) & (rp<37) 
 
gen tcanta:1= (tasting==1) & (rp==11) 
gen thoney:1= (tasting==1) & (rp==12) 
gen ttus:1 = (tasting==1) & (rp==13) 
gen tcana:1= (tasting==1) & (rp==14) 
gen tgal:1= (tasting==1) & (rp==15) 
gen twat:1 = (tasting==1) & (rp==16) 
 
 
*Generate age: AGE1 is 18-29, AGE2 is 30-49, AGE3 is 50 or over 
 
gen dage1=(age==1 | age==2) if!missing(age) 
gen dage2=(age==3|age==4) if!missing(age) 
gen dage3=(age==5|age==6|age==7) if!missing(age) 
 
 
*Generate edu: EDU1 is high school diploma or less, EDU2 is some college-bachelor's degree, EDU3 is 
some grad school or more 
 
gen dedu1=(edu==1 | edu==2) if!missing(edu) 
gen dedu2=(edu==3|edu==4|edu==5) if!missing(edu) 
gen dedu3=(edu==6|edu==7) if!missing(edu) 
 
 
*Generate income: INC1 is <50k, INC2 is 50K to <100K, INC3 is 100K or more 
 
gen dinc1=(income==1 | income==2|income==3) if!missing(income) 
gen dinc2=(income==4|income==5|income==6|income==7|income==8) if!missing(income) 
gen dinc3=(income==9|income==10) if!missing(income) 
 
 
*Generate average value of weekly expenditures on fruits and vegetables: ASPENDFV 
 
recode wfv (1=12) (2=37) (3=62) (4=87) (5=100), generate (aspendfv) 
 
 
*Generate average percentage of fresh fruit on hand: APFOH 
 
recode freshf (1=0) (2=12.5) (3=37) (4=62) (5=87.5), generate (apfoh)  
 
 
*Generate average percentage of fresh vegetables on hand: APVOH 
 
recode freshv (1=0) (2=12.5) (3=37) (4=62) (5=87.5), generate (apvoh)  
 
 
*Generate paired sum of pounds of fresh fruit and vegetables on hand: FVPOH 
 
gen fvoh=apfoh+apvoh 
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*----------------------------------- 
*SUMMARIZE 
*----------------------------------- 
sum hhsize aspendfv fvoh 
 
*----------------------------------- 
*DISTRIBUTION TESTS 
*----------------------------------- 
*Separate wtp by treatement rounds 
gen wtpb=wtp if (10<rp) & (rp<17) 
gen wtpbt=wtp if (10<rp) & (rp<17) & tasting==1 
gen wtpbnt=wtp if (10<rp) & (rp<17) & tasting==0 
gen wtpind=wtp if(20<rp) & (rp<27) 
gen wtpgvt=wtp if(30<rp) & (rp<37) 
 
*To graph CDFs 
*cumul wtpb, gen(Baseline) 
*cumul wtpind, gen(Ind) 
*cumul wtpgvt, gen(Gvt) 
*stack Baseline wtpb Ind wtpind Gvt wtpgvt, into(c wtp) wide clear 
*line Baseline Ind Gvt wtp, sort 
 
gen issuer:1= (industry==1) 
replace issuer=. if industry==0 & government==0 
 
gen indbas:1= (industry==1) 
replace indbas=. if rp>30 & rp<37 
 
gen gvtbas:1= (government==1) 
replace gvtbas=. if rp<20 & rp<27 
 
ksmirnov wtp, by(tasting) 
ksmirnov wtp, by(issuer) 
ksmirnov wtp, by(indbas) 
ksmirnov wtp, by(gvtbas) 
 
*tasting 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==11 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==11 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==12 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==12 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==13 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==13 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==14 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==14 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==15 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==15 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==16 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==16 & wtp==0 
 
*no tasting 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==11 
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sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==11 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==12 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==12 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==13 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==13 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==14 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==14 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==15 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==15 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==16 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==16 & wtp==0 
 
*industry 
sum wtp if rp==21 
sum wtp if rp==21 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if rp==22 
sum wtp if rp==22 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if rp==23 
sum wtp if rp==23 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if rp==24 
sum wtp if rp==24 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if rp==25 
sum wtp if rp==25 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if rp==26 
sum wtp if rp==26 & wtp==0 
 
*government 
sum wtp if rp==31 
sum wtp if rp==31 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if rp==32 
sum wtp if rp==32 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if rp==33 
sum wtp if rp==33 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if rp==34 
sum wtp if rp==34 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if rp==35 
sum wtp if rp==35 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if rp==36 
sum wtp if rp==36 & wtp==0 
 
*all 
sum wtp if canta==1 
sum wtp if canta==1 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if honey==1 
sum wtp if honey==1 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if tus==1 
sum wtp if tus==1 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if cana==1 
sum wtp if cana==1 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if gal==1 
sum wtp if gal==1 & wtp==0 
sum wtp if wat==1 
sum wtp if wat==1 & wtp==0 
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*AVERAGE BIDS EQUAL OR ABOVE LOCAL PRICES 
*tasting 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==11 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==11 & wtp>2.48 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==11 & wtp<2.48 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==12 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==12 & wtp>3.98 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==12 & wtp<3.98 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==13 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==13 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==13 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==14 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==14 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==14 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==15 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==15 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==15 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==16 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==16 & wtp>2.50 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==16 & wtp==2.50 
sum wtp if tasting==1 & rp==16 & wtp<2.50 
 
*no tasting 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==11 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==11 & wtp>2.48 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==11 & wtp<2.48 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==12 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==12 & wtp>3.98 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==12 & wtp<3.98 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==13 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==13 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==13 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==14 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==14 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==14 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==15 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==15 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==15 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==16 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==16 & wtp>2.50 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==16 & wtp==2.50 
sum wtp if tasting==0 & rp==16 & wtp<2.50 
 
*Industry 
sum wtp if rp==21 
sum wtp if rp==21 & wtp>2.48 
sum wtp if rp==21 & wtp<2.48 
sum wtp if rp==22 
sum wtp if rp==22 & wtp>3.98 
sum wtp if rp==22 & wtp<3.98 
sum wtp if rp==23  
sum wtp if rp==23 & wtp>2.99 
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sum wtp if rp==23 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if rp==24  
sum wtp if rp==24 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if rp==24 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if rp==25 
sum wtp if rp==25 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if rp==25 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if rp==26 
sum wtp if rp==26 & wtp>2.50 
sum wtp if rp==26 & wtp==2.50 
sum wtp if rp==26 & wtp<2.50 
 
*Government 
sum wtp if rp==31 
sum wtp if rp==31 & wtp>2.48 
sum wtp if rp==31 & wtp<2.48 
sum wtp if rp==32 
sum wtp if rp==32 & wtp>3.98 
sum wtp if rp==32 & wtp<3.98 
sum wtp if rp==33 
sum wtp if rp==33 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if rp==33 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if rp==34 
sum wtp if rp==34 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if rp==34 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if rp==35  
sum wtp if rp==35 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if rp==35 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if rp==36 
sum wtp if rp==36 & wtp>2.50 
sum wtp if rp==36 & wtp==2.50 
sum wtp if rp==36 & wtp<2.50 
 
*all 
sum wtp if canta==1 & wtp>2.48 
sum wtp if canta==1 & wtp<2.48 
sum wtp if honey==1 & wtp>3.98 
sum wtp if honey==1 & wtp<3.98 
sum wtp if tus==1 & wtp>3.99 
sum wtp if tus==1 & wtp<3.99 
sum wtp if cana==1 & wtp>3.99 
sum wtp if cana==1 & wtp<3.99 
sum wtp if gal==1 & wtp>3.99 
sum wtp if gal==1 & wtp<3.99 
sum wtp if wat==1 & wtp>3.99 
sum wtp if wat==1 & wtp==3.99 
sum wtp if wat==1 & wtp<3.99 
 
*----------------------------------- 
*FULL BIDS 
*----------------------------------- 
 
 *----------------------------------- 
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 *Constant Parameters Tobit Model 
 *----------------------------------- 
 
 tobit wtp honey tus cana gal wat tcanta thoney ttus tcana tgal twat industry government dage2 
dage3 dedu2 dedu3 hhsize female married dinc2 dinc3 aspendfv fvoh, ll(0) 
 estimates store ctobit 
 
 *----------------------------------- 
 *Random Effects Tobit 
 *----------------------------------- 
 
 xtset id 
 xttobit wtp honey tus cana gal wat tcanta thoney ttus tcana tgal twat industry government dage2 
dage3 dedu2 dedu3 hhsize female married dinc2 dinc3 aspendfv fvoh, ll(0) tobit 
 estimates store retobit  
 xtset, clear 
   
 *----------------------------------- 
 *Random Effects Linear 
 *----------------------------------- 
 
 xtset id 
 xtreg wtp honey tus cana gal wat tcanta thoney ttus tcana tgal twat industry government dage2 
dage3 dedu2 dedu3 hhsize female married dinc2 dinc3 aspendfv fvoh, mle 
 estimates store relinear 
 xtset, clear 
  
 *or 
 
 *xtmixed wtp honey tus cana gal wat tcanta thoney ttus tcana tgal twat industry government 
dage2 dage3 dedu2 dedu3 hhsize female married dinc2 dinc3 aspendfv fvoh || id:  
 *estimates store relinear 
  
 *----------------------------------- 
 *Random Parameters Linear/Mixed Linear   
 *----------------------------------- 
        
 xtmixed wtp honey tus cana gal wat tcanta thoney ttus tcana tgal twat industry government dage2 
dage3 dedu2 dedu3 hhsize female married dinc2 dinc3 aspendfv fvoh || id: honey tus cana gal wat tcanta 
thoney ttus tcana tgal twat industry government, mle covariance(independent) 
 estimates store lmixed 
  
   
 *Note: An independent covariance structure allows for a distinct variance for each random effect 
within a random-effects equation, and assumes that all covariances are zero (and thus correlations=0)
   
  
 *Calculate correlation matrix to see whether random effects are actually correlated  
 estat vce, correlation 
  
 *This matrix displays the coefficient estimates and the naturallog(standard deviations) of the 
random effects, where s1_1_1 is Honey. 
 matrix list e(b) 
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 *Test the standard deviations (i.e. random effects) for significance 
 test  _b[/lns1_1_1]=0 
 test  _b[/lns1_1_2]=0 
 test  _b[/lns1_1_3]=0 
 test  _b[/lns1_1_4]=0 
 test  _b[/lns1_1_5]=0 
 test  _b[/lns1_1_6]=0 
 test  _b[/lns1_1_7]=0 
 test  _b[/lns1_1_8]=0 
 test  _b[/lns1_1_9]=0 
 test  _b[/lns1_1_10]=0 
 test  _b[/lns1_1_11]=0 
 test  _b[/lns1_1_12]=0 
 test  _b[/lns1_1_13]=0 
 test  _b[/lns1_1_14]=0 
 test  _b[/lnsig_e]=0 
  
 *Calculate 95% intervals for the random parameters using the estimated standard deviations 
 *HONEY 
 gen ihoneyu=_b[honey]+1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_1]))) 
 gen ihoneyl=_b[honey]-1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_1]))) 
  
 *TUSCAN 
 gen itusu=_b[tus]+1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_2]))) 
 gen itusl=_b[tus]-1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_2]))) 
  
 *CANARY 
 gen icanau=_b[cana]+1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_3]))) 
 gen icanal=_b[cana]-1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_3]))) 
  
 *GALIA 
 gen igalu=_b[gal]+1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_4]))) 
 gen igall=_b[gal]-1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_4]))) 
  
 *WATERMELON 
 gen iwatu=_b[wat]+1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_5]))) 
 gen iwatl=_b[wat]-1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_5]))) 
  
 *TASTINGxCANTALOUPE 
 gen itcantau=_b[tcanta]+1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_6]))) 
 gen itcantal=_b[tcanta]-1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_6]))) 
  
 *TASTINGxHONEY 
 gen ithoneyu=_b[thoney]+1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_7]))) 
 gen ithoneyl=_b[thoney]-1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_7]))) 
  
 *TASTINGxTUSCAN 
 gen ittusu=_b[ttus]+1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_8]))) 
 gen ittusl=_b[ttus]-1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_8]))) 
   
 *TASTINGxCANARY 
 gen itcanau=_b[tcana]+1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_9]))) 
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 gen itcanal=_b[tcana]-1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_9]))) 
  
 *TASTINGxGALIA 
 gen itgalu=_b[tgal]+1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_10]))) 
 gen itgall=_b[tgal]-1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_10]))) 
  
 *TASTINGxWATERMELON 
 gen itwatu=_b[twat]+1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_11]))) 
 gen itwatl=_b[twat]-1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_11]))) 
  
 *INDUSTRY  
 gen iindustryu=_b[industry]+1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_12]))) 
 gen iindustryl=_b[industry]-1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_12]))) 
  
 *GOVERNMENT 
 gen igovernmentu=_b[government]+1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_13]))) 
 gen igovernmentl=_b[government]-1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_13]))) 
  
 *INTERCEPT 
 gen iinteru=_b[_cons]+1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_14]))) 
 gen iinterl=_b[_cons]-1.96*(exp((_b[/lns1_1_14]))) 
  
 *That is, 95% of the individual's random parameters are expected to lie in these intervals 
 sum ihoneyu ihoneyl itusu itusl icanau icanal igalu igall iwatu iwatl itcantau itcantal ithoneyu 
ithoneyl ittusu ittusl itcanau itcanal itgalu itgall itwatu itwatl iindustryu iindustryl igovernmentu 
igovernmentl iinteru iinterl 
  
 
 
*END DO FILE 
log close 
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APPENDIX C 
  
C.1 Estimated Parameters for the Two-class Model 
 
Table C-1. Latent Class Parameter Estimates for Two-Class Model 
    Class 1 Class 2 
  
Fee Chasers Good Folks 
  
Latent class membership 
probabilities (π) 
    6.19% 93.81% 
Variable Definition Indicator-Response Probabilities (θ) 
FIRST 
Participating for the first time in an 
experimental auction 0.98 0.69 
RELATIVES Relatives work at the university 0.29 0.27 
HELPU Signed up to support the educational institution 0.14 0.88 
PAYMENT Would have participated even without payment 0.22 0.58 
FRUITS 
Signed up because of interest in the auctioned 
products 0.23 0.54 
RESIDENT Permanent resident in the area 0.40 0.70 
HELPRES Signed up to help advance research efforts 0.09 1.00 
FEE 
Considers that all studies must include a 
participation fee 0.87 0.36 
FULLTIME Employed full time 0.11 0.29 
POSTPONED 
Postponed other activities to be able to 
participate 0.42 0.53 
DEGREE Earned a degree at the educational institution 0.20 0.29 
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C.2 Stata Code 3
rd
 Essay 
 
 
*-------------------------------------------- 
*DO FILE ANALYZE EXPERIMENTAL AUCTION DATA 
*LCA / RANDOM EFFECTS TOBIT PER LATENT CLASS 
*ALBA J. COLLART 
*-------------------------------------------- 
 
*START DO FILE 
log using output, text replace 
set more off, permanently 
clear 
 
discard 
//set trace on 
drop _all 
 
cd "C:\Users\acollart\Desktop\DISSERTATION\AUCTION\LCA\STATA\Results" /*CHANGE THIS 
PATH TO MATCH THE FILE LOCATION ON YOUR MACHINE*/ 
 
use "C:\Users\acollart\Desktop\DISSERTATION\AUCTION\LCA\STATA\Results\LCA.dta"  
/*CHANGE THIS PATH TO MATCH THE FILE LOCATION ON YOUR MACHINE*/ 
 
*------------------------ 
* Latent Class Analyses 
*------------------------ 
*2 Classes 
doLCA first relatives helpam payment fruits resident helpresearch fee fulltime postponed degree, /// 
      nclass(2) /// 
   seed(861551) /// 
   categories(2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2)  /// 
   criterion(0.000001)  /// 
   rhoprior(1.0) 
 
   return list 
* Class membership probabilities 
matrix list r(gamma) 
matrix list r(gammaSTD) 
* Item-response probabilities 
matrix list r(rho) 
matrix list r(rhoSTD) 
* Posterior probabilities 
*matrix list r(post_prob)  
    
*3 Classes 
doLCA first relatives helpam payment fruits resident helpresearch fee fulltime postponed degree, /// 
      nclass(3) /// 
   seed(861551) /// 
   categories(2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2)  /// 
   criterion(0.000001)  /// 
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   rhoprior(1.0) 
      
return list 
* Class membership probabilities 
matrix list r(gamma) 
matrix list r(gammaSTD) 
* Item-response probabilities 
matrix list r(rho) 
matrix list r(rhoSTD) 
* Posterior probabilities 
*matrix list r(post_prob)  
 
 
*4 Classes 
*doLCA experience relatives helpam payment fruits resident helpresearch fee fulltime postponed degree, 
/// 
      *nclass(4) /// 
   *seed(861551) /// 
   *categories(2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2)  /// 
   *criterion(0.000001)  /// 
   *rhoprior(1.0) 
      
 
*5 Classes 
*doLCA experience relatives helpam payment fruits resident helpresearch fee fulltime postponed degree, 
/// 
      *nclass(5) /// 
   *seed(861551) /// 
   *categories(2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2)  /// 
   *criterion(0.000001)  /// 
   *rhoprior(1.0) 
      
 
*6 Classes 
*doLCA experience relatives helpam payment fruits resident helpresearch fee fulltime postponed degree, 
/// 
      *nclass(6) /// 
   *seed(861551) /// 
   *categories(2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2)  /// 
   *criterion(0.000001)  /// 
   *rhoprior(1.0) 
      
 
*7 Classes 
*doLCA experience relatives helpam payment fruits resident helpresearch fee fulltime postponed degree, 
/// 
      *nclass(7) /// 
   *seed(861551) /// 
   *categories(2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2)  /// 
   *criterion(0.000001)  /// 
   *rhoprior(1.0) 
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*8 Classes 
*doLCA experience relatives helpam payment fruits resident helpresearch fee fulltime postponed degree, 
/// 
      *nclass(8) /// 
   *seed(861551) /// 
   *categories(2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2)  /// 
   *criterion(0.000001)  /// 
   *rhoprior(1.0) 
      
 
*9 Classes 
*doLCA experience relatives helpam payment fruits resident helpresearch fee fulltime postponed degree, 
/// 
      *nclass(9) /// 
   *seed(861551) /// 
   *categories(2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2)  /// 
   *criterion(0.000001)  /// 
   *rhoprior(1.0)    
 
*Note: The posterior probabilities has been already pasted in the LCA.dta file. 
*For the ecmtr models Class 1 in LCA results is Class 3 in the regressions. Class 2 is Class 1 and Class 3 
is Class 2.  
*----------------- 
*Econometric models 
*----------------- 
 
*LEGEND 
* rp=round.product 
 
*round:  =1 tasting (between) 
*   =2 industry (within) 
*    =3 government (within) 
 
*product:  =1 cantaloupe 
*   =2 honeydew 
*   =3 tuscan 
*   =4 canary 
*   =5 galia 
*   =6 watermelon 
 
reshape long wtp, i(id) j(rp) 
 
*----------------------------------- 
*Variables manipulation 
*----------------------------------- 
 
*Generate indicators for product varieties 
 
gen canta:1= rp==11|rp==21|rp==31 
gen honey:1= rp==12|rp==22|rp==32 
gen tus:1= rp==13|rp==23|rp==33 
gen cana:1= rp==14|rp==24|rp==34 
gen gal:1= rp==15|rp==25|rp==35 
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gen wat:1= rp==16|rp==26|rp==36 
 
*Generate indicator for treatments, and interactions of tasting*product 
 
gen tasting:1= (id<419) 
gen industry:1= (20<rp) & (rp<27) 
gen government:1= (30<rp) & (rp<37) 
 
gen tcanta:1= (tasting==1) & (rp==11) 
gen thoney:1= (tasting==1) & (rp==12) 
gen ttus:1 = (tasting==1) & (rp==13) 
gen tcana:1= (tasting==1) & (rp==14) 
gen tgal:1= (tasting==1) & (rp==15) 
gen twat:1 = (tasting==1) & (rp==16) 
 
 
*Generate age: AGE1 is 18-29, AGE2 is 30-49, AGE3 is 50 or over 
 
gen dage1=(age==1 | age==2) if!missing(age) 
gen dage2=(age==3|age==4) if!missing(age) 
gen dage3=(age==5|age==6|age==7) if!missing(age) 
 
 
*Generate edu: EDU1 is high school diploma or less, EDU2 is some college-bachelor's degree, EDU3 is 
some grad school or more 
 
gen dedu1=(edu==1 | edu==2) if!missing(edu) 
gen dedu2=(edu==3|edu==4|edu==5) if!missing(edu) 
gen dedu3=(edu==6|edu==7) if!missing(edu) 
 
 
*Generate income: INC0 is <30k, INC1 is 30K to <50k, INC2 is 50K to <100K, INC3 is 100K or more 
gen dincd0=(income==1) if!missing(income) 
gen dincd1=(income==2|income==3) if!missing(income) 
gen dincd2=(income==4|income==5|income==6|income==7|income==8) if!missing(income) 
gen dincd3=(income==9|income==10) if!missing(income) 
 
**Generate income: INC1 is <30k, INC2 is 30K or more 
gen dinc1=(income==1) if!missing(income) 
gen 
dinc2=(income==2|income==3|income==4|income==5|income==6|income==7|income==8|income==9|inc
ome==10) if!missing(income) 
 
*Generate average income 
gen avincome=0 
replace avincome=14999.5 if income==1 
replace avincome=34999.5 if income==2 
replace avincome=44999.5 if income==3 
replace avincome=54999.5 if income==4 
replace avincome=64999.5 if income==5 
replace avincome=74999.5 if income==6 
replace avincome=84999.5 if income==7 
replace avincome=94999.5 if income==8 
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replace avincome=124999.5 if income==9 
replace avincome=150000 if income==10 
 
gen navincome=avincome/1000 
 
*Generate average value of weekly expenditures on fruits and vegetables: ASPENDFV 
 
recode wfv (1=12) (2=37) (3=62) (4=87) (5=100), generate (aspendfv) 
 
 
*Generate average percentage of fresh fruit on hand: APFOH 
 
recode freshf (1=0) (2=12.5) (3=37) (4=62) (5=87.5), generate (apfoh)  
 
 
*Generate average percentage of fresh vegetables on hand: APVOH 
 
recode freshv (1=0) (2=12.5) (3=37) (4=62) (5=87.5), generate (apvoh)  
 
 
*Generate paired sum of pounds of fresh fruit and vegetables on hand: FVPOH 
 
gen fvoh=apfoh+apvoh 
 
*----------------------------------- 
*Summary statistics 
*----------------------------------- 
*Indicators, 1=yes 2=no 
preserve 
 
replace first=0 if first==2 
replace relatives=0 if relatives==2 
replace helpam=0 if helpam==2 
replace payment=0 if payment==2 
replace fruits=0 if fruits==2 
replace resident=0 if resident==2 
replace helpresearch=0 if helpresearch==2 
replace fee=0 if fee==2 
replace fulltime=0 if fulltime==2 
replace curious=0 if curious==2 
replace postponed=0 if postponed==2 
replace degree=0 if degree==2 
 
sum first relatives helpam payment fruits resident helpresearch fee fulltime 
sum curious postponed degree 
 
restore 
 
*All Participants 
sum wtp dage1 dage2 dage3 dedu1 dedu2 dedu3 hhsize female married avincome dincd0 dincd1 dincd2 
dincd3 highlast aspendfv fvoh primary 
 
*For 2 classes 
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preserve 
keep if c2s1==1 
sum wtp dage1 dage2 dage3 dedu1 dedu2 dedu3 hhsize female married avincome dincd0 dincd1 dincd2 
dincd3 highlast aspendfv fvoh primary 
restore 
 
preserve 
keep if c2s2==1 
sum wtp dage1 dage2 dage3 dedu1 dedu2 dedu3 hhsize female married avincome dincd0 dincd1 dincd2 
dincd3 highlast aspendfv fvoh primary 
restore 
 
 
*For 3 classes 
preserve 
keep if c3s1==1 
sum wtp dage1 dage2 dage3 dedu1 dedu2 dedu3 hhsize female married avincome dincd0 dincd1 dincd2 
dincd3 highlast aspendfv fvoh primary 
restore 
 
preserve 
keep if c3s2==1 
sum wtp dage1 dage2 dage3 dedu1 dedu2 dedu3 hhsize female married avincome dincd0 dincd1 dincd2 
dincd3 highlast aspendfv fvoh primary 
restore 
 
preserve 
keep if c3s3==1 
sum wtp dage1 dage2 dage3 dedu1 dedu2 dedu3 hhsize female married avincome dincd0 dincd1 dincd2 
dincd3 highlast aspendfv fvoh primary 
restore 
 
*For highlast sessions 
sum wtp if id<125 | 300<id & id<324 | 500<id & id<521 | 700<id & id<726   
*For lowlast sessions 
sum wtp if 200<id & id<219 | 400<id & id<419 | 600<id & id<619 | 800<id & id<827   
 
*----------------------------------- 
*Random Effects Tobit for All 
*----------------------------------- 
*Educational level removed in all models with demographics because of perfect collinearity with age in 
class 3 
 
*Demographics 
xtset id 
xttobit wtp honey tus cana gal wat tcanta thoney ttus tcana tgal twat industry government dage2 dage3 
hhsize female married navincome aspendfv fvoh, ll(0) tobit 
estimates store retobitdemo 
 
*Marginal effects  
*For the latent dependent variable  
*mfx compute 
*For the probability of being uncensored 
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*mfx compute, predict (p(0,.)) 
*For the expected value of y conditional on being uncensored 
*mfx compute, predict (e(0,.)) 
*For the unconditional expected value of y 
mfx compute, predict (ys(0,.)) 
 
*No Demographics 
xttobit wtp honey tus cana gal wat tcanta thoney ttus tcana tgal twat industry government aspendfv fvoh, 
ll(0) tobit 
estimates store retobit 
 
lrtest retobit retobitdemo, force stats 
xtset, clear 
 
*Mkt Penetration (on sale prices) 
sum wtp if wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if wtp==2.99 
sum wtp if wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if canta==1 & wtp>2.48 
sum wtp if canta==1 & wtp==2.48 
sum wtp if canta==1 & wtp<2.48 
sum wtp if honey==1 & wtp>3.98 
sum wtp if honey==1 & wtp==3.98 
sum wtp if honey==1 & wtp<3.98 
sum wtp if tus==1 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if tus==1 & wtp==2.99 
sum wtp if tus==1 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if cana==1 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if cana==1 & wtp==2.99 
sum wtp if cana==1 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if gal==1 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if gal==1 & wtp==2.99 
sum wtp if gal==1 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if wat==1 & wtp>2.50 
sum wtp if wat==1 & wtp==2.50 
sum wtp if wat==1 & wtp<2.50 
 
*----------------------------------- 
*Random Effects Tobit for 2 classes 
*----------------------------------- 
*Class 1 
preserve 
keep if c2s1==1 
 
*Demographics 
xtset id 
xttobit wtp honey tus cana gal wat tcanta thoney ttus tcana tgal twat industry government dage2 dage3 
hhsize female married navincome aspendfv fvoh, ll(0) tobit 
estimates store retobitc2s1demo 
 
*Marginal effects  
*For the latent dependent variable  
*mfx compute 
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*For the probability of being uncensored 
*mfx compute, predict (p(0,.)) 
*For the expected value of y conditional on being uncensored 
*mfx compute, predict (e(0,.)) 
*For the unconditional expected value of y 
*mfx compute, predict (ys(0,.)) 
 
*No Demographics 
xttobit wtp honey tus cana gal wat tcanta thoney ttus tcana tgal twat industry government aspendfv fvoh, 
ll(0) tobit 
estimates store retobitc2s1 
 
lrtest retobitc2s1 retobitc2s1demo, force stats 
xtset, clear 
 
restore 
 
*Class 2 
preserve 
keep if c2s2==1 
 
*Demographics 
xtset id 
xttobit wtp honey tus cana gal wat tcanta thoney ttus tcana tgal twat industry government dage2 dage3 
hhsize female married navincome aspendfv fvoh, ll(0) tobit 
estimates store retobitc2s2demo 
 
*Marginal effects  
*For the latent dependent variable  
*mfx compute 
*For the probability of being uncensored 
*mfx compute, predict (p(0,.)) 
*For the expected value of y conditional on being uncensored 
*mfx compute, predict (e(0,.)) 
*For the unconditional expected value of y 
*mfx compute, predict (ys(0,.)) 
 
*No Demographics 
xttobit wtp honey tus cana gal wat tcanta thoney ttus tcana tgal twat industry government aspendfv fvoh, 
ll(0) tobit 
estimates store retobitc2s2 
 
lrtest retobitc2s2 retobitc2s2demo, force stats 
xtset, clear 
 
restore 
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*----------------------------------- 
*Random Effects Tobit for 3 classes 
*----------------------------------- 
*Educational level removed in all models with demographics because of perfect collinearity with age in 
class 3 
 
*Class 1 
preserve 
keep if c3s1==1 
 
*Demographics 
xtset id 
xttobit wtp honey tus cana gal wat tcanta thoney ttus tcana tgal twat industry government dage2 dage3 
hhsize female married navincome aspendfv fvoh, ll(0) tobit 
estimates store retobitc3s1demo 
 
*Marginal effects  
*For the latent dependent variable  
*mfx compute 
*For the probability of being uncensored 
*mfx compute, predict (p(0,.)) 
*For the expected value of y conditional on being uncensored 
*mfx compute, predict (e(0,.)) 
*For the unconditional expected value of y 
mfx compute, predict (ys(0,.)) 
 
*No Demographics 
xttobit wtp honey tus cana gal wat tcanta thoney ttus tcana tgal twat industry government aspendfv fvoh, 
ll(0) tobit 
estimates store retobitc3s1 
 
lrtest retobitc3s1 retobitc3s1demo, force stats 
xtset, clear 
 
*Mkt Penetration (on sale prices) 
sum wtp if wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if wtp==2.99 
sum wtp if wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if canta==1 & wtp>2.48 
sum wtp if canta==1 & wtp==2.48 
sum wtp if canta==1 & wtp<2.48 
sum wtp if honey==1 & wtp>3.98 
sum wtp if honey==1 & wtp==3.98 
sum wtp if honey==1 & wtp<3.98 
sum wtp if tus==1 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if tus==1 & wtp==2.99 
sum wtp if tus==1 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if cana==1 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if cana==1 & wtp==2.99 
sum wtp if cana==1 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if gal==1 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if gal==1 & wtp==2.99 
sum wtp if gal==1 & wtp<2.99 
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sum wtp if wat==1 & wtp>2.50 
sum wtp if wat==1 & wtp==2.50 
sum wtp if wat==1 & wtp<2.50 
 
restore 
 
*Class 2 
preserve 
keep if c3s2==1 
 
*Demographics 
xtset id 
xttobit wtp honey tus cana gal wat tcanta thoney ttus tcana tgal twat industry government dage2 dage3 
hhsize female married navincome aspendfv fvoh, ll(0) tobit 
estimates store retobitc3s2demo 
 
*Marginal effects  
*For the latent dependent variable  
*mfx compute 
*For the probability of being uncensored 
*mfx compute, predict (p(0,.)) 
*For the expected value of y conditional on being uncensored 
*mfx compute, predict (e(0,.)) 
*For the unconditional expected value of y 
mfx compute, predict (ys(0,.)) 
 
*No Demographics 
xttobit wtp honey tus cana gal wat tcanta thoney ttus tcana tgal twat industry government aspendfv fvoh, 
ll(0) tobit 
estimates store retobitc3s2 
 
lrtest retobitc3s2 retobitc3s2demo, force stats 
xtset, clear 
 
*Mkt Penetration (on sale prices) 
sum wtp if wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if wtp==2.99 
sum wtp if wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if canta==1 & wtp>2.48 
sum wtp if canta==1 & wtp==2.48 
sum wtp if canta==1 & wtp<2.48 
sum wtp if honey==1 & wtp>3.98 
sum wtp if honey==1 & wtp==3.98 
sum wtp if honey==1 & wtp<3.98 
sum wtp if tus==1 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if tus==1 & wtp==2.99 
sum wtp if tus==1 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if cana==1 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if cana==1 & wtp==2.99 
sum wtp if cana==1 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if gal==1 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if gal==1 & wtp==2.99 
sum wtp if gal==1 & wtp<2.99 
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sum wtp if wat==1 & wtp>2.50 
sum wtp if wat==1 & wtp==2.50 
sum wtp if wat==1 & wtp<2.50 
 
restore 
 
*Class 3 
preserve 
keep if c3s3==1 
 
*Demographics  
xtset id 
xttobit wtp honey tus cana gal wat tcanta thoney ttus tcana tgal twat industry government dage2 dage3 
hhsize female married navincome aspendfv fvoh, ll(0) tobit 
estimates store retobitc3s3demo 
 
*Marginal effects  
*For the latent dependent variable  
*mfx compute 
*For the probability of being uncensored 
*mfx compute, predict (p(0,.)) 
*For the expected value of y conditional on being uncensored 
*mfx compute, predict (e(0,.)) 
*For the unconditional expected value of y 
mfx compute, predict (ys(0,.)) 
 
*No Demographics 
xttobit wtp honey tus cana gal wat tcanta thoney ttus tcana tgal twat industry government aspendfv fvoh, 
ll(0) tobit 
estimates store retobitc3s3 
 
lrtest retobitc3s3 retobitc3s3demo, force stats 
xtset, clear 
 
*Mkt Penetration (on sale prices) 
sum wtp if wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if wtp==2.99 
sum wtp if wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if canta==1 & wtp>2.48 
sum wtp if canta==1 & wtp==2.48 
sum wtp if canta==1 & wtp<2.48 
sum wtp if honey==1 & wtp>3.98 
sum wtp if honey==1 & wtp==3.98 
sum wtp if honey==1 & wtp<3.98 
sum wtp if tus==1 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if tus==1 & wtp==2.99 
sum wtp if tus==1 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if cana==1 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if cana==1 & wtp==2.99 
sum wtp if cana==1 & wtp<2.99 
sum wtp if gal==1 & wtp>2.99 
sum wtp if gal==1 & wtp==2.99 
sum wtp if gal==1 & wtp<2.99 
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sum wtp if wat==1 & wtp>2.50 
sum wtp if wat==1 & wtp==2.50 
sum wtp if wat==1 & wtp<2.50 
 
restore 
 
log close 
 
 
